


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OLD HOUSE OF LORDS.

FOREIGN SECRETARIES
OF
THE XIX. CENTURY TO 1834.

BY
PERCY M. THORNTON.

VOL. I.

SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:
W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13 WATERLOO PLACE,
PALL MALL. S.W.

1881.

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THESE PAGES
ARE
DEDICATED TO
H. M. HYNDMAN,

IN CONFIDENT BELIEF THAT WHEN HIS TALENTS ARE ENGAGED
IN THE
SERVICE OF HIS COUNTRY
HE WILL NEVER FORGET THOSE HISTORICAL MEMORIES
OF WHICH HE IS PROUD
AND WITH WHICH HE IS CONVERSANT.

INTRODUCTION.

THE careers of our prominent public men must ever possess interest for Englishmen. The adoption or abandonment of a line of policy depends so entirely on the direction of individual minds, that in estimating the value of any given measure, the character and capacity of the statesman must be considered in connection with the political condition of his times. An attempt has been here made to combine short biographical notices of the Foreign Secretaries of the nineteenth century to 1834, with allusions to the salient subjects which engaged their attention.

Without any desire to write a history of England during those exciting times, the writer nevertheless hopes to send his reader for further instruction to the pages of the painstaking authors to whom he is mostly indebted for the completion of his task.

Lord Liverpool left on record his opinion that the office of Foreign Secretary of State will always give the person who holds it a degree of consequence in Parliament and the country which, perhaps, belongs to no other department, whilst neither the increase of population nor the extended franchise has robbed the position of its prestige, even if under certain circumstances the pre-eminence claimed for it be disputed.

It has been said by a well-known modern writer that it is open to every man to live in the past. Professor Stubbs then spoke of a period which, with all its interest, could not directly have influenced our own position in the world. But there is a past equally open to the inquirer, without an adequate acquaintance with which it is scarcely possible to live intelligently in the present. The moral and material positions of the various classes in England are so universally fixed by the peculiarity of conditions under which the nineteenth century was ushered in, that the historical outline should be known universally throughout the kingdom. For instance, it is desirable that every individual should learn the real cause of that great war, the financial result of which still hangs like a millstone around our necks, because if mere expediency, and not dire necessity, prompted

our rulers to deliberately hamper future generations, then, indeed, are they deserving of the reprobation which all honest men will desire to bestow. That the light of truth must lead to a contrary conclusion, the writer's careful research has convinced him. But the question should, nevertheless, receive the close attention of all intelligent people. It is in the belief that such a knowledge may be best forwarded by giving prominence to the personal services of our statesmen, that has led the author to contribute the subjoined historical portraits.

Much well-worn ground has of necessity been traversed in the accomplishment of this design. If, however, sufficient interest is awakened to induce a further research into the pleasant groves of literary information, this book will have not been written in vain.

This work has not, moreover, been attempted without the possession of leisure and opportunity to consult available histories and biographies, together with other authorities acknowledged in the margin.

In several cases it has been found impossible to avoid sacrificing chronological order to biographical completeness, and more than once, for a similar

reason, the sketch of an individual's career has transgressed the limits originally traced.

It is, indeed, a subject the very fringe of which it is but possible to touch in a volume of moderate dimensions, and nothing more has been attempted here.

The writer has received the greatest kindness from Lord Harrowby, The Hon. and Rev. A. Phipps, Lord Grey, Lord Bathurst, Mr. A. K. Stewart, of Ards, and others, who have rendered his task the smoother.

The advantage of an exceptional acquaintance with the *Bexley Papers* has also been of inestimable value, and thanks are thereby due both to Mr. John Thornton and to Mr. Thompson, the courteous and kind custodian of the Manuscript Department in the British Museum.

The more recent memoirs have purposely been compiled in a less detailed form, as trenching on the politics of our own times, which lie entirely out of the sphere of the author's immediate object.

Domestic events, although generally avoided, have secured attention when culminating in any great point of national interest, such as Catholic Emancipation, Abolition of the Slave Trade, Reform, and Abolition of the Corn Laws. Without passing

mention of these events no biography can be complete, provided the individual whose career we are narrating lived and moved in those stirring times.

The ten years during which Lord Castlereagh was at the Foreign Office contain events of such magnitude, that it has been found necessary to divide that period into three separate chapters.

Grateful thanks are, moreover, due to Colonel G. B. Malleson, C.S.I., for his estimate of Lord Wellesley's career in India, which, appended to the short sketch of that nobleman's Foreign Secretaranship, will be read with general interest.

It would also be ungracious were the author not to acknowledge himself indebted for the ready and ungrudging assistance rendered by the reading-room attendants at the British Museum, who, when applied to, spared neither time nor trouble to provide books, no matter how minute the reference required, or laborious the task of discovering the actual source of such information.

It is thus open to any poor scholar of respectability to have access to a library which has no superior for purposes of practical information, and to pursue his studies under the pleasant conditions of quiet comfort and kindly sympathy.

The writer has in these volumes alike endeavoured to avoid the obvious objections to contemporary history—pointed out by Lord Macaulay—and has striven to steer clear of present controversy.

He appeals, therefore, confidently for support to that vast majority of his countrymen who, whatever may be their political opinions, think first of the welfare, and then take delight in the achievements of their country.

Battersea Rise, Clapham Common,

February 1881.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

I TAKE an opportunity, while issuing a second and amended edition of these volumes, to thank my critics for hints as to form and construction, such as, if allowed to remain unremedied, must have to a great extent destroyed the value of any biographical work even though it were still available for reference.

I am the more indebted to such criticism, inasmuch as the favourable verdict pronounced by those whose good opinion is of value, has led me to accede to my Publishers' request, and to resolve on carrying my scheme down to the settlement of the Greek Frontier Question in 1881.

In so doing I shall continue carefully to avoid all personal allusions, wherever they cannot conscientiously be inoffensive, but shall deal with matters of public policy in accordance with strict fact.

This undertaking has been entered on after considerable hesitation, as being contrary to the original scheme, which, as was set forth in an introduction to these present volumes, desired to avoid the difficulties connected with comment on contemporary events.

But the considerable circulation attained by Mr. Justin M'Carthy's last volume of his *History of our own Times*, containing, as it does, comments and conclusions on the Foreign Policy of Lord Beaconsfield's Government, to the soundness of which many thinking and reading men demur, has of itself created a necessity which the forthcoming volumes will endeavour to satisfy by criticism devoid of passing passion or prejudice. True it is, that following on other volumes, famed alike for the eloquence and accuracy displayed in their pages, Mr. M'Carthy's last published book enjoyed a popularity entirely independent of the matter therein contained.

But the effect on the public mind of both England and America (where the *History of our own Times* has been specially in vogue) was none the less powerful. Moreover, more than one revelation has been since made, elucidating matters of State policy which now are simple and clear, but which, owing to necessary Ministerial reticence, were previously hidden in impenetrable mist and uncertainty.

Mr. M'Carthy's best energies were doubtless given to elucidating the truth concerning a party struggle, during which he himself was no lukewarm supporter of the popular side, but it is impossible to accept without comment such wholesale historic condemnation of a deliberate policy prompted by a great statesman, who acted with the best available information before him, and was supported by colleagues of eminence and experience.

Some of my critics seem to have judged these two volumes as if they pretended to recite a history of England during the present century, a task which it is now scarcely possible to accomplish, inasmuch as the most important sources of information yet untouched are not likely to be finally made public until most of us now living have passed away. It is, moreover, a fact that the secret records connected with the great struggles of 1793, 1802, and 1803–1815, have been jealously guarded, and will not be available during the present century. When I entered upon this task I therefore resolved (after duly appraising the merits of the individuals whose careers I had undertaken to write), not to enter into any violent condemnation of actions, the complete motives prompting which might be hidden. Careful study, assisted by the aid of private documents, without which much that I have written would have been mere journalistic work, has convinced me of the

general falseness of the harsh judgment hastily passed on many of our ministers. I am certain that no man can attain the highest positions in this State without such sterling qualities of intellect and character as must excite the admiration of an impartial biographer.

Whilst admitting Mr. Courtney's criticism in the *Academy* to be temperate and, from his point of view, justifiable, I claim to have shown, through the medium of Lord Bexley's correspondence, that peace was so sorely needed by England that the compromise of Vienna in 1814–15 can scarcely be finally condemned in history, even if the durability of the peace then secured did not speak volumes in its favour. Moreover, the soundness of my conclusions has been fully borne out by the lately published correspondence of Talleyrand with Louis XVIII.

I am likewise unable to hold myself responsible for the shortcomings (as seen by the critic of the *Globe* newspaper) in the first Lord Dudley's most famous speech, when, speaking in 1825 as Mr. J. W. Ward, he was said by the *Annual Register* to have both instructed and delighted the House of Commons. It would almost seem if, in the hurry of the moment, the *Globe* writer may have hastily confused quoted matter with that of the author.

More than one writer, when alluding to the views

set forth in these pages, has expressed an opinion that tradition in Foreign Affairs lies buried in the vault at Hughenden. So, at least, somewhat regretfully, says the *Saturday Reviewer*, when in his criticism of this book he expresses fear lest the position gained for England by the Settlement of 1815, and exemplified by the European belief in British strength and influence, has been sacrificed to more popular theories and ideas.

The writer cannot, however, bring himself to share such fears, believing, as he does, that the lesson of each great career has not been lost on a thoughtful and patriotic nation.

The estimate of Lord Aberdeen's character, arrived at after a careful study of all available matter, has been so fully borne out by the lately published second volume of the *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, and likewise by private information placed at the author's disposal, that it is open to hope and believe that an equally just estimate of his public conduct will ere long likewise prevail.

When the *Saturday Reviewer*, in passing judgment on these pages, gives his opinion to the effect that *no single statesman* was so responsible for the Crimean war as Lord Aberdeen, he probably bears in mind the fact that the nobleman in question was Prime Minister when the struggle with Russia commenced in 1854.

Beyond that all must, from the nature of the case, be pure conjecture, and to prove his assertion the critic must show that the dangers described in Syria, when the Greek and Latin Churches differed as to custody of the holy places, were of little importance, and that a rejection of the warm friendship offered by Napoleon III. on behalf of France had not as an alternative a possible coalition of the nations against England and Austria (not by any means in warm accord), the very essence of which compact would have been the surrender to Russia of *carte blanche* as to the Black Sea and Constantinople. And, indeed, to no other conclusion could a rejection of the French Alliance have led.

It is intended in the continuation of *Foreign Secretaries of the Nineteenth Century* to examine this phase of history by the light of such evidence as has been revealed to us, although, in the absence of adventitious aid which private correspondence affords, the data must of necessity be sparse and incomplete. For instance, the papers of French statesmen who re-created the empire in 1852 are not, Mr. Blanchard Jerrold tells us, to be forthcoming at present. The secret correspondence left by Persigny, Fleury, and however fragmentary, that of De Morny, would doubtless disclose evidence showing Lord Aberdeen's frank acceptance of the French alliance to have been the

only possible policy for a British minister desiring to shield his country from ills which he had himself witnessed between 1803 and 1815.

Confidently anticipating the verdict of the future, as regards Lord Aberdeen's public policy, it is pleasant to dwell upon other memories connected with his career, not the least disinterested of which was a settled resolve to allow no member of his own family to profit through the enjoyment of power and influence, such as possession of the Premiership entailed.

It has been more than once suggested that a too laudatory strain has been adopted in writing the lives of our Foreign Secretaries. The careful reader will, however, perceive that the talents of the Marquis Wellesley, Canning, and Fox, have been acknowledged superior to all, even if the work performed by Castle-reagh and Palmerston has placed them in an equally prominent position on the roll of fame.

There can, moreover, be no reason to regret having pointed out Lord Mulgrave's perspicuity in descrying talent when he brought Lord Palmerston, Lord Dundonald, Lord Hill, Lord Lynedoch, and Mr. J. W. Croker to the fore, nor can it be denied that Lord Harrowby exercised, through his talents and political acumen, an influence far in advance of the reputation he left behind him.

As for Lord Liverpool, the study of his life and letters, as set forth by Mr. C. D. Yonge, might be undertaken by the most brilliant of our rulers in the present time, and lead to a solidity of political thought and character not possessed by nine out of ten who set their philosophical predecessor down as a mediocrity.

These are matters which cannot be disproved by the mere *ipse dixit* of any critic, however gifted with the faculty of discerning the contents of a book almost at first sight.

The claims of Lord Grenville to statesmanship having been generally admitted by each critic who has examined his titles, there remains but to sustain the reputation of Lord Dudley as a wit, a writer, and a man of letters, together with the high character and talents of Lord Aberdeen (which attracted minds of the noblest type, and led their owners to acknowledge his political leadership), and it will be scarcely then disputed that the office of Foreign Secretary fell into no unworthy hands between the years 1800 and 1834. So that the original design of this work had its justification, even if a final verdict on the manner of its accomplishment awaits the completion of the author's extended task.

One able critic has assailed the views of Foreign Policy expressed by the author, in terms which admit of no compromise.

If the writer in the *Cambridge Independent Press* be right in embracing the views on Foreign Policy held by the so-called Manchester school, he is at issue with all statesmanship, from the days of Aristides and Themistocles to those of Lincoln and Bismarck.

Let the Government be based on popular will, or supported by the bayonets and breechloaders on which Continental despots now rely, the human nature of their mankind is still of similar type.

If peace were to be gained and retained for the mere asking, what school of political thought would receive a moment's toleration which acted on principles involving a gratuitous drain of human life and human resources ?

At the same time, it is impossible to deny that the special critic, to whom allusion is here made, states his views with a force and directness it is not possible fairly to combat in these few lines.

Believing, then, that good cause for sustaining the ancient policy of England will be demonstrated before this book is finished, the task of setting forth due reason for such adherence must be at present deferred.

Allusion to the matter would scarcely have been made here, even at this length, but for an averment of the *Cambridge Independent Press*, to the effect that the author condemned Mr. Gladstone's Government for

allowing Russia to repudiate her engagements as to the Black Sea during the Franco-German War.

As one about to enter on an historical task perfectly unbiassed, and desiring to exercise a dispassionate judgment on this and all other matters of policy, the writer disclaims having ever given utterance to such a sweeping and off-hand opinion upon a subject hedged in with manifold difficulties.

No such averment certainly appears in *Foreign Secretaries of the Nineteenth Century to 1834*, where it is obvious that its interposition would have been uncalled for.

So far as believing that England should take her stand manfully on public treaties, and not on any undefined and, therefore unstable ground, the author pleads guilty to having dissented to measures which lured the nation from occupation of that only safe diplomatic ground, such as enabled Metternich to say in 1829, that in England the carrying out of a treaty is always regarded as a sacred duty (*Autobiography of Prince Metternich*, vol. iv. page 453).

That large bodies of men are now found to recommend doctrines involving the subversion of national good faith cannot justly be charged exclusively to either political party.

Nevertheless, without taking an unduly gloomy view

of public affairs, or fostering the doubts of that multitude of alarmists which surrounds us, it is evident to many (and those not the least instructed amongst us) that the integrity of the Empire should continue to be England's watchword in every quarter of the globe.

PERCY M. THORNTON.

Battersea Rise, S.W.,

June 1881.

N O T E
ON
LORD MULGRAVE'S BIOGRAPHY.

THE interest with which Lord Mulgrave's biography has been received by those whose opinion the author most values, has led him to publish the following additional particulars.

The earlier history of the present Lord Normanby's family finds no correct chronicle in any of the modern Peerages, and dates from the year 1656, when Constantine Phipps was born at Reading, being the first of that family who arrived at any prominent distinction. This Sir Constantine was the great-grandfather of Pitt's Foreign Secretary, and himself established a reputation as a distinguished lawyer in the reign of Queen Anne. Through a marriage with the family of Sawyer, of Swallowfield, Berks, Sir

Constantine had become familiar with Sir Robert Sawyer, who, as counsel for the Bishops in James II.'s reign, established an abiding reputation.

Thus it came to pass that Constantine Phipps was brought forward in his early practice at the bar, where his name has been perpetuated by means of more than one State trial.

As an advocate alike of the Jacobite and High Church party, it fell to him, in conjunction with Sir S. Harcourt, to defend Dr. Sacheverell, and compose that churchman's defence at his trial.

When towards the close of Queen Anne's reign the Tories came into power, Sir S. Harcourt was made Lord Chancellor of England, and his former coadjutor, Sir C. Phipps, was sent to Ireland in a similar capacity, exercising supreme power until Queen Anne's death, during a period when the Lord Lieutenant did not reside at Dublin, or indeed in Ireland at all. Be that as it may, he was recalled into private life when George I. ascended the throne, and contented himself with acting as advocate for the Jacobites in 1715, whilst he defended Bishop Atterbury in the House of Lords when that prelate involved himself in a Bill of Pains and Penalties by corresponding with the friends of the Pretender.

Sir Constantine Phipps' family was a numerous one,

and their virtues are recorded in an ancient monument in Swallowfield church ; but one alone, William Phipps, appears to have left descendants.

This William Phipps married Lady Katherine Annesley, daughter of the Duchess of Buckingham by her first husband James Annesley, Earl of Anglesea.

The Duchess of Buckingham lost her children by the last Duke of Buckingham of the Sheffield family, but left all she could bequeath to her grandson Constantine Phipps, whose mother Lady Katherine Phipps—as we have previously stated—was her only surviving child.

Thus it came to pass that in the person of Constantine Phipps was accumulated the distinction and wealth of two noble families. Horace Walpole in his letters recounts how the Duchess of Buckingham arranged the marriage of this youth with Lepel Harvey, daughter of the then Earl of Bristol.

Although the Irish property which came through the Annesleys was lost in a law suit to a claimant in the person of Lord Montmorres, Constantine Phipps was finally left in possession of a fine fortune and of the Irish barony of Mulgrave, to which he had been presented through the interest of his brother-in-law George Harvey, Earl of Bristol, when that nobleman became Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

The three sons of Constantine Phipps and Lepel

Harvey were-- (Firstly) Constantine John, 2nd Baron, captain Royal Navy, in which capacity he made an effort to discover the North-East Passage. His lordship held several official situations, and won an English barony which died with him in 1791. (Secondly) Henry Charles, the subject of our memoir. (Thirdly) Edmund, the popular General, so long Member for Scarborough,

It was through the influence of Constantine John, his elder brother, that the Lord Mulgrave of these volumes was brought under the notice of public men, and this fact should not be lost sight of.

Lord Mulgrave was a classical scholar of considerable merit, and did justice to an education with which, even at Eton, it has in later years been found necessary to combine more practical studies.

Early in life Lord Mulgrave had been taken by his elder brother to see Dr. Johnson, then living near Windsor, and on an apology being made for bringing a mere child to disturb his leisure, the Doctor remarked, "I am pleased with small things, and not displeased with small things," evolving thereby a lesson in philosophy which one and all may contemplate with advantage.


The military authorities must have thought highly of Lord Mulgrave's capacity, or he would not have been

entrusted with the whole Northern District at a moment when, as in 1803, a French invasion was thought imminent.

His sagacity in selecting public men, his Foreign Secretaryship, and successful administration both of the Admiralty and Ordnance Offices, have been fully descanted on elsewhere.

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Lord Grenville.

FOREIGN SECRETARIES
OF
THE XIX. CENTURY TO 1834.

L O R D G R E N V I L L E.

MAY 1791 TO MARCH 1801.



IMSELF the son of a statesman and Prime Minister of England, cousin to the younger Pitt, and springing from a race of legislators, young William Wyndham Grenville was born to senatorial honours. As a child he showed precocity if not genius, and some verses of his are extant which find their place in the Grenville papers.

“They run as follows :—

WILLIAM WYNDHAM GRENVILLE.

JANUARY, 1771 ; AGED 11.

A traveller wandering through the vales of Stowe,
The fairest garden here on earth below,
Says to his guide, “ ’Midst all the domes and shrines
Where Garden Venus in her temple shines,

Where George's statue* rears its awful head,
Adorns and seems to rule the neighbouring mead,—
I see no temple to Minerva's name,
No grateful line to celebrate her fame."

"No," says the guide, "the sage Minerva dwells
Within the house, and in each art excels ;
For both her wisdom and her skill you find
In worthy Temple's virtuous dame combined."

Two miles from Buckingham commences the celebrated avenue of elms which characterizes this lovely spot, where, amidst gentle undulating scenery, and surrounded by a garden where fancy has done all to enhance nature's charms, stands the seat of the Grenville family. Famous in the politics and learning of their time as the owners were, a magnificent art collection adorned the walls within which the future statesman wrote the apostrophe to his aunt's virtue, and although this has been dispersed, memories of surpassing interest still crowd on the mind of the visitor.

Those acquainted with the character of George Grenville as given in Adolphus's history of England, will recognise in the father a portrait of the son. The same thoughtful and even philosophical demeanour was in each and either case super-added to a clear and argumentative style of public speaking, which, if it never ascended into the regions of high eloquence, yet kept an intelligent level, such as rendered each utterance important. To Lord Grenville's father we owe the first breaking away from an old but untenable custom obtaining in England, which allowed the House of Commons,

* George Grenville, Prime Minister 1763-65.

as represented by the majority of the day, to be judge in election petitions. Mr. Grenville was thus the means of such questions being removed from out of the immediate sphere of party passion, and, impressed with the results of such legislative success, Mr. Trevelyan speaks of him as a House of Commons man, specially proud of his position in that unique assemblage, and identified with its history.

The distinguished son, whose career is under consideration, received the advantage of an Eton education, in turn conferring on his school the honour of adding once more to the long roll of distinguished scholars, of whom the two friends and contemporaries, Wellesley and Grenville, were not the least famous.

The lines of youthful poetry above quoted may be said to evince talent, if absolute signs of genius be absent, whilst an early love for the classics afforded scope for exercise of such powers, and at the same time reconciled Pitt to a cousinly companionship made pleasant by mutual tastes and identical pursuits. Mr. C. D. Yonge, in his painstaking and valuable life of Lord Liverpool, has expressed an incidental opinion to the effect that Lord Grenville was a man rather of industry.* than natural talent, and has proceeded to convey an impression to the reader that assertion in argument, vanity, obstinacy, and unconciliatory manners were combined in his character, and gave effect to his actions.

A different conception has, however, been arrived at here after research and consideration, and it is impossible to believe but that if the historian had made Lord

* Book i. page 48.

Grenville's character the special study he has Lord Liverpool's, he would have modified his opinion, even if he did not reach a different conclusion. "William is safe," writes Pitt, at the time of the general election in 1784. The young man was then standing for Buckinghamshire, and soon we read that the Prime Minister, recognising his genius, gave him the post of Under Secretary to the Board of Trade. The origin of William Grenville's call to office sprang from an intimacy which the king himself had cultivated when threatened with the continual domination of a Whig oligarchy. It was the delight of the beleaguered monarch to surround himself with rising young men, who by advice, and ultimately by active co-operation, might relieve him from the pressure of a coalition which threatened to usurp all Parliamentary authority.

How this procedure resulted in success history relates. Pitt's talents were discovered, and the country brought round to his way of thinking so far as to grant him a Parliamentary majority at the election of 1784.

William Grenville was a more powerful agent in these events than is generally believed, and the outcome, as we shall show, was that Foreign Affairs were practically relegated to his direction, for, as Lord Malmesbury tells us, he had more absolute authority than any of the six Secretaries of the department he had known.

Grenville was promoted from the Board of Trade to the Home Office, and in 1790 elevation to the Upper House followed, where his sonorous and dignified style of oratory was in Lord Stanhope's opinion adapted to the taste of his hearers. He had received the benefit of a

thorough classical education,* and there was a refinement in all his ideas which befitted the aspect of the House, and was in accordance with the feelings of those around him. He never tried to soar into the higher flights of oratory, but his speeches were well delivered, logically argued, and at times so forcible that the effect was considerable. It will be found that he had a good reason for every strong political position he took up. He would have no peace with the Jacobins. He dreaded Napoleon. He disbelieved, in company with a majority of military men, that the British could hold their own in Spain. He was an honest and consistent supporter of Catholic emancipation, and twice sacrificed office for the principle. In matters of judgment he was frequently wrong, and his temperament was such, that, when he thought the ship of state steering a crooked course, he was inclined to believe all things lost with the overruling of his opinions. He was on these occasions almost arrogant in his self-assertion, but without this explanation the honesty of the man's character might not be understood.

Towards the close of Lord Liverpool's Administration the Prime Minister desired to estop Lord Grenville's possible opposition, and induced him to act on a Committee, that he might hear facts as to the necessity for a suspension of the Habeas Corpus. Lord Liverpool was confident of his help, *if satisfied* as to the wisdom of a Government course.

This disposition of itself precludes factional conduct,

and explains much that had previously occurred in times when party ran high, and hasty decisions may have been arrived at, reached, maybe, without reference to the matured experience of an Opposition whose talents fitted them to shine in any national council. But Lord Liverpool understood all this, and trusted to Lord Grenville's high sense of truth and justice.

It should, moreover, never be forgotten that when Lord Grenville attained to the Premiership in 1806, he took the earliest opportunity which his position as head of a party combination would admit, to propose the practical, if gradual abolition of slavery. In a letter to Lord Sidmouth * immediately after the formation of the Government he alludes to this matter, and foreshadows the terms of that motion brought forward by Fox,† the substance of which is given in a later page of this volume.

Lord Grenville had cold manners, and was exceedingly reserved by nature, so that he seldom began a conversation, but readily entered into any discussion that arose, and Sir James Mackintosh speaks of him in 1813 as having a strong understanding, without genius, much positive knowledge in all the branches and dependencies of politics, and of his private studies as being Greek and botany.

He was well read in English history, and was upon it beyond most men conversant. Such is a sketch of the individual who at the age of 33, and in the year 1791, received the Foreign Office Seals from Mr. Pitt. Strong intimacy and even affection, had for some time existed

• *Lord Sidmouth's Life.*

† See C. J. Fox.

between the cousins who in the face of so powerful an opposition controlled both the Lords and Commons.

Pitt was for the first time foiled in Parliament, when in 1791 he proposed to aim against Russia, and save Turkey and Constantinople from the absorption so longed for by Catherine.* English influence henceforth declined in the North, we are told,† and the after conduct of Denmark may be traced to this cause ; but Pitt's and Grenville's immediate object was gained, and the massing of 150,000 Austrians and Prussians on the Polish frontier moderated Catherine's aggressions towards Constantinople. During the gigantic events connected with the French Revolution, Lord Grenville's Foreign Secretaryship has almost been lost sight of in the overpowering influence of that mighty mind,‡ whose inspiration was present in the action of every colleague.

Having accepted the Foreign Office seals in 1791 the weight of negotiation with France fell of necessity upon Lord Grenville. His despatches remain a standing mass of evidence whereon to determine the vexed questions connected with those troublous times.

Was England justified in resisting the French Revolution ? Was she wrestling with a phantom, and could her liberties and condition have remained intact without the deadly struggle so often described ?

* Bishop Tomline in his *Life of Pitt* tells us that the extent of the danger apprehended could not be revealed to Parliament. In other words, the immediate subjugation of Turkey and capture of Constantinople was feared.

† *Life of Lord Sidmouth*, by Hon. G. Pellew, D.D., vol. i. p. 86.

‡ Pitt.

Two opposing forces, representing severally Order and Liberty, met on the arena of Europe. Despotism, alas! was linked there with Order. It had become to be part and parcel of the system in vogue, not only in France, the German Empire and Spain, but possessed the sympathies of those who ruled the Muscovite hordes, slowly emerging from barbarism, as of the more civilised military rule which the great Frederick of Prussia had perforce and from geographical reasons been forced to engraft on the institutions of his country.

The Low Countries, the province of Brabant more particularly, had experienced the evil results of this universal tendency.

Under pretence of sustaining the Stadholder against the encroachments of a revolutionary spirit, the most frightful barbarities were, during 1787-9, perpetrated in the name of order, and, under shadow of the Imperial standard, unarmed and helpless citizens were shot down in the streets. The Emperor's proclamation of peace and forgiveness was, so to speak, repudiated by his creatures, and a tyranny, resembling in some particulars that of Alva, seemed about to be established.*

In France, since the year 1670, a reprehensible practice had been resorted to, which was supposed to strengthen the hands of the State. *Lettres de cachet* were issued by the kings, in virtue of which sealed communications persons against whom they were directed could be thrust into prison and exiled without trial.

* This was not forgotten in 1794, when the British, under the Duke of York, were opposed by the people in their endeavour to re-establish the power of the Stadholder.

Justice and liberty were certainly non-existent, and the overflowing dungeons of the Bastille attest the hideous length to which cruelty and political wickedness had carried the governing class.

The aristocracy of France had forgotten that they drew their position and enjoyed their dignities as the leaders of a great people. They allowed themselves to become the tools of men who ruled the State more for the advantage of those in possession of power and property than of the general community.

They were, moreover, from time to time the servants of a worldly minded and degraded Church, whilst the very principles of conduct which the Bible has enjoined on the followers of Christ were flagrantly and openly repudiated, nay, discredited in high places.

Falsehood and vice stalked abroad, and might surmounted right in dealings between class and class.

The Reformation, and its attendant lamp of freedom, had been roughly and successfully smothered, so that the smouldering ashes of discontent were hidden alike from the eye of the statesman and the apprehension of a polluted aristocracy. What wonder, then, that the crash came suddenly and with the greater violence.

The sustentation of the system had come to depend on the ability of those who directed the State machine ; and when the mainspring failed, France had to suffer the direction of new and rougher mechanism. Louis XVI. would certainly have been accounted a good king had he lived fifty years before his time. With the vices of the Grand Monarque he had unfortunately discarded that strength of government which characterised

the sway of his great predecessors. These traditions of his house once discarded, there remained but that right divine which paled before the rising doctrines of liberty and equality. It was at this very inauspicious moment that, for the sake of injuring England, Louis joined with Spain to encourage the American revolt, which they led to a successful issue. The example proved fatal and contagious, and thus it came to pass that France overthrew her natural rulers.

In England, fortunately, the transition from feudal to mediæval times, and thence to the possession of wholesome freedom had been gradual if uninterrupted. There had never been a struggle between class and class. It was the barons assembled at Runymede who demanded the Great Charter. Even in the civil wars it was left to a country gentleman to assert national liberties, whilst no movement of a communistic character threatened the realm during the Reformation, or when James II. elected to break a compact hitherto subsisting between him and his subjects. The result of numerous controversies, sealed truly with the blood of many a patriot and martyr, was that mass of written and unwritten wisdom—the British Constitution.

It was impossible but that in a country like France, where the shackles had been lately removed, sympathy should be felt for those abroad who were seeking like advantages. This feeling acted and reacted again and again, until, at the moment when Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville stood together at the helm, the good ship carrying England's fortune was swayed to and fro by two rival currents of opinion. All inequalities

had by no means been removed in England. Laws dating from barbarism still disgraced the statute book. Power — fairly administered on the whole — was still in the hand of a coterie, who, in league with the Crown, held the balance between Parliamentary parties.

When, therefore, the European coalition of 1792 took place against France, an avowed object of which appeared to be the re-establishment of the monarchical principle, the voice uplifted in England against these proceedings was not that of a faction.

Fox spoke the feelings of millions when he protested against an interference with the internal affairs of other nations. Lord Grenville had, however, little difficulty in showing that France, by forcing Holland to open the Scheldt, had violated the treaty of 1788, and so justified the diplomatic objections raised by Mr. Pitt's ministry. When, moreover, events in Paris reached a climax, and Louis XVI. was overpowered by the mob, it began to dawn on Englishmen that something beyond the equality which Fox believed in was aimed at by the Revolutionists. That equality was defined by the Whig leader to be equal rights before the law, *i.e.* the right of a poor man to spend and enjoy a shilling as freely as his more fortunate neighbour could profit by the possession of a thousand pounds.

This just and moderate idea held possession of Fox's mind throughout all discussions which ensued, and those who would read his conduct aright must not fail to grasp the fact.

Lord Grenville, in bringing forward his Alien Bill, adduced irrefragable proof of intrigue for the subversion

of the kingly office in Great Britain, and showed that if this interference did not come from the Paris Convention direct, agents of theirs scattered pamphlets of a seditious character through Ireland,* and established Jacobin societies in the heart of London. Their own public declaration will show the end aimed at.

It contained the following :—

“ The National Convention † . . . faithful to the principle of the sovereignty of the people, which will not permit them to acknowledge any of the institutions militating against it, decree. . . .

“ It will treat as enemies the people who, refusing or renouncing liberty and equality, are desirous of preserving their *Prince*, and privileged castes, or of entering into accommodation with them.”

With doctrines such as these compromise was impossible, and the orators who joined Burke and Windham in dreading a subversion of the British constitution were fully justified in their alarms.

* “ What were the affections and motives that caused us to put down rebellion in Ireland ? To protect our families, our properties, and our liberties ! What were the antipathies by which we were excited ? Our abhorrence of French principles and French ambition ! What was it to us that France was a Republic ? I rather rejoiced when I saw the ancient despotism of France fall down. The reason I took up arms and am ready still to bear them against France, is because she *intruded herself upon our domestic concerns* ; because with the rights of man and the love of freedom on her tongue, I see that she has the lust of dominion in her heart.”—*Speech of Mr. Plunkett on the Union in the Irish Parliament*, 1793.

† Declaration of November 19th, 1793. Too long to be given in full.

The execution of Louis XVI., however, did not shake Fox's steady support of the cause which he believed to be bound up with liberty.

Professing deference and affection for the British Constitution he yet denounced most unsparingly both the actions of Government at home and the Continental coalition abroad. Goaded by the tyrannous objects of European rulers, wholesome and reasonable yearnings for liberty had given place to a licence, which, however much to be regretted, was, he held, less objectionable than autocratic rule, and possessed an additional advantage, in that it could never become permanent in its disturbing influence.

Mr. Wilberforce has left several passages on record which show that Pitt desired peace, but one must suffice as a specimen.

Writing to the author of a work which was published to denounce ministerial policy,* Mr. Wilberforce says :

"There is one radical error which runs through your pamphlet ; that, I mean, of imputing to Mr. Pitt a war system ; as if it were his plan, his wish, his predilection to engage in war, and that he had set himself to consider how he could effect his purpose.

"In point of fact, great political events are rarely the offspring of cool deliberate system ; they receive their shape, size, colour, and the date of their existence from a thousand causes which could hardly have been foreseen, and in the production of which various unconnected and jarring parties have combined and assisted."

* *Life of Wilberforce*, vol. ii. p. 7.

It was not until the distinctly hostile character of French proceedings came home to Pitt that he acquiesced in Lord Grenville's policy and reluctantly relinquished his projects of reducing the National Debt, and further of amending that Constitution whose existence he was at last forced to believe in danger.

The man who does not realise the fact that both Lord Grenville and Pitt were anxious for peace and reasonable change at home, will not gauge the merits of the controversy by which England became agitated.

The cause that may be said to have shaped the course of events is undoubtedly the anti-religious character of the new theories as they came from France.

Men were invited to a feast of reason where the denial of God's goodness was prominently asserted. The joys of life were attributed to natural laws, and intervention of the Creator on behalf of man stoutly and contemptuously denied. Well might Mr. Burke declare that he dreaded a day of no judgment. This extraordinary individual threw his enormous influence and exerted his eloquence on behalf of Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt, and in so doing he broke up the Whig party, and carried with him Windham, the talented and plain-spoken orator and fascinating man.

The Foreign Secretary never hesitated, and his refusal to receive M. Chauvélion as representative of the French Republic, forms the point around which differences have raged ever since.

On the one hand it has been declared by Sir James Mackintosh and Brougham that the refusal was an insult to the French nation, who, as Government apologists on

the other hand declare, had already committed an act of war when, in defiance of treaties, they forced open the Schelt.

The technical dispute has an interest even at present, when the justice and wisdom of English policy under Pitt is still questioned in influential quarters.

The justification of Lord Grenville's actions was demonstrated so clearly in Marsh's *Politics* (a book which became a standard work) that the evangelical party in Parliament, of which Mr. Wilberforce and Mr. Henry Thornton were distinguished members, quoted from its pages whenever the original policy adopted by Pitt was questioned. The justice and rectitude of a chosen line of action which has influenced events through the lives of those oldest amongst us, cannot be lightly dismissed. Therefore it is that a leisure hour spent over Mr. Marsh's pages will amply reward the reader.*

Lord Grenville's conduct appears to have been considerably affected by his respect and love for the Established Church, which would clearly have been buried under that general wreck which an overthrow of the British Constitution was intended to effect.

He also sympathised with Pitt in his desire for gradual Parliamentary Reform, but they both resolved to oppose with all the might of England that desire for sudden and complete change of institutions and opinions which might have been thrust upon us had not the King and his ministers remained firm.

The power that Burke's support gave them is incal-

* Marsh's *Politics*.

culable. His oratory lies in the pages of history to show us what outspoken words in season may effect when issuing from the eloquent lips of a born ruler of men.

At the same time there is good reason to rejoice that Fox held a brief for those who believed the European repudiation of French principles to be hurtful to liberty. Lord Grenville was so desirous of peace that, short of recognising the authority that had subverted royalty in France, and threatened it abroad, he was prepared to negotiate. He offered to send a representative who might meet the French General* on the Dutch frontier. Before, however, this could be effected, Holland was overrun and peace rendered impossible. Napoleon knew full well (when speaking to Metternich† he sneered at England's attachment to the Low Countries) that their subjugation by a first-class naval power could never co-exist with English strength. He himself elsewhere declared the French possession of Antwerp to be a pistol presented at the head of Great Britain. Thus commenced seven years of uninterrupted bloodshed. War was declared by the French against England and Holland,‡ and Mr. Wilberforce was brought to admit that Lord Grenville and Pitt were not the aggressors. He still doubted, however, if due pains had been taken for staving off the declaration.

Lord Grenville had been for some months corresponding with the principal European powers for the

* Dumouriez.

† Metternich's *Autobiography*.

‡ War with France commenced February 1st, 1793.

purpose of obtaining a joint representation to France, assuring her if she would engage to keep within her own limits, she should be left to settle her internal government.

This fact ministers refused to publish, for reasons best known to Lord Grenville and the Prime Minister. When, however, in 1799 Pitt did recount the history of these negotiations, Fox replied that had the minister openly made that declaration to France and her continental enemies, he should have had nothing more to say or desire.

It is probably true that the Opposition at home would have modified their tone, but what peaceable effect public avowal of that which was notoriously the prevailing British feeling could have effected amongst members of the French Convention, it is difficult to imagine. The fact is that the first European coalition against France, which may be said to have collapsed on the field of Valmy,* and before England became involved in war, did desire to replace the Bourbons on the throne, and to replace them there without guarantees of any kind, so revealing a desire to interfere with the internal affairs of France. Although our policy was only that of self-defence, it had become clear to Pitt and Grenville that we were about to be attacked, and must prepare to defend ourselves† by joining with those whose principles were not wholly to our taste.

* September 20, 1792.

† England was not an original member of the first coalition against France.

The alternative appeared to them to be a worse evil, and to involve civil war.

When the die was cast every means to secure alliances against the French was avowedly adopted. The British co-operation had, however, arrived too late, and the military successes of Buonaparte and Moreau threw us back on to our natural element, where before long the superiority of our sailors became manifest.

Macaulay has declared that Pitt waged war feebly. He has been replied to by Lord Stanhope. Brougham, in his turn, derides the scale on which ministers designed operations against their foe. The naval victories of Howe, Duncan and Nelson, he declares, would have occurred under any government, allowing no stray laurel from Cape St. Vincent or the Nile to adorn the brows of Pitt and Grenville, a denial which appears to be the more unfair, because naval failure would have involved a responsibility far exceeding any credit which bare justice demands, and the unbiassed writer must give.*

It should be remembered that England had not the means of making war effectively in Europe unless times were favourable for subsidising the Continent, and that they could not be so considered when ill success had damped the ardour of Prussia, Austria, and Russia.

For the first year a combined march on Paris seemed possible, but with continued French success it had to be abandoned, and military efforts being more or less

* Lord Brougham distinctly gives credit for naval successes to Lord Chatham's Administration, and refuses it to that of Mr. Pitt.—*Vide Statesmen of the Time of George the Third*, vol. i.

disconnected were sadly ineffectual. With the exception of the campaign of the Archduke Charles on the Maine, all the news from Europe during the first three years was adverse to the cause which England had taken up. The Archduke's success has been forgotten in the subsequent military collapse, but with the exceptions of Marlborough and Buonaparte, no military reputation outshone his during the eighteenth century. England twice essayed to take the field in force, and in 1794 18,000 men were sent to Holland under the Duke of York for the purpose of reinstating the power of the Stadholder in his dominions, but a failure was registered which indeed laid those responsible open to censure, but from which full knowledge of the events robbed somewhat of its sting. Brougham finds fault with the policy of attacking the West Indian possessions, and other out-lying colonies of France, which he declares would naturally have been resigned to the victors of a conflict waged in more vital quarters.* This objection appears to be specially far-fetched, inasmuch as if the paid hosts of Germany and Russia had not succumbed, no more valuable aid could have been given them than the diversion which an attack on colonial possessions would have been sure to make in the plans of so proud and high-spirited a nation.

During the year 1795, Lord Grenville made an offer of peace to France upon reasonable terms. The negotiations continued for some time, but fell through when the French flatly refused to evacuate Holland.

* Again he allows credit to Lord Chatham for similar operations.

Lord Malmesbury's diaries have since proved how genuine was Pitt's desire for an honourable peace, and when the facts came to be known, the Ministry received increased support from Parliament.

Lord Malmesbury's account of his mission to the Directory in 1795-96 should be studied by those desirous of learning the state of society in France,* and the genuine wish of the English Government for peace. The *pourparlers* with Delacroix, the Minister of French Foreign Affairs, are graphically described, whilst to a student of Lord Grenville's career more than one letter is of great interest.

The negotiations were broken off on the plea that the Directory could not undertake to include England's ally, the Emperor of Austria, in the treaty of peace, but desired a separate arrangement with ourselves, that they might fall on to the Archduke Charles' army with the better chance of success, an outlook scarcely likely to commend itself to a British ruler. Lord Malmesbury, moreover, discovered evidence of an expedition being fitted out against Ireland, and ultimately left France in despair of success, when he received Lord Grenville's hearty commendation for his tact and patience.

Perhaps no more dramatic events have ever occurred than those which preceded the glorious results of Nelson's seamanship and determination which led to the discovery of the French fleet off the shores of Aboukir.

"Victory or Westminster Abbey" was the hero's watchword as, in the fading twilight,† he bore down on Admiral Bruey's fleet, arranged in battle array and

* *Lord Malmesbury's Diaries*, vol. iii. p. 250.

† August, 1798.

supported on each flank by powerful land batteries. "He will wait until the morning," was the fixed opinion of the experienced French admiral, but no hesitation occupied Nelson's breast, and before the grey morning had tinged the sandy shores, nine French sail-of-the-line had been destroyed, and the dispersal of Napoleon's means of transporting his army become complete.

This occurred, moreover, when the Continent was wavering, and gradually yielding to Pitt's schemes.

For a time the tide of battle had rolled somewhat evenly, and but for Buonaparte's skill and bravery in Italy, where Lodi,* Arcola,† and Rivoli ‡ laid the foundation of his great fame, the allied armies were not by any means borne down by their rivals, whilst at home in England ministerial anxiety as to Ireland had been, during 1797–98, tempered by contemplation of naval success.§

Moreover, during 1799, a gleam of light shone over Europe, when Marshal Suwarow again and again at Cassano, Adda, and Trebia improved the occasion of Buonaparte's absence in Egypt on his romantic expedition in quest of Eastern fame and influence.

The pause that ensued after this change of fortune naturally seemed to Pitt and Grenville fraught with the happiest omens, and Lord Grenville never for a moment hesitated, and left no diplomatic stone unturned.

* Lodi, May 10th, 1796.

† Arcola, November 14th–17th, 1796.

‡ Rivoli, January 14th–15th, 1797.

§ Duncan defeated Dutch under De Winter at Camperdown October 11th, 1797; whilst a Spanish fleet was beaten and dispersed off Cape St. Vincent, February 14th, 1797, by Jervis, afterwards created Lord St. Vincent.

Lord Mulgrave's mission to the Archduke Charles's camp was devised by Lord Grenville and had it been found possible to inspire Suwarow and the Austrians with belief in Mulgrave's warnings the subsequent disasters might clearly have been avoided.*

This can, however, be scarcely charged against the Foreign Secretary.

It was on August 23rd, 1799, that, with a celerity unsurpassed, and aided by seamanship of which the French may justly be proud, Buonaparte sailed from Egypt in a frigate which, in company with another of similar build and two sloops, first touched at Corfu and then ran the gauntlet of a British fleet comprising eight sail-of-the-line. Six weeks after leaving Egypt, Buonaparte landed at Frejus, on the shores of Provence, and was received by the population with frantic delight. His journey to and reception at Paris was one long triumph, and pains were taken in the metropolis to mark him as the man of the day. General Moreau made way for him, and accepted the second position in a gorgeous fête that was given to the two commanders.

The Abbé Sieyes had for some time occupied a high place in the Republican counsels. He was desirous of modifying the constitution and of practically rendering it a constitutional government by means of two chambers and a president. It is believed by some that he had communicated the situation to Buonaparte in Egypt, who declared that he left his army in consequence of events in France. Be that as it may, the Abbé played

* See account of this mission in Lord Mulgrave's *Biography*.

into his hands, and by his collusion Buonaparte was enabled to overthrow the Jacobin party, and to get himself proclaimed First Consul.* The military power was delivered over to the Great Corsican, never to be lost until finally wrested from him on the plains of Flanders. Breathing threatenings against his Continental foes, he yet desired peace with England. His despatch to Lord Grenville was clever and plausible.

It enlisted on his side elements which were wavering on behalf of peace, at a moment when Pitt was failing in popularity and the country sorely tried with the drain and bloodshed of a long war.

The Foreign Secretary led the consequent Parliamentary discussion of January 1800 with high ability. He had to defend his official despatch, in which, refusing to treat with the French Consulate, he had suggested the return of the Bourbons as the best and most natural pledge of the alleged wish for peace. Qualified as that suggestion had been by the statement that no claim was made to prescribe a form of government to France, it was immediately fastened on by enemies at home and abroad as an interference with the internal affairs of other nations.† In the Commons a most exhaustive and remarkable speech was delivered by Mr. Dundas (afterwards Lord Melville). He laid bare the sophistries of Buonaparte's communication, and accentuated the point dwelt upon by Lord Grenville which disclosed the duplicity of those

* November 10th, 1799.

† For report of Lord Grenville's speech, see *Annual Register*, 1800, p. 77.

orders left with General Kleber in Egypt, viz. that he was to treat with the Porte and agree to an early abandonment of the country, but not to evacuate or fulfil his engagements. Practically, the French meant to keep what they had gained in the East. Moreover, it was shown that as a subsidy of £220,000 for preparations and annual promises of £40,000 a year had been made to Russia for carrying on the war, and that we had like arrangements with Austria and other nationalities then in arms, was it reasonable that we should suddenly be asked to throw over our allies, and sacrifice all the advantages which the genius of the Archduke Charles and the gallantry of the Austrian troops had gained ?

But with the French still in Egypt and in possession of Malta, it would have been a manifest advantage to Buonaparte, who knew that Kleber's army was in great danger.

The magnificent oratory that ensued presented Erskine, Pitt, and Fox at their best ; but there was one voice silent,—one the blended sweetness and nobility of whose tones had sustained and elevated the discussions which had before taken place on the shifting scenes of this vast Drama —Burke. The man of high thought and bold conceptions had in 1797 passed away, an old man, worshipped and honoured by his countrymen. His former attitude was urged as an argument for treating with the new *régime* which had supplanted that of the Jacobins, with which he would have no peace.

To this Pitt retorted that there was no adequate ground of security in negotiating with a Power that left the wrongs and aggressions committed against our allies

unredressed. The original cause of complaint was not removed.* Fox was at his best, and in his peroration reminded ministers that if they desired that the negotiation should have included their allies, they should at least have given Buonaparte the opportunity of agreeing to the proposed preliminaries. In this he clearly touched the weak point of Lord Grenville's technical case, as the minister had dreaded Buonaparte's position in Egypt, would hear of no compromise in the Low Countries, and desired scope for the Austrian arms.

It was universally admitted that Lord Grenville had announced his policy to the House of Lords in a speech of great dignity and eloquence. When calling on the nation for the fresh efforts which discontent and sedition rendered doubly irksome, he pointed out how, but for disunion at home, the fleets of France never would have dared to approach Ireland and help to kindle a rebellion which their dupes had suffered for.

But for disunion, moreover, amongst the members of the last European coalition, all the calamities under which Europe groaned would have been averted.

He had from the first avowed that if France remained mistress of the Continent, we could have no safety. "It is with pride and satisfaction," said his Lordship, "that I have never submitted to you the necessity of a different policy. I have valued too much the testimony of my own conscience, the feelings of national honour, the dictates of public duty, and, perhaps, those frail memorials which may remain of me,

* Holland was still occupied by the French.

should men take the trouble to inquire how William Lord Grenville thought and acted in this great crisis, ever to advise any other than a manly, vigorous line of conduct, or to recommend any resource but our own constancy and perseverance." Such was the substance and part peroration of a speech that lived long in the memory of its hearers, and helped to animate hopes that ever since the battle of the Nile had sunk to a low ebb. Buonaparte's precarious position in Egypt was, however, taken advantage of by Turkey and Russia to join England, Austria, Portugal and Switzerland.* That his dispositions were carefully and skilfully laid, the student of history will attest, and to Lord Grenville must due praise be also given as ably designing the second European coalition against France. Lord Grenville's words also fell on discriminating ears. If ever an assembly existed, inclined by natural predilection and interest towards the maintenance of peace, it is the British House of Lords, who with every interest involved in the happiness, well-being and contentment of the people, just cause and expediency, verging on necessity, must be not only urged but demonstrated before their decisive countenance can be gained to shield the warlike policy of a minister.

The English were twice in Holland during the progress of these events, on each occasion under the generalship of the Duke of York. In 1794 they formed the right of the coalition army, and, deprived of the support which Prussia covenanted to give of at least 61,000 men, were likewise separated by the fortune of war

* 1799-1800.

from Austria.* A retreat across the Rhine, and subsequent embarkation from the Prussian coast ensued. In 1799 a great effort was made by Pitt and Grenville. The expedition achieved a conspicuous naval success, as eight Dutch sail-of-the-line and seventeen frigates were captured and conveyed to England. On shore the Duke, after various skirmishes, fought a drawn battle with General Brune near Bergen for the possession of Haarlem, but lost all he there retained at Alkmaer, on September 19th, 1799, after which the palpable distress of his army counselled the compromise which ended in an exchange of prisoners, and the embarkation of the British for England. Such a distressing military failure was injurious for other reasons, inasmuch as after this disaster the people of Holland declared for the French, who established the Batavian republic under Gallic protection, and involved the Dutch in war with England. Again, but for Pitt's and Grenville's discernment the talents of the Duke of York would have been, as they were well-nigh being, lost to his country, as the glamour of disaster in the field might have kept his power of military organisation from receiving acknowledgment, and so a distinct weapon of strength would have been of necessity deducted from the national armoury.

The first symptoms of re-action from Suwarow's success in Europe occurred in 1799, when having disregarded the warnings of our British envoy,† the Russians and Austrians suffered defeat at Zurich,‡ and

* The English were left with 30,000 men opposed to 70,000.

† Lord Mulgrave.

‡ September 25th, 1799.

were forced by Massena to abandon Switzerland. In the East Sir Sydney Smith's successful defence of Acre was supplemented by the gallant Abercromby holding his own in Egypt, when, profiting by the prescience of Wellesley, he alike cemented the union between England and India, and secured British predominance on the fields of Aboukir and Alexandria.*

It was there and then declared that India, as an integral part of the Imperial system, should contribute towards European efforts on her behalf, when directed against the common enemy.

Malta, moreover, fell into British occupation.†

Fortune wavered around Genoa, where the French under the ubiquitous Massena, were forced by a conjunction of the Austrian army and British fleet to evacuate the fortress. On the plains of Italy, however, Buonaparte gained a decisive victory at Marengo.‡

A battle lost was, to use the First Consul's own words, a battle won, when, after a disastrous retreat, he rallied his troops around the advance of Dessaix' reinforcements.

The subsequent treaty with Melas, the Austrian general, gave Italy practically over to the French.

In Germany during 1801 the skill and generalship of Moreau prevailed over the military ability of the Austrians. How far the Austrian commanders were paralysed by home counsels it is no part of this book to decide ; but the bold advance of the French into the heart of Austria, to within 50 miles

* March 1801. In July 1799 the French defeated the Turks at Aboukir.

† September 5th, 1800.

‡ June 14th, 1800.

of Vienna, received its reward at the peace of Luneville,* where traditional connection with Italy was temporarily, and with Holland finally severed. Buonaparte's power was undoubtedly rendered pre-eminent over Italy and Germany, but the Austrian means of resistance was by no means destroyed by the lopping off of distant provinces. It was clear, however, that the second combination against France had crumbled away, and at the same time Lord Grenville's official part in the direction of events was drawing to a close.†

It is strange to reflect that during the existence of a Government, stamped as to its foreign policy, according to men's general belief, with the sole individuality of Pitt, we should learn from such an authority as Lord Malmesbury, that Lord Grenville was, upon the whole, the most resolute and active of the six Foreign Secretaries he knew ; and why ? Because, as we are told by the same authority, he became most independent of his colleagues.‡

The will must, indeed, have been a strong one before which Pitt yielded and Canning shrunk, unwilling to be a nonentity in his office of Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

* Peace of Luneville, February 9th, 1801.

† It is not generally known that a British army of 10,000 men landed at Ferrol in Spain, under Sir James Pulteney, in August 1800, but that on gaining the heights they desisted from making further attempts on the strong fortifications, and re-embarked. Sir James' attempt may be compared to that of the legendary French king of France, who, with 20,000 men, marched up a hill and then marched down again. This was the last of Pitt's unsuccessful expeditions commented on by Macaulay, and its failure gave rise to considerable dissatisfaction.

‡ *Lord Malmesbury's Diaries*, vol. ii. p. 180.

The foreign administration of such a man should, we think, be the more closely studied and its strength appreciated.

We stand, as it were, on an eminence, and look down on a panorama of the mighty past. The actions, nay, the thoughts of men are laid bare.

Enigmas are unfolding their mysteries, as year by year evidence is, so to speak, rescued from the tomb.

The prescience of Pitt and Grenville is manifest, in that they discovered the true character of Napoleon's rule before it guided the world. On the other hand, Fox's foresight is remarkable, when in graceful and forcible periods, he told the House of Commons that the country was weary of the war and its undue burdens; that a cessation from the struggle would be welcomed, together with a return to the reform required at home. The peace of Amiens, and its welcomed cessation from national exertion, proved part of his programme to be desired; and as for the internal changes foreshadowed, they have all been accomplished with benefit to the State.

There remains, then, but the fear whether it be possible under the altered conditions of the present to renew the efforts of the past, and for the Whig programme as propounded by Fox and Grey, and subsequently endorsed by Grenville, to prove a conspicuous success.

It is for Englishmen, sinking all minor differences, to combine on matters of national policy, and prove that the rule of the many is not incompatible with combined and individual sacrifices.

Lord Grenville's character will not be understood, unless his devotion to religion at home and abroad, and his belief in the principle of establishment be duly digested. When France proposed negotiations for peace in 1800, there was no guarantee given that the principles of religion had replaced those vaunted infidelities which had characterised Jacobin rule, and been in some degree a heritage of Voltaire's teaching. Napoleon, however, when in power, adopted the Roman Catholic religion as that of the nation, and by so doing softened the spirit of hostility amongst those who saw in religion the mainstay of a State.

Thus it was that in opposition Lord Grenville enunciated some views, logically incompatible with a peace which in office he consistently reprobated.

Against Napoleon, and his mode of aggression, he continued opposed; but in conjunction, at first with Fox, and afterwards with Lord Grey, would have agreed to a compromise with the system, in return for a cessation from a struggle to which, as conducted by Government, he thought he saw no other end than failure and national bankruptcy.

In this particular he was inferior in political foresight to men like Liverpool, Canning, Harrowby, and Castlereagh, who never hesitated. The Empire was, however, at least an organised system, and, morally speaking, an improvement on the Communism which pursued its end with equal ambition.

On the 7th of February 1801 Mr. Pitt resigned. The announcement was made in the House of Lords by Lord Grenville.

FOREIGN SECRETARIES OF THE XIX. CENTURY.

George III. had declined to allow the question of Catholic emancipation to be mooted, and such refusal was accounted by ministers incompatible with continuance in the King's Government.

Pitt always intended and, indeed, by implication had *promised*, that the union with Ireland should be followed by a measure of relief to that large majority of His Majesty's subjects who professed the Roman faith. Lord Grenville had also warmly espoused their cause as part of the civil and religious liberty he desired for Great Britain, together with the preservation of that Church which he loved so well.

The severance of political connection between Pitt and Grenville was not effected until after much deliberation and deep regret. It could scarcely be otherwise after the responsibility jointly incurred during moments of peril and doubt.

As Lord Mulgrave's letters tell us, the breach was on the point of being healed at one time. Would that it had been forgotten, and remained unrecorded in the pages of history !

Pitt, who equally with Cornwallis and Castlereagh knew the terms of the implied promise to grant Catholic emancipation, considered himself justified in deferring such fulfilment until the people of England and their Sovereign were less averse to the change. Lord Grenville deliberately judged otherwise, and probably did much thereby to secure a future satisfaction of the Roman Catholic claims. But he lived to be Premier in a Government which found an immediate settlement of the question impossible, and one would fain have

seen Pitt spared the pain of a separation from his kinsman who, notwithstanding an after-connection with the Whigs, learned his lessons of statesmanship at his great cousin's feet.

The course of Lord Grenville has been misunderstood because those who sympathised most with his ready decision at the commencement of the revolutionary war, were unable to harmonise violent opposition to Canning's policy in Spain with adherence to former professions. The war that he waged so sternly and steadily had since only varied in character because it became more marked in its intensity of interest for Englishmen, who, if defeated abroad and in the Peninsula, must have prepared most undoubtedly to face the horrors and suffer the deprivations of the struggle when transferred to the region of their own island home.

The causes, as well as the details, of the early struggle with France have been traced here with care, because out of a hundred people who have satisfied themselves that on the whole Napoleon's hostility was unappeasable, the vast majority have not studied the question in its inception. It is quite possible to favour the Whig theory held by Fox, Shelburne, Sheridan, and others, that but for the general hostility to Republican doctrines as they first appeared in France, the high-spirited French nation would not, in self-defence, have had its attention turned towards military tactics, and so forged a weapon for offensive purposes such as the world has never seen before or since, and yet hold the Napoleonic war a necessity. But such a position can only be taken up after reference to the plain facts which have here been

given without prejudice, even if an opposite conviction possess the writer's mind.

The history of the struggle with Imperial France will from time to time introduce us to the thoughts and opinions of this distinguished individual. He was destined to occupy the highest position which a subject can attain, and as he had been Foreign Secretary under Pitt, to finish his official course as Prime Minister with Fox as Foreign Secretary.

Truly a glorious career, undergone when the old world was changing, and whilst the last remnants of the feudal and mediæval systems were about to merge into times of riper liberty.

It is said that under the formal manner of Lord Grenville was hidden a warm heart, and when the untimely death of Mr. Pitt was communicated to him he covered his face and wept freely.* They had been close friends in boyhood, and Grenville's elevation to the Peerage came when Pitt most required someone he could rely on to lead the Lords. It was, moreover, hoped that his cousin's tact would conciliate Lord Chancellor Thurlow, who, of all Pitt's colleagues, was the most difficult to manage.

Lord Grenville's public life was not the inconsistent

* Lord Grenville had married Anne Pitt, sister of the Lord Camelford who suffered death in a duel with one Captain Best in 1804. Thus by matrimonial alliance as by birth and personal friendship was he allied to the interests of Pitt rather than Fox. The balance was, however, ultimately turned in favour of the latter by the influence of his brother, Mr. Thomas Grenville, whose alliance with the Whigs and with Fox in particular, was notorious.

one it has sometimes been represented. He cannot be shown to have swerved from principle, even if his strong desire for Catholic emancipation and reform carried him from the 'Tory to the Whig camp.

Legislation on these subjects was clearly desired by Pitt, and Lord Grenville was but carrying out the wishes of his former leader.

At times his criticisms on the Spanish war and its management were extreme and injurious, but they can seldom be declared entirely baseless.

He held that we were embarked on a task beyond our strength, military and financial. Thoroughly acquainted as he was with either branch of our State machine, he was predisposed to limit warlike capacity and deprecate expense such as he believed would drain the exchequer.

Other statesmen (Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Canning, and Lord Hawkesbury, in particular) discerned before him the pre-eminent talents of Sir Arthur Wellesley, but the experience of Pitt's seventeen years' rule had not been to inspire the ministerial mind with trust in our commanders.

"Some old woman in a red ribbon," was once Lord Grenville's answer as to the possible leader of any military expedition.*

Lord Grenville appears to have believed, in common with a great many other Englishmen, that when the army of our leading commander, Sir John Moore, was forced

* Lord Stanhope's *Life of Pitt*.

to evacuate Spain, and the general fell at Corunna, there was but scanty hope of others succeeding where he had failed. Again Lord Grenville disbelieved in the Continent continuing to oppose Napoleon, who might at any moment have found himself free to pour his resources into the Peninsula. The calculations of Canning, Lord Hawkesbury, and Lord Wellesley were, however, justified by events, and the Peninsula war lured Napoleon to his fall.* Metternich, moreover, tells us that French policy towards Austria was modified by ill-success in Spain, and as we know, the drain of life and gold continued there to the bitter end, whilst dread of Austria and Russia tied Napoleon's hands, and prevented a supreme effort being sustained across the Pyrenees.

That Lord Grenville should have put forward the other side of the question is not to be wholly regretted. It is curious that in 1810 Napoleon should have remarked to Metternich that no peace with England was possible whilst Lord Wellington's brother (Lord Wellesley) was Foreign Secretary, and until the Grenville party came into power; but that after Napoleon's escape from Elba Lord Grenville expressed himself favourable to a relentless prosecution of the war, and Lord Wellesley was found in opposition.

It is difficult to define where such expressions of disapproval should begin and end. Judgment, patriotism, patience, and moderation are conspicuous requirements for an opposition leader to possess, and without the exer-

* Prince Metternich's *Autobiography*.

cise of these virtues it would seem almost impossible to give constitutional expression to the doubts and opinions of necessary criticism. That the Whig party exceeded the limits of these duties during the contest with Napoleon is unfortunately too plain to allow of denial.

It has been regretfully admitted by eminent men of their own persuasion who saw the mistake before they themselves were elevated to guidance of party action. Lord Russell has expressed this feeling strongly, as has Mr. Horner^{*} and even Lord Holland.

The after-conduct of Lords Russell, Palmerston, and Clarendon has, fortunately for the State, carefully disregarded precedents leading to the supposition that a popular Government possesses inherent weakness abroad.

Perhaps no office was ever better suited to Lord Grenville's tastes and acquirements than that of Chancellor of Oxford University, which honour fell to his share in 1809, after an election at which the Tory interest had been divided. There the want which he himself acknowledged was not likely to be felt. No scope was afforded for the management of men, in which Lord Grenville was as deficient as Pitt and Fox were pre-eminent.

So far as the instincts of statesmanship are concerned, the constant support given by Lord Grenville to Lord Wellesley in India should not be forgotten; and it was given when prejudice and ignorance of Indian affairs

* "Mr. Horner never ceased to grieve that his party had failed to see in the Spanish war a struggle for European liberty; instead of pursuing a course revolting to every true feeling for the independence of mankind."—Lord Russell's *Recollections*.

might have led to the practical relinquishment of our Empire, threatened as it was with extinction through foreign designs.

The deliberate opinion of his political opponent and able contemporary, the second Lord Harrowby, as communicated to the author by his son, is to the effect that he knew no one so well furnished with the natural requisites of a statesman, together with all the knowledge which a statesman should possess. Mr. Pitt, moreover, speaks of him as an undoubted authority on Constitutional History, and the papers from which the latter opinion has been culled will be found to possess inestimable value to the student of Pitt's character and career, inasmuch as they have never been utilised for historical purposes, and consist of a correspondence between Pitt and Grenville at the time of their co-operation in the government. When the time comes for the historian to arise who shall desire to probe yet further the motives and designs of these remarkable men, not the least valuable source of information will be found in these letters now at Dropmore, in the possession of Lady Harriet Fortescue.

Sir James Mackintosh paid a visit to Lord Grenville in 1813, and then found him inclined for the retirement which marked his latter years.*

* It must have been a remarkable oration which Lord Grenville delivered in 1819 when vindicating the Manchester magistrates. Mr. R. P. Ward spoke of it as lofty and convincing from beginning to end ; Lord Harrowby as a model of high and dignified argument ; whilst the great Duke of Wellington said Lord Grenville's speech

At Dropmore, the shady retreat between Beaconsfield and Maidenhead, this once celebrated man passed the latter part of an eventful life.* Had he chosen, office was more than once believed to be within his grasp; but the condition of the Whig party and weaker health ruled otherwise. He died a decided Whig, although, by the ties of birth and marriage, his connection was with other political traditions.

When, however, Lord Grey's Reform Bill came fully before the country, Lord Grenville was known to disapprove of its provisions as being too extreme. The accompaniments of seditious meetings and ominous threatenings directed against the Peers were not by any means to his liking. Lord Chancellor Brougham seems to have striven hard to reconcile the great politician to

was the finest he ever heard in the House of Lords.—*Diary of R. P. Ward*, vol. ii. p. 39.

The Duke's praise must be judged as that of an optimist in such matters, for, as the *Times* said of him at the time of his death, he magnified his own opinions in order to impress them on his hearers. The Duke could appreciate events with unfailing nicety, but failed to describe them precisely.—Jennings's *Anecdotal History of England*, p. 240.

Nevertheless, Lord Grenville's speech, even if not the best Wellington ever heard in the Lords, must have been a very great one.

This was the last great impression upon public opinion ever made by Lord Grenville, who henceforth retired to Dropmore.

* The keeper of the Grenville Library at the British Museum remembers Lord Grenville drawn about in a chair when towards the close of his life vigour failed him. The same individual (an old servant) was with Mr. Thomas Grenville when he died at the ripe age of 92.

the measure of his adopted party, but in vain.* Erskine, however, speaks confidently of the Government's confidence in the Chancellor's ability to soothe the doubts which Lord Grenville felt on this subject.

The presumption certainly is that he failed, inasmuch as not one written word of Lord Grenville's is forthcoming at this crisis on behalf of a Government with whom he may be supposed to have generally sympathised. More than this, we have evidence that Lord Grey himself doubted the wisdom of the extremes which circumstances had led him into indirectly subscribing to

In a conversation held in November 1832, with Mrs. Manners Sutton, he admitted that he feared the comititary agitation had been carried too far.†

Lord Brougham, moreover, lived to quail before the Frankenstein which his party had aroused, and acknowledged his anxiety at the dark political out-look, ‡ a state of things which, as it appears, was traced by Lord Grenville to the extraordinary blindness of the party of resistance.

Throughout the sixth, seventh, and eighth volumes of the *Supplementary Wellington Despatches*, opinions are again and again avowed by individuals of position and rank,

* *Memoirs of the Life and Times of Lord Brougham*, vol. iii. p. 495.

† *Wellington Supplementary Despatches*, vol viii. p. 450.

‡ Lord Brougham, writing to Dr. Knight in May 1831, speaks as follows :—" I believe a strong Government absolutely necessary to save the country. I speak the more plainly because you are well aware that no man is less exclusive in his political propensities than I am and always have been since I became seriously alarmed at the anti-aristocratic spirit."—*Wellington Supplementary Despatches*, vol. vii. p. 456.

which one would have long ago believed to be relegated to those mediæval times to which their realisation could alone belong.

The fault, as we have elsewhere striven to show, was not, however, so much that of individuals as of ever recurrent human nature, destined in the 19th century to reproduce a struggle not unlike that which once prevailed between the patricians and plebeians of ancient Rome.

The name of Lord Grenville is associated in the minds of many historical students with an austere individual, faithful, above all things, to the Church of England ; a Whig from conviction, and yet a fitting individual for the office of Oxford University Chancellor.

But no recorded impression of Lord Grenville gives him credit for the liberality and kindness which, springing from the true nature of his heart, have rendered his name beloved and honoured in Dropmore, and, indeed, throughout the district where he was best known.

We have heard of certain popular individuals who have confined their amiability to the moments when standing under the searching eye of public criticism, but who have not sustained that high level in the secret records of their homes.

It was otherwise with Lord Grenville. Enquire where you will amongst the tenantry, the same enthusiastic answer is given. He was a noble gentleman. The custodian of the Grenville Library in the British Museum knew Lord Grenville well, and will endorse every word here written, attesting to the statesman's goodness and kindness.

Whatever may be thought of Lord Grenville's after-

policy, there can be little doubt that his Foreign Secretaryship was of surpassing interest, and when the record of the 19th century comes to be written, it will be an imperfect volume which does not contain the actions of William Wyndham Lord Grenville.

He died in 1834, at the age of seventy-eight, leaving no child to inherit his title.



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
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Lord Hawkesbury.

LORD HAWKESBURY.

MARCH 1801 TO MAY 1804.



SITORS to the old Charterhouse will remember that after wandering through tapestried rooms, they were taken to the ante-chapel, where are inscribed the names of illustrious Carthusians.

Foremost amongst these, must be reckoned Robert Banks Jenkinson, afterwards Lord Liverpool. His father before him had been a pains-taking politician, skilled in finance and commerce, in measures connected with which he assisted Mr. Pitt very materially.

The early friend of Canning,* Mr. Jenkinson learned to revel in the delights of literature.

Travel came to his lot as that of a young Englishman of means and fashion. Passing through Paris just before the Revolution broke out, he entered Parliament

* They were at Oxford together.

in 1791 as member for Appleby, where Pitt had first gained entrance to the House of Commons. Mr. Pitt selected him to open debate on the Russian armament, and the Prime Minister characterised this maiden effort as full of science and philosophy, for truly the speaker had come fully instructed to his task.

In 1792, Mr. Jenkinson travelled through Belgium and Germany, and witnessed the state of continental feeling which brought about the league against France. Quarrels between Prussia and Austria preventing the two countries acting cordially together, seem to have opened the future statesman's eyes to the difficulty of effecting a real concert between the sovereigns of Europe, even in the face of what they deemed vital danger.

He strongly advocated an advance upon Paris, as likely to unite the allies in a common object, and strike a blow at the heart of the Revolution. However, this idea was laid aside, when fortune, as it shortly did, inclined to the side of the French.

In 1796, Mr. Jenkinson became Lord Hawkesbury, and favoured the attempt made by Pitt to end the war, which, renewed again in 1798 and 1800, was on each occasion foiled by the impracticability of the French negotiations.

The famous naval quartette, Nelson, Howe, St. Vincent, and Duncan, swept the seas of French shipping, armed and unarmed; but the valour of our troops could not avert disasters which inferior generalship imposed on us when we essayed to regain Holland for the Stadholders.

It was, therefore, after military failure, and in the

midst of distress and discontent at home, that Mr. Pitt desired to follow up the union of Ireland with Great Britain, by a measure of Catholic relief. To this, George III. refused his assent.

The character of George III. has been variously estimated. By Lord Brougham* prominence has been given to his relentless and unforgiving conduct towards those who differed from him in principle ; to the indifferent education he had received, and the unconstitutional estimate of the power of a prerogative, which, during the Premiership of North, Pitt, Addington, and Grenville, asserted a position ahead of either Lords or Commons.

It is shown how he told his favourite minister, Lord North,† that he would never prosper until he learned to disregard defeat in the Commons, and that the prevalent desire of the ministers seems uniformly to have been first to please the King, and avoid measures which he was known to regard with disfavour.

On the other hand it has been urged, with equal truth, that one unfailing standard of principle was ever before George III., and that no personal exaltation ever intermingled with his determined opposition to whatever he believed unconstitutional and contrary to his coronation oath. He believed that on the terms of the compact between England and the House of Brunswick, he was as much bound to preserve Protestant ascendancy in

* *Lives of Statesmen of the Reign of George the Third.*

† *Letters of George the Third to Lord North.*

Ireland, as he was to assert Imperial supremacy in the councils of our colonies.

His letters may be ungrammatical, but they are at least pithy, terse, and always to the point; nothing seemed to escape him, from the conduct of individual members in Parliament to the tenour of an agent's letter.

"Ford * writes without flowers" is his characteristic comment on the report of a visitor to Paris, who believed Louis XVI. was about to help the Americans, and the character of that document was not misinterpreted by the English king, who henceforth prepared for the hostility of France.

The results of this policy lie before us. American independence was gained, as in the opinion of most men it invariably must have been under the peculiar combination of circumstances † which ensued. But the same cause that helped to split in twain the British Empire, destroyed once and for ever the foundations on which the French Monarchy had for ages rested secure. Tainted by the contagion of Republican ideas, the soldiers and sailors of France returned to give effect to their newly imbibed principles, destined shortly to take root in ground otherwise prepared for their reception. The last man to recognise American independence, the upright British king, declared he would be equally faithful to the new conditions which he had unwillingly

* *Letters to Lord North from George the Third*, edited by Lord Brougham.

† France, Spain, and Holland joined America.

sanctioned. The refusal to settle the Catholic claims seems to us now a gigantic error.

The emancipation of the Roman Catholics was, sooner or later, inevitable, its final adoption being allied to the best and wisest traditions of statesmanship. But notwithstanding these errors, there remains the constitution of this kingdom in its present condition as a monument to George III.'s memory.

Nobody who reads the history of the French Revolution, and learns the sympathy which the thoughts and aspirations of its devotees aroused here, can fail to see that the stolid determination and statesman-like forethought of our grand old king saved this country from a revolution.

It is impossible to travel in the country districts of Great Britain and see the morality and comfort which the national acknowledgment of religion amongst us has effected, and not bless the memory of the ruler who defended their liberties. Inalienably allied as religion is to the well-being of any community of men, its abandonment and the adoption of selfish rules of conduct have ever proved the precursors of national decline.

It is not proposed here to enter into the merits of the Catholic question. The assertion that good citizenship was incompatible with the religion of a Roman Catholic, has not, as a matter of fact, been proved correct in modern Ireland. But for the priestly and Papal influence being exerted on the side of law and order, more than one later crisis would have become acute and have enlarged the domestic troubles which hover around a still unsolved political problem. But for the generous

measures of public policy dreamed of by Pitt, forwarded by Grenville, and consummated by Peel and Wellington, this beneficent tendency would scarcely have existed.

When George III. refused to accept Catholic emancipation in 1801, he was asserting a principal that has since been abandoned by the nation, but which it does not follow the special circumstances of the time did not render expedient. Mr. Addington, at any rate, accepted office on the tacit understanding that this question was not to be advanced, and when Lord Hawkesbury took the Foreign Office seals he became soon convinced of the desirability of that peace which the changed demeanour of the First Consul of France appeared to render possible.

The reign of Lord Hawkesbury at the Foreign Office was distinguished by direction of the discussions which led to peace being arranged at Amiens between Great Britain and France on March 27th, 1802. Unhappily the chronicler must likewise describe the speedy return of war, which, coming as it did when the national desire for repose had been by no means satisfied, has led to the opinion that statesmen hoped for nothing but an armed truce, when discarding the protests of Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham, they resolved to seek a *modus vivendi* with that devouring spirit of aggrandisement which had fixed itself on the national counsels of France. When the resolve had once been taken, the choice of Lord Hawkesbury as instrument for carrying it through was in every way desirable. Those there were who under-rated the abilities of that steady man of business, whose solid worth was to influence the destinies of his time.

Lord Hawkesbury's (then Mr. Jenkinson) first speech in Parliament had been one upholding the European balance of power.* The principle at stake has been more or less condemned in modern times, but, as Professor Montagu Burrows has told us in his *Imperial England*, it contains the germ of a great truth.

Like other truisms, the balance of power as an antidote to war may be pressed to a hurtful extreme, and prove dangerous to liberty; but until the time comes when wars shall cease, and the lion lie down with the lamb, there will be danger to the State whose rulers shall elect to isolate their country. For to such result must the rejection of Lord Hawkesbury's great principle logically lead.

The key-note of the Minister's conduct preceding the Peace of Amiens may be said to have been struck when his observance of this principle has been noted.

Buonaparte, as First Consul of France, had succeeded in arraying the kingdoms of the north in commercial opposition to this country,† and for the moment no European field appeared to invite scope for British energies or due results for expenditure of her matchless but weakened resources.

At home the cry for peace was general, and the Foreign Secretary resolved to consolidate strength and to take advantage of circumstances which appeared to make a cessation of hostilities possible.

* The phrase, "balance of power," was first used in Parliamentary discussion by Sir Robert Walpole.

† The policy of opposition to the armed neutrality which entailed Lord Nelson's action at Copenhagen in 1801, was resolved on by Mr. Pitt.

The jealousy of English naval power had led Europe to accede to French proposals which, Lord Hawkesbury saw, their own interests would ere long force them to rebel against, and it is worth while to notice here, that the maritime changes demanded by the Confederation were not nearly so sweeping as those actually passed into law by the Declaration of Paris sixty years afterwards.

It is impossible, moreover, to read the records of our high-handed conduct in insisting on the rule of search, as put in practice both against Denmark and Sweden, without seeing that Napoleon gauged the weak spot in England's position when he essayed to enlist on his side the jealousy of smaller naval Powers. Russia, it is true, had no such grievance to urge, but her gradual change of attitude became equally notorious, and culminated in the seizure of British property in Russia, and an embargo being laid on all English vessels in the ports of that Empire.

When the unfriendly conduct of Russia became likewise apparent, the extent of the web which Buonaparte was weaving unfolded itself to the English Ministry, who had to chose between facing new dangers and accepting the compromise which it became known that the French were prepared to accede to.

At home, two bad harvests in 1799 and 1800, together with one indifferent one in 1801, had reduced the lower classes to the verge of famine. So inadequate was the supply of wheat that many well-to-do families agreed to limit consumption to a quartern loaf per week, and to their further credit were open-handed to such a degree

that absolute want was avoided among the poor. But the public spirit became impaired, and the continuance of a desolating struggle with France, aided by her new allies, was judged impolitic and doubtful in the extreme.

Still the nation, as represented by Mr. Addington's able Foreign Secretary, was prepared to agree to no dishonourable terms. The fruits of Sir Ralph Abercromby's victory in Egypt were to be secured and the French evacuation rendered permanent, whilst Ceylon and Trinidad were to be retained by England, and Buonaparte's troops withdrawn from Naples and the Papal States.

Lastly, and most important proviso of all, Malta was to be surrendered by England to the Knights of St. John, and placed under the guarantee of Russia and Naples, who engaged not to return the island to France.

Herein, however, were the seeds of future discord. For a time it seemed as if nothing short of the immediate evacuation of Malta would satisfy the plenipotentiaries of France, who, when the treaty was signed, must have seen that difficulties were likely to arise. The Hereditary Grand Master of the Knights of St. John was said to be the Emperor Paul of Russia, who for reasons of his own refused to accept the guarantee assigned to him in the treaty.

The Order itself was scattered and disorganised. Their return to Malta was improbable, and proved an excuse given both for French irregularities elsewhere, and for retributive diplomatic evasion on the part of England.

That Lord Hawkesbury knew the French desire to

possess Malta, and prepared to thwart it in every possible way, can be the only solution of a transaction which, looked at fairly, cannot be said to present England as minutely faithful to treaty engagements.

The debates which ensued in the English Parliament showed that the nation would never agree to part with Malta, and the sentiment was expressed by Mr. Windham, an able and finished speaker, when he spoke anxiously of the French claims and of their probable satisfaction whenever Buonaparte chose to wrest his spoil from the feeble hands into whose keeping it was to be entrusted.

The First Consul of France and Talleyrand were certainly bent on opposing a British occupation of the island, and the wonder is that so considerable a time should have elapsed before the inevitable disagreement ensued. Lord Hawkesbury's admirable speech in defence of the treaty was the pride of Government and Opposition alike. As Pitt declared,* “Who after Mr. Fox was qualified to conduct such negotiations as was Lord Hawkesbury ? ”

Every despatch to Lord Cornwallis, our plenipotentiary, had been carefully written out by the Foreign Secretary, and the instructions were complete, and nothing omitted.

But a shadowy idea has been transmitted to us of the form and character of the minister who did so much to give his country a long and durable peace.

* C. D. Yonge's *Life and Letters of Lord Liverpool*.

As Foreign Secretary he laid the foundation of that consummation so devoutly to be desired, and if as Prime Minister his power of conciliating and governing the passions of others is better remembered than his terse and simple oratory, and patient endurance of the hardest and weariest work, he will yet be remembered as the author of that Peace of Amiens which made subsequent exertions possible to a high-spirited but exhausted nation.

The Peace of Amiens had the public concurrence of both Pitt and Fox. Failing our hopes of Continental alliances, the former held that, although not precisely in terms what he could wish, the peace appeared to him creditable, and, on the whole, very advantageous.

The great Whig leader praised it for very different reasons, and took the opportunity of tilting at Pitt's measures and their assumed failure. Better terms, he declared, were to be had for asking towards the close of the preceding century, and the minister of that day was answerable for all the distress and slaughter which had since occurred.

Lord Grenville, on the other hand, fiercely assailed what he believed to be an unnecessary resignation of our conquests.

It appears to us that Lord Hawkesbury deserves great credit for his perspicuity in seizing a favourable opportunity for negotiating a peace which after-events proved necessary, and at the same time retaining vital British interests under the shadow—alas!—of that uplifted sword, which Britain's enemies shortly forced into renewed action.

There was, perhaps, solid truth underlying the Parliamentary opposition of Windham and Grenville, but the objections had been well considered and, so to speak, discounted by the ministers. It was the breathing space that the fleetest horse or the strongest athlete requires which was sought for our island home—an oasis in that long valley of war and death through which it was necessary to pass before the goal of peace, plenty, and domestic reform could be reached, and England transformed into that favoured spot which we know and other nations envy.

There is evidence to show that peace was welcomed by our neighbours across the sea, so far as the people themselves were concerned. Lord Hawkesbury had recommended the fitting-out of Lord Cornwallis' *entourage* with unusual splendour, and the popularity of the negotiations became manifest as the populace crowded around the equipage of the English plenipotentiary, when, under the shadow of the noble Cathedral, representatives of France, Spain, and Holland met to ratify the definitive treaty. (March 27th, 1802.) *

Lord Hawkesbury had given attention to the smallest

* The table on which the treaty was signed is still at the Hotel de Ville, Amiens, and on the wall are pictures of Lord Cornwallis and the other plenipotentiaries. It is curious to read in the chronicles of that time with what enthusiasm peace was received in England. There was, so to speak, a general blaze of joy. The metropolis and other large towns were illuminated. Feasting, processions with bands playing joyful music, and military demonstrations prevailed. We hear also of mail coaches covered with trophies, and drawn home in triumph by the crowds. Thus did Englishmen receive the truce, of which Sheridan declared, "all men were glad, but none proud."

details, and the French love of splendour and respect for outward appearance was not forgotten.

When the anticipated time arrived and Napoleon threw aside the mask that he had worn with ill-disguised aversion,* the demand for an immediate retirement from Malta reached the English ministry. Malta was then, as now, regarded as the stepping-stone to Egypt, and secret communication warned Lord Hawkesbury how the British were to be driven from that country in defiance of a recent treaty which confirmed their occupation thereof. This placed peace out of the question unless Buonaparte could be induced to withdraw his demands concerning Malta, and application was made by Lord Whitworth to Joseph Buonaparte, who had, in the first instance, represented France at Amiens.

A suggestion was about this time mooted, to the effect that England, in her character of what Lord Grenville called the milch-cow of Europe, should find money to be distributed amongst Napoleon's courtiers, and thus, if possible, get his consent to the abandonment of a project which the English people were determined he should not carry out. Malta was not to belong either directly or indirectly to France. Joseph Buonaparte was believed to wish the treaty negotiated by him to stand, and other prominent Frenchmen to have an interest in maintenance of peace. But Napoleon's brother called officially on Lord Hawkesbury to fulfil

* "Buonaparte seized the *Fame* packet, bound to Jersey, but driven into Cherbourg, between the signature of preliminaries and the definitive Treaty."—Dyer's *History of Europe*.

the covenants of the Treaty of Amiens and evacuate Malta.

Reply was given that the aggrandisement of France, which had proceeded during the peace, was against the spirit of that treaty, as was the aggression on Switzerland.

As for Malta, the Knights of St. John and the Grand Master were not forthcoming to undertake the occupation, and the island would not be delivered over to France as a place of arms. Hence arose a deadlock it was found impossible to remove.

The bribe was never more than privately hinted at, and neither Mr. Addington nor Lord Hawkesbury were disposed to pay secret service money away for objects so obviously uncertain of attainment. Who was to guarantee the continued fulfilment of any such pact, and what English legislature would vote money for a purpose at once degrading and unworthy? Not the least demoralising part of Napoleon's system consisted in the wholesale distribution of gold amongst favourites and military officials. The enrichment of his own family, moreover, temporarily resulted, and but for the fact that greed in turn begets extravagance, the Napoleonic legend might have been allied to the possession of wealth unrivalled but by the merchant and banking princes of Europe.

The consequences of this pampered desire for gold made themselves apparent throughout France, and permeated to the steps of the consular throne, proving from first to last the bane of an Imperial system, which, having no root in the traditions on which it from necessity partially rested, betook itself to the extraneous assistance afforded by profusion and military glory. The establish-

ment of juster laws than had hitherto prevailed, codified, as they undoubtedly were, with rare skill, and overlooked by a master mind versed in the peculiarities of the Gallic character, accompanied those blandishments.

It is impossible to peruse the intensely instructive pages of *Prince Metternich's Life*, and not to see how all this policy of human wisdom with its preposterous pandering to national weakness depended for its success—aye, for its maintenance—on the presence of the man himself. It is clear that jealousies and furious party spirit were repressed, but at no one time destroyed, and the star of Buonaparte's fortune alone stood between him and the oft courted death in battle, and the gleam of that assassin's knife, which must have haunted the retirement of St. Cloud and the pleasant groves of Malmaison. But it is impossible not to see that, as with the retirement of the all-inspiring presence the system must crumble away, so must the continuance of such influence sap the moral life of a nation, ruled by such a man and governed by such means.

That this destructive canker-worm did not work its way into English public life, is owing to no individual more than to Lord Hawkesbury.

The temptation of securing a probable respite from war, when most required, by means of bribing Buonaparte's following, was put aside by Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington as impossible in English politics,*

* Joseph Buonaparte's frank and honest character, as revealed in the Cornwallis Papers, shows the improbability of his adherence to such scheme.

and we have given prominence to this fact because the secret of a long-continued influence is here apparent. Men looked up to the statesmen of undoubted truth and probity whose public utterances, if simple and unpretentious, conveyed the plain, unvarnished truth.

With rulers such as these on the one hand, and a successful military adventurer on the other, it is wonderful at first sight to contemplate the undecided demeanour of Europe when the conflict between Great Britain and France was renewed. A reference to Metternich's first State paper will, however, show that continued naval success had in the year 1800 generated jealousy, and called into being that unnatural coalition, headed by France and Russia, whose hostility slumbered and was by no means extinct when the peace of Amiens came to an end. (May 22nd, 1803.)

Hence it came to pass that Lord Hawkesbury had not to hand the means of furthering those natural alliances which his well-known policy would have led him to embrace. Measures of defence rather than of offence became, therefore, the deliberate choice of ministers. Mr. Addington was of opinion that by husbanding resources for defence of our own shores, we should reap a fuller benefit from the breathing space which the late peace had given us, and be the better able to take the initiative when the moment should arrive.

The Prime Minister is brought forward prominently here, because the peace of Amiens is as indelibly connected with his name as with Lord Hawkesbury's, so that the national rest prescribed by Addington should be

traced to its author with the same instinct that has attributed our continental influence and alliances to the spirit and genius of his mighty successor.

Lord Hawkesbury, however, loyally defended this attitude as adapted to special circumstances, and from the moment that Lord Whitworth held his famous interview with Napoleon, the energies of the Foreign Office were directed towards thwarting any attempt at invasion which might be made. Great was the excitement in England whilst peace and war were in the balance. A forged letter, purporting to be written by the Foreign Secretary, and announcing a satisfactory settlement with France, obtained credence in the city, and the funds rose from $63\frac{3}{4}$ to $71\frac{1}{4}$. When Government apprised the Lord Mayor of the truth, a corresponding depression ensued. The French view of the question, if not indeed the germ of the whole dispute, may be gathered from the following account of the famous scene between Buonaparte and Lord Whitworth, which, as the earliest that reached England, and taken from a reliable source, may possess of itself historical interest.

"In the saloon where Josephine received ambassadors and persons of distinction, people were surprised by the First Consul's unusual abruptness of manner on making his entrance. He spoke loudly to Lord Whitworth after saluting the company:

"' You know, my Lord, that a terrible storm has arisen between England and France ? '

"LORD W.—' Yes, General Consul, but it is to be hoped that this storm will be dissipated without any serious consequences.'

“B.—‘ It will be dissipated when England shall have evacuated Malta. If not, the cloud will burst and the bolt must fall. The King of England has promised by treaty to evacuate that place, and who is to violate the faith of treaties ? ’

“LORD W. (*surprised*).—‘ But you know, General Consul, the circumstances which have hitherto delayed the evacuation of Malta. The intention of my sovereign is to fulfil the Treaty of Amiens ; and you know also— —’

“B. (*with impetuosity*).—‘ You know that the French have carried on the war for ten years, and you cannot doubt but that they are in a condition to wage it again. Inform your Court that if, on the receipt of your despatches, orders are not issued for the immediate surrender of Malta, then war is declared. I declare my firm resolution is to see the treaty carried into effect, and leave it to the Ambassadors of the several Powers who are present to say who are in the wrong. You flattered yourselves that France would not dare to show her resentment whilst her squadrons were at St. Domingo. I am happy thus publicly to undeceive you on that head.’

“LORD W.—‘ But, General, the negotiation is not yet broken, and there is every reason to believe— —’

“B.—‘ Of what negotiation does your Lordship speak ? Is it necessary to negotiate what is conceded by treaty —to negotiate the fulfilment of engagements and the duties of good faith ? ’

“Lord Whitworth was about to reply. Buonaparte made a sign with his hand, and continued in a less elevated tone, ‘ My lord, your lady is indisposed. She

may probably breathe her native air rather sooner than you or I expected. I wish most heartily for peace, but if my just demand be not instantly complied with, then war must follow and God will decide. If treaties are not sufficient to bind to peace, then the vanquished must not be left in a condition to offer injury.'

"Buonaparte afterwards walked up and down the hall, and discoursed gaily with the guests, but to the English he returned a cold salute."—Article on Public Affairs (*Christian Observer*, 1803).

The theatrical character of this interview tallies with more than one of a like description which the publication of Prince Metternich's papers prove Napoleon to have forced on the Austrian Ambassador at crucial periods of political history. Once, indeed, a message was sent to Metternich telling him that no personal antipathy was intended.

It is clear that Napoleon III. was but carrying out the traditions of his family when in 1859 he startled Europe by an abrupt and threatening observation made to the Austrian Ambassador on a public occasion, thereby presaging the war in Lombardy and Italian independence.

Lord Hawkesbury put the English case before the nation in an able State document entitled "His Majesty's Declaration,"* and although this should be carefully studied by the lover of history, it is not within the scope of this work to do more than extract the important matter named therein. The

* *State Papers*, May 1803.

English contention as regards Malta was explained at length.

It urged that at no time since the Peace had England been bound to evacuate Malta, because several important stipulations were not fulfilled by France.

Yet, notwithstanding the right which His Majesty had hence acquired to retain Malta, evacuation or renewal of war were the alternatives presented. As the French still pointed to the Treaty of Amiens as unfulfilled by England, the two countries continued arguing in a circle, until it was seen that the knot could alone be untied by the sword.

The supreme value of the possession in question was not at that moment gauged by the public, and but for Napoleon's designs on Egypt Mr. Addington's Government would possibly have sacrificed for the sake of peace that which has proved of inestimable worth both during the renewed war with France, the Crimean conflict, and Indian Mutiny. The probable future of the Euphrates valley as a route to India was foreshadowed by Sir J. Macintosh, and many thinking men have ever since desired to see England with a chain of communication between her shores and Eastern Europe.* A taint of illegality clings around the means by which Malta accrued to Great Britain, but it is fair to allow that the alternative of neutralisation meant the establishment of French influence.

The majority of the Knights of St. John would themselves have been under Buonaparte, and English sur-

* See *Greater Britain*, by Sir Charles Dilke, M.P.

render have forged a weapon of offence against her commerce and prestige.

Fair play, as beloved by Englishmen, has never more conspicuously been disregarded than by the opposition to Mr. Addington's Government during the phase of public opinion that made peace as negotiated at Amiens possible. At the very outset, when Pitt had failed either to carry on the Government or to make peace, we find him asking Canning not to laugh at the Speaker's elevation to the Treasury. More than that, however, the sarcastic and brilliant politician refused to undertake. In real earnest, it was never intended to give Addington and Hawkesbury the fair chance they had every right to claim just as much as if they had received a fresh mandate from the nation when in later years it elected its members by household suffrage.

When peace came the unfortunate treaty pleased neither Whig nor Tory, but its after-justification has proved that Addington and Hawkesbury will live in history as the authors of a stitch in time which in sober truth may be said to have saved nine.

As we know, the Whigs ultimately joined in the chorus and dragged Addington from his seat, but his measures were a distinct result of the position he was called on to take up, and in Lord Nelson's and St. Vincent's opinions did not in the least neglect naval interests. Lord Malmesbury's *Diaries* will show that never for a moment were the followers of Mr. Pitt at ease, but political intrigue was succeeded by proposals for a Coalition whose only battle-cry was to be “Let us get rid of the Doctor.”

Canning's talents and especially his wit tended much to bring about the inevitable end, but it cannot be denied that men such as Pitt and Fox must, as a rule, head the parties they severally belong to. The exception took place when a temporary Government became necessary, but with the crisis arrived a state of affairs in which it became plain that if Pitt did not rule, Fox would. It was as if Mr. Canning in 1827 had remained out of office, and left power to his friends. How long could such a Government have lasted? Or again, to quote a perhaps more apposite case, If in 1880 Lord Granville had become Premier, would not Mr. Gladstone have been forced once more to head his party, which otherwise, in a disunited condition, would have fallen a prey to Lord Beaconsfield's sturdy blows.

The debates in Parliament* before and after the Peace of Amiens should be studied by all lovers of eloquence and argumentative power. The characters of Pitt, Fox, Addington, Windham, Sheridan, the Grenvilles, and Lord Hawkesbury can be better understood from the perusal. Certainly the oratorical powers of the Foreign Secretary shine in clear and simple perspicuity, even beside the more brilliant eloquence with which they are surrounded. It is easier to understand how something nearly akin to despair smote the Government ranks when, soon after the renewal of war, Mr. Addington moved his Foreign Secretary to the Lords in his father's lifetime (January, 1804). The objects of this step are fathomless

* *Annual Register, 1801-2-3.*

so far as Government strength was concerned, as it left the Prime Minister to oppose high-minded and plainly enunciated truisms amidst the gathering of a coalition which in ability has had no superior in history.

“Let us be first rid of the Doctor,” was Fox’s irreverent mode of defining his hostile attitude. Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville wavered at first, and then joined Mr. Windham in the common cry, so that the rest which Napoleon’s unpreparedness and Addington’s policy of defence still marked out for the country, was disturbed by the inevitable change of Government which Mr. Pitt’s readiness for office made necessary.

Discontent with Lord St. Vincent’s administration of the Admiralty, and his preparations for defence, were the visible signs of Pitt’s hostility, before which stronger governments than Mr. Addington’s would have fallen.

Sir Archibald Alison has passed a severe judgment upon the parsimonious character of Mr. Addington’s Government, maintaining that when Lord Melville acceded to the Admiralty, the requisite stores were non-existent and the Navy below its proper strength. The reader of the Hon. and Rev. G. Pellew’s *Life of Lord Sidmouth* must admit that such a charge has little if any foundation, inasmuch as an administration lacking proper public spirit in naval affairs would not have had the conspicuous commendation which Lord Nelson conveyed to its chief. The fact is, that so desperate had appeared the domestic condition of France, and so reasonable the hopes of peace, that Napoleon was paralysed so far as offensive warfare was concerned, and for a year at least after the renewal of hostilities

his measures were preparatory and, comparatively speaking, innocuous, so that in England a relaxation of effort had occurred in sympathy.

The time doubtless had come when the star of Pitt shone out again pre-eminently from amongst the satellites who adorned the political hemisphere. The nation was certain, sooner or later, to insist on his guidance, and Mr. Addington welcomed the time with the equanimity of a statesman. It is remarkable that contemporary opinion was by no means unanimous as to the superiority of Lord Melville's administration of the Navy over Lord St. Vincent's. These charges of parsimony and false economy have been frequent in our history, and while containing a certain amount of truth, are frequently the result of that ebb and flow of popular feeling which at one time urges that the national strength should seek undue repose, and at another expects fleets and armies to start up as at the bidding of a magician's wand. Lord Hawkesbury's presence in Mr. Addington's Cabinet was, in itself, a guarantee of due regard to public safety.

King George III. had, in the interval of his first attacks of illness, chafed at Mr. Pitt's absence from the ministry. Once he sent a message to say he traced his ailment to that cause, and the reception of it had grieved Pitt bitterly.

So it came to pass that the waves closed around the administration of which Lord Hawkesbury had been Foreign Secretary, and the registry of its worth was left for the decision of posterity.

If Lord Hawkesbury had done nothing else than

arrange the preliminaries of the Peace of Amiens he would have rendered his country incalculable service.* Sheridan said of that peace that it was one which all welcomed but none were proud of.

But for the evidence secured thereby of the insecurity of any compact with Napoleon, there could never have been anything approaching unanimity in our national counsels.

It existed during the next administrations, containing, as they jointly did, politicians of all shades.†

Lord Hawkesbury was proved to possess statesman-like qualities of the highest class when, after scanning the horizon, he deliberately came to the conclusion that, after all, peace was insecure if not incapable of preservation. The ultimate concurrence of Mr. Wilberforce and his independent following in this opinion has done much to convince historians of its rectitude.

* Mr. Vansittart, Chancellor of the Exchequer, writes to Lord Castlereagh in 1814, saying how the Peace of Amiens had made after-efforts possible.

† A justification of the Peace of Amiens is to be found in Mr. Pitt's own words, spoken to Lord Malmesbury. In vol. iv. p. 151, of the *Diaries* it will be found recounted how he, speaking during the latter days of Mr. Addington's Government, believed that if we acted with a just mixture of spirit and forbearance, and could protract the evil of war for a few years, *war* would then be an evil much less felt. And, again, on p. 162 of the same volume:—"If it were possible to go on, without risking our power or safety, four or five years in peace, our revenues would then be in such an improved state that we might without fear look in the face of such a war as we had just ended." This appears to the author to contain the very spirit which animated Lord Hawkesbury throughout his Foreign Secretaryship.

Not only was the power of France to be stretched over Switzerland and Italy, but a scheme for the partition of Turkey was revealed to Lord Hawkesbury, for the purpose of foiling which hopes were first opened of a Russian alliance in this country.

The murder of the Duke d'Enghien occurring a few weeks after the renewal of war, stirred up indignation against Napoleon,* and created a public opinion in England which would not rest content with what political opponents represented as inadequate measures.

Lord Hawkesbury at this crisis devised a system of volunteer effort as supplementary to the regular forces in times of national peril.

By this means 330,000 volunteers were assembled to meet the threatened invasion. The present militia and yeomanry stand as a monument to his memory, which have since made possible the creation of an army reserve † adapted to change of time and circumstance. Some of the criticisms which raised a public opinion against the Government of Mr. Addington were proved to be empty.

Demand was made for a fleet of small boats to act in shoal water, a species of nautical structure which the naval men of the day by no means favoured, and which has since received full professional trial and been found wanting.‡ The utility of Mr. Windham's system of

* Napoleon at Boulogne, 1805.

† General Peel's Act, 1867.

‡ Sir Charles Napier's Expedition to the Baltic, 1854.

Martello towers has likewise not been held to possess a value equal to the cost of its adoption. The War Office being, however, in 1881, on the point of arming these towers with modern artillery, proves that the original scheme was not altogether without merit.

Sir Archibald Alison has given his opinion to the world that Lord Liverpool's talents were not of the higher order.

Pitt was of a contrary opinion in 1801, and the efforts of Mr. C. D. Yonge * have beyond doubt brought fresh matter into the arena.

He shows that Lord Hawkesbury's Foreign Secretaryship stands out in brilliant confutation of such mistaken judgment. It may be true that in later years, when in exercise of that exquisite tact and discernment which enabled him to keep burning questions from the front when the Commonwealth needed all its resources for self-defence, there were not put into prominence those other qualities of the statesman which his contemporaries discerned, and which an honest and careful study of Mr. Yonge's volumes will show that he possessed.

His Premiership is perforce brought before the readers of the later pages in this book, and has no place here; but his being the head of a school in statesmanship which Prime Minister after Prime Minister has chosen to model himself upon, proves that the possession of extraordinary information, unfailing patience, natural kindness, facility of expression, both of tongue and pen, and above all a high rectitude of purpose, may land the

* Lord Liverpool's *Life and Letters*.

possessor on the highest pinnacle of fame which a British subject can attain. In the science of governing the passions and restraining the ambition of men, and yet retaining their service for the State, Lord Liverpool has not his equal in English modern history, so that his Premiership merits far more than the mere passing notice here given, and it was, to say the least of it, a most extraordinary evidence of the power of compromise in politics. A period of equal responsibility was certainly undergone by Mr. Pitt, but not during times of greater import abroad and at home.

For the scope of his policy Lord Liverpool was always proud to acknowledge himself indebted to Pitt, and the war forced upon Europe had of necessity to be carried to a conclusion. It became necessary then to determine where liberty drifted into licence, and his action is challenged according to individual bias. It is indicative of the life a public man led in those times when we read that every morning he received piles of letters. Some were certain to entail labour, some to give anxiety if not vexation, whilst a few might render passing satisfaction to the wearied statesman.

The judgment of posterity—certain to be the more favourable as time goes on—is a poor return for labours which, in his own case, ended in paralysis, and in that of his Foreign Secretary, in loss of mental equilibrium. It has been insinuated by Mr. Kinglake that Lord Liverpool, who* of all men did most to organise the

* Mr. Kinglake ascribes the foundation of the new organisation to Mr. Dundas.

War Office in 1810–11, was guilty of omitting a plain duty when in 1816 he, as Prime Minister, allowed the temporary system to be broken up without finding a substitute which should supersede the sovereign's constitutional power over the service, and forthwith bestow it on Parliament.

But he must of necessity have run great risk of arousing popular jealousy against permanent military institutions, must have incurred the hostility of the Court at the close of a successful war, when the public treasury was exhausted, and have done all this, moreover, when the strongest Parliamentary influence was adverse to such a change, and when Europe was yet quivering with half-subsided excitement.

It would indeed have been a contravention of President Lincoln's rule, “never swop horses in crossing a stream,” if Lord Liverpool had plunged England into a doubtful constitutional controversy for objects which, however good in themselves, might have denied us the services of our chief organiser,* if not of our greatest general,† neither of whose merits exempted them from passing unpopularity. Never has an individual continued so many years in prominent political situations without displaying party spirit as Lord Liverpool. Persistently refraining from use of sarcasm in debate, he either did not possess the combative spirit common to most eminent statesmen, or he had unrivalled power of suppression. When we contemplate the acrimony which even historians and philosophers have displayed when

* Duke of York.

† Duke of Wellington.

launched into the vortex of party strife, this abstention is the more remarkable. Mr. Yonge has justly remarked that Lord Liverpool's private character is a reflex of his public actions.

There is little to note beyond a high sense of moral rectitude, and abhorrence of anything unreal, whilst his duty to his country was nobly performed, and each successive generation will be more ready than the former to acknowledge the benefits they inherit from a most remarkable administration.

The opinions of Lord Liverpool are reflected with certainty in his speeches, because those effusions were not merely the results of spontaneous and polemical expression, but of long and well considered judgment. Probably no more readable volume could be formed out of Parliamentary addresses than a sympathetic editor might compile out of Lord Liverpool's oratory. The substance of a speech made by Lord Liverpool on Ireland in June 1822 is even now worth reproduction, as showing the philosophical outcome of much thought and some experience. In the opinion of Lord Liverpool the sub-divisions of property in Ireland arrested the progress of civilisation. At the same time he believed the evils of that country to arise from the internal state of society, and the relation in which the great body of the people in that country stood with respect to that portion of the people who had property. The Prime Minister must have had the desirability of some legislation as to Irish land in his mind's eye, but not in the direction of the creation of a peasant proprietary. He went on to speak of the bad moral effect that absenteeism

had on the people, even beyond the material injury suffered from large masses of money being drawn from the country instead of being spent in it.

As to Parliamentary Reform, Lord Liverpool held liberal sympathies, but doubted whether an extended franchise would lead to a better reflex of the general national will, or, to use his own characteristic simile, whether, if the people were collected together on Salisbury Plain, and allowed to give a collective vote, they would necessarily eschew improper attachments or unreasonable aversions, whether it be certain that they would not place too much confidence in an unworthy minister, while they refused the same trust to another whom all men acquainted with his character and scheme of policy would desire to honour. The defect, according to Lord Liverpool (then Mr. Jenkinson), did not in 1793 consist so much in representation, but was deeply ingrained in human nature, and could not be removed by concession as could mere passing discontent. In common with many other thoughtful statesmen, he trembled, to use his own words, at the idea of a pure democratic preponderance, such as must obtain when the franchise is conferred as a right, and not, therefore, accepted as a privilege.

Thoughts such as these cannot be entirely disregarded even now, when, eighty-seven years afterwards, we are awaiting the results of yielding the outworks of a citadel not yet delivered up to mere popular clamour.

Lord Liverpool himself, however, would not have defended *per se* the obvious abuse which rendered the possession of a borough a marketable property, and it

was mainly against such evils that the reformer's efforts were first directed.

In distribution of patronage Lord Liverpool's conduct was simply unexampled for its watchfulness over public interests, reaching even, as some thought, to undue sensitiveness. Talk of his Premiership as an age of jobs, why he refused to forward the desires of the Duke of Wellington* as if he had been the poorest subject George IV. possessed, provided he was not satisfied of the propriety of a request !

Towards the close of 1826 Lord Liverpool was warned by Sir Henry Holland that his health was in a precarious condition.

As, however, he persevered in discharging his excited and exhausting duties, his system failed to gain the requisite repose, and on the 17th of February 1827 he retired to rest at Fife House apparently in good health.

On the following morning, Saturday the 17th of February, he took his breakfast alone in his library, and read through the post letters, the advent of which he was wont to dread. Some time afterwards his servant, looking into the apartment, found him stricken with paralysis.

From that moment his resignation of the Premiership became a necessity, and a career closed which will both bear and repay constant study.

Throughout the necessary researches for the composition of these pages no fact has struck the writer so forcibly as that Lord Liverpool's talents and services

* *Life and Letters of Lord Liverpool*, by C. D. Yonge, vol. iv.

have been notably and strangely underrated by his countrymen. A study of his career will reveal philosophical thought and seldom-erring wisdom, joined with the tact and moderation of a statesman, and sustained by the high principle of a Christian, in a degree not found united in a single character in any other instance presented by the records of his time.



LOR^D HARROWBY.

MAY 1804 TO MARCH 1805.



N the year 1762 was born Dudley Ryder, afterwards second Baron Harrowby. In 1776 he went to Harrow under Mr. Heath. In those days it was the Harrovian custom for boys of position and ability to present their pictures to the master under whose roof they lived. That of the young Ryder is now extant, and represents a most attractive-looking youth. There is trace in those frank, open features of the temper and discrimination which afterwards enabled him to play no mean part in the world's history. The picture in question was given by the representative of the Heath family to the present Lord Harrowby, and is cherished as an heirloom.

A family representative of this boy's old master was, at the time of the late tercentenary at Harrow, the senior



Lord Harrowby.

old Harrovian, and his signature remains amongst many others enrolled on that day as a link between young and old Harrow—between the scholar of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Young Mr. Ryder from the first evinced the possession of talent, and his quickness in acquiring languages was of great help to the future diplomatist.

He learned to become a ready and accomplished French scholar, and there can be little doubt that this talent, seconded as it was by patient observation and sound judgment in estimating character, contributed greatly towards a reputation which became famous on the Continent, and was appreciated most thoroughly by the many colleagues with whom he from time to time acted.

During the whole of his life Lord Harrowby suffered from a liability to headache of an acute and disabling character; consequently it was that in more than one Government he was obliged to take positions which did not entail hard official work. It is, therefore the higher tribute to his many excellent qualities that he should have been the chosen colleague of four different Prime Ministers.

It may, perhaps, have been consequent on the uncertain health above described, but Lord Harrowby throughout life seemed constitutionally inclined to shrink from the highest office. Twice at least the Premiership appears to have come within his grasp when, either from modesty or other kindred cause, he made way for others. He had the discrimination, it may have been, to gauge the extent of his strength, and so accepted

offices where his advice and judgment were exercised on behalf of the State, but where his services were not fully made known to the public.

At the age of twenty-one a seat in Parliament awaited the future Peer. As many years afterwards he told the House of Lords, his family was so respected and befriended in Tiverton, that it was an interest simply and entirely personal, and dependent neither on possession of property nor conference of money, ~~that~~ secured the seat. He would not, as he jocularly observed, have feared the pecuniary opposition even of an Indian Nabob. His grandfather, having been Solicitor General in 1730, came to the borough and secured his election. The worthy law officer of the Crown was succeeded by his eldest son, and in turn the like honour came to be conferred on the subject of this chapter, whilst in 1795 Mr. Ryder's colleague in the representation of Tiverton died, and a younger brother was welcomed by the electors.

The above tells of a phase in the political life of those days, which later legislation has entirely obliterated. There is now no such thing as a safe family seat, and as the wisdom of our rulers has so decreed, it is doubtless for the best. There is, however, nothing mean or demoralising in the adherence of Tiverton to the Ryder family.

We have it on Lord Harrowby's own assertion, that it was the feeling of respect for the father which, descending to the son's sons, opened an honourable career to the scions of a noble house, by gaining for him the training of the House of Commons so invaluable

to any future Peer who, like Lord Harrowby, possesses talents and inclination to profit thereby.

Lord Harrowby, then Mr. Ryder, was Pitt's second in his duel with Tierney in 1796, and before that event reminded the Minister how England would be endangered if left bereft of a guidance she relied on, and asked, should the chances of conflict prove unfortunate, who was to fill the vacant post when an unfruitful and sustained war pressed heavily on the nation.

That such warnings should be addressed to England's chosen Minister at such an hour and under such circumstances, is alone sufficient condemnation of a system which has fortunately become extinct in England.

On this occasion, however, we see the Statesman's friend, faithful alike to the man he loved as to the nation he served. In March 1801, with the full concurrence of his party, Lord Harrowby (then Mr. Ryder) accepted the Treasurership of the Navy in Mr. Addington's Government. This step was not taken alone, but in the excellent company of Lord Hawkesbury and several other friends of Mr. Pitt.

The formation of Pitt's second administration has been the cause of much controversy, inasmuch as the resignation of Addington was said to have been brought about by a combination of Pitt's and Fox's adherents, made for the object of uniting the nation in coalition against Napoleon. Yet, when the new Government appeared, neither Fox's adherents nor those of the Grenville connection were represented. The King, it has been

urged, if firmly pressed, would have withdrawn his objection to Fox, inasmuch as his supremacy in England's council was accepted, after Mr. Pitt's death, without a murmur.

Lord Grenville was certainly asserting a fully recognised right when he objected to the exclusion of an individual marked out for office by talent and popularity; but Pitt, had he risked all on the demand of a coalition with Fox, might have been forced to thrust in the background principles which he believed the public safety demanded. Hence the danger of such unconstitutional union. When, therefore, Mr. Pitt returned to power amongst his own adherents, it was natural that he should fill the offices of Foreign Affairs and the Admiralty with others than those who occupied them under Mr. Addington.

He had objected to the general scope of Foreign policy, and to the administration of the Admiralty in particular, under Mr. Addington. Hence it was that Lord Hawkesbury's talents were utilised at the Home Office. Lord Harrowby had delicate health, but of all Pitt's immediate followers to whom the Cabinet was restricted, he had wider knowledge of Continental affairs, thought more about them, and, as the sequel proved, was the fittest man to assist Pitt in his great task of once more uniting the nations against France. Lord Harrowby may be described as essentially an eloquent man. He could be deeply stirred by a fact or thought which aroused his imagination. A great speech of his at an early meeting of the Bible Society has never been forgotten amongst the members, one of whom described

its effect to the writer. He was a politician rather than a philanthropist, but he had come there, he told them, to sound the trumpet of alarm, and to assist in making known how many millions of human beings still existed who had never heard of Christianity. Early in his career, moreover, Lord Harrowby declared himself for abolition of the slave trade, and his utmost endeavours were joined to those of Pitt in endeavouring to reason with the opposition, which was so strong on both sides of the House. Mr. Pitt's idea when the Addington Government fell was undoubtedly, as we have explained, to combine all parties in a general committee of safety in presence of the manifest danger of invasion which, whatever Napoleon may have since alleged to the contrary,* was very real. Thousands of pounds were not spent upon the Boulogne flotilla for nothing. The command of the seas was, moreover, in dispute, and the secret alliance of France and Spain placed France in possession of a fleet for immediate purposes, which, but for Nelson's skill and the favour of the elements, might have screened the Boulogne flotilla during its progress to our shores.

True it is that, as one of Napoleon's generals is said to have remarked, he never hoped to hold permanent possession of the country, but could undertake, if once landed, to make England unfit to live in for a century

* Napoleon declared to Metternich that his army assembled at Boulogne was always intended to overwhelm Austria ; that he never soberly thought of a project on England, which would probably in its execution send him to the bottom of the sea.

after the invasion.* Such was the spirit of the foe Great Britain had to cope with, and to do so with the prestige of being a united nation †—a foe, moreover, who had all his energies at liberty in consequence of Continental jealousies. Now to reconcile these jealousies became the work of Pitt and Lord Harrowby.

The continued exclusion of Mr. Fox from power has been charged against George III. as an unworthy exercise of prerogative; but on the occasion in question,

* In conversation with Sir Pulteney Malcolm at St. Helena, he alluded to his former designs on England in a manner which showed that he had at least a double object in view at Boulogne.

† The conjuncture of all parties at this period is graphically described in a letter from the famous Cambridge scholar and divine, Dr. Dealtry, who was then a guest of Samuel Thornton, Esq., Governor of the Bank of England, M.P. for Surrey, at Albury Park, near Guildford. A County meeting was held at Epsom, for the purpose of assuring His Majesty of general support against external foes. Several prominent Whigs appeared to speak, amongst whom was Lord William Russell, who affirmed the justice of the renewed struggle, although doubting the necessity of the original war with France. After Sir Thomas Turton, a Southwark politician, had indulged in some recrimination as to Lord William Russell's former political opinions, there arose, to use Dr. Dealtry's words, "an individual who delivered one of the very best speeches he ever heard." It soon appeared that he was no common man, unknown as his face was to many present. He justified the war in the strongest terms, drew a most able character of Buonaparte, and said that the French had caused Emmett's rebellion in Ireland. His description of the conduct of the French armies was so pathetic that many were moved to tears, he being heard sometimes with solemn silence, and interrupted by loud and universal bursts of applause when he concluded by solemnly calling on every man in the country to take up arms immediately. The individual proved to be Mr. Sheridan.

both the King and Pitt were prepared for a coalition which, for the fame of Fox and the Prime Minister, it is well to know never received consummation.

The union of those who have no two political objects or opinions in common, cannot (however grave the circumstances combining to call it forth) be for the good of the State.

The people of England are, moreover, specially alive to the surrender of principle which is involved in a change of this description, and although in later days the invention of a specious political term has prevented that from being called a coalition which, in sober truth, is sometimes nothing else, there has not, since the union of Fox and North, been seen an open compromise of opinions between two leaders of opposite parties who are about to divide between themselves and followers the chief offices of State.

Lord Grenville has also been charged with ingratitude for deserting Pitt at this crisis. Bare justice, however, bids one to pause before registering such judgment. True it is that Grenville owed much to his great relative, but if one principle had been chosen as a guiding influence by the former leader of the Peers, it was that of the removing Catholic disabilities. For this he had shown every preference and desire which political opportunity afforded. Is he, therefore, to be censured if a seat in a Cabinet where such claims remained unmentioned seemed out of place and the offer to be repudiated accordingly?

To realise under what disadvantages our Roman Catholic fellow-subjects then laboured, one has only to

know that neither in Parliament nor in the army was a career open, and in the latter service no officer could rise beyond the rank of Colonel, while the Duke of Norfolk, Premier-Peer, and Earl Marshal of England, was unable to exercise his duties without special legislative interference. In the judgment of Lord Grenville, and those who thought with him, this was calculated to weaken England in any sustained effort she might be called on to make.

It was in May 1804 that Mr. Pitt formed his Ministry, and it was in the same month that Buonaparte, after conniving at the murder of the Bourbon prince, the Duke d'Enghien, stepped into the throne of that family and was proclaimed Emperor of the French.

On June the 6th the *French Gazette* published the following :—

“ The invasion of England is to be attempted before the 14th of July. . . . Thirty-six hours’ calm, and England is ours.”

Threats such as these were soon followed up by an alliance with Spain, by which means Napoleon thought to outnumber the British fleet. The squadron within Brest was at least equal to that performing the duties of blockade. When, therefore, both Toulon and Rochefort were destined to contribute a quota towards a combined and allied fleet, there was due cause for hope that a rendezvous of naval power could be concentrated off the shores of Spain which might outnumber the fleet under Nelson, and this, after various counter manœuvres, proved to be well founded.

In September Lord Harrowby gave notice to the

merchants trading to Spain and the Mediterranean that armaments were preparing in the Spanish ports.

The Spanish Government had agreed to pay over a monthly subsidy to France in lieu of the troops and ships which by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso they had consented to find. England did not, however, decide on action until French soldiers and sailors passed through Spanish territory to Ferrol.

Certain French ships were, moreover, blockaded in the above harbour, and the leaders hoped that by manning and arming the Spanish squadron there located, a superior force might be launched against the English.

The capture by the Government of four treasure-ships bound from the West Indies to Ferrol, was the cause of much comment in and out of Parliament, inasmuch as war had not been formally declared, and after this rencontre peace between Spain and Great Britain became impossible. The mistake would rather appear to have been the weakness of the squadron sent to intercept the Spanish ships, consisting, as it did, but of four large frigates, thus forcing the Spaniards to fight for their very honour's sake. It should not be forgotten, however, that our naval resources were fully engaged in opposition to the French.*

* The capture of three, and destruction of one, Spanish treasure-ship was not effected without an incident which stirred the warm-hearted British people, so that a considerable section forgot all questions of international law whilst stirred by sentiments of the purest humanity.

Not only had the loss of 300 lives by the explosion diverted the question from one of judgment to one of feeling, but men were

At this supreme crisis the Foreign Secretary was, unfortunately, obliged to resign his office, but not before the seeds of a European coalition against France had been sown.

Lord Malmesbury, in his famous diary, speaks as follows of Lord Harrowby's efforts :

“ Lord Harrowby found from Foreign Office information that the Continent was quite in awe of France ; Austria unrecovered from her panic ; and besides the natural pusillanimity of Cobenzyl,* the idea of seeing again a French victorious army at the gates of Vienna, terrified them all—that the French had a great force in Lombardy and towards Venice, and this kept them in a constant state of apprehension ; that he, therefore, despaired of bringing this court forward.

“ Berlin he stated less unfavourably than I should have

shocked by the sorrows and sufferings of an unhappy Spanish merchant, who, after spending 25 years of his life in America, had amassed a large fortune, married a beautiful wife, and had become the father of four daughters and five sons. His money in specie was on board the *Mercedes*, which he quitted just before the action with one son for another ship. It is a fact that within ten minutes after he left for the purpose of assisting to man a vessel short of hands, he saw all those dearest to him blown into the air, whilst every dollar that he possessed went to the bottom of the sea. The case was, therefore, not argued in England generally on its merits, and before the debates in Parliament cleared the air, and showed how dire was our necessity.

Moreover, before Trafalgar every available ship was required to watch the French ports, and the measure which humanity would have dictated—viz. the interception of the treasure-ships by overwhelming force—was easier suggested than put into practice.

* The Austrian Minister.

expected ; and said the evil arose from the King supposing he was like the great Frederick to govern by himself, when in fact he was led by flatterers and traitors ; that besides the French had filled the north-west side of Germany so full of troops, and posted them in such a way, that he doubted if the French would not be in Berlin before a Prussian army of any size could be collected. Russia, however, he thought, was the court most likely to be brought into action.

"He went on to state that Spain was subservient to France, and would, sooner or latter, be put in motion against us."

To give an idea of the time and labour consumed by Lord Harrowby in arranging this famous coalition, he was on one occasion closeted with Woronzow, the Russian ambassador, for five hours. Woronzow was delighted with Lord Harrowby, and gave an opinion that Berlin would follow Russia in a combined policy.

It is instructive to compare Prince Metternich's reflections on the European politics of the time with those of Lord Harrowby. Metternich was then employed at Berlin as Austrian envoy, and was to bring the Austrian and Prussian courts into alliance. Lord Harrowby's estimate of the King proved to be a true one, and between the threats of the Russian Emperor and the violation of Prussian territory which Napoleon ventured on at Anspach, when bent on surrounding the Austrian general Mack at Ulm, it ended in Prussia preserving a contemptible neutrality, which resulted in the nation's future degradation.

Austria was brought into action contrary to Lord

Harrowby's hopes, and had the counsel of the Emperor Francis prevailed over that of his Imperial brother Alexander, Austerlitz would never have been fought, and Napoleon's peril proved great indeed. At the same time, Metternich tells us how the Tyrol and Upper Austria were on the point of rising, and how the least hesitation on the part of France or of her generals would have brought this about.

So far as human affairs can be said to have been arranged with skill and forethought, the coalition in 1805 will ever remain an evidence of Pitt's diplomacy and statesmanship, and the praise due to its construction must be shared by Lord Harrowby, whilst the origination of the idea has been traced to George III. himself. The ultimate failure was beyond English power to avert; and Prince Metternich, in his admirable autobiography, has truly traced it to the jealousies and imperfect concert between Russia, Austria and Prussia, but above all to the overbearing and tyrannical conduct of Alexander.

The character of the Emperor Francis of Austria shines out brightly through all the reverses of his country, adding a nobility to disaster itself, and presenting a bearing in unison with the simple, patient courage of the poor German soldiery, who went forth to disaster after disaster and murmured not.

Madame de Remusat's remark has great penetration when she wonders why the Powers did not agree at first utterly to destroy Napoleon or else leave him to carry out his projects. The opposing him singly or in a half-hearted fashion seemed to her folly. If Pitt's desire

could have been accomplished, Buonoparte's early designs would have been nipped in the bud ; but the European orchestra that Lord Salisbury has told us of in 1880 never would play in tune. The renewal of the war with England in 1803 had undoubtedly taken Buonaparte by surprise, and foiled his plans as regards this country. Doubtless he reserved his efforts for whatever quarter might seem likely to favour France ; but that the camp at Boulogne was deliberately planned to blind Austrian statesmen as to his designs on their country is too far-fetched, and will not stand the test of thought.

There is evidence that Napoleon hoped, by a general scheme of commercial exclusion, to destroy British commerce, and by a naval alliance to chase our fleets from the seas. For this plan he required time, which universal opinion in England refused to give, notwithstanding that a ministry was in power who desired to husband national resources.

For the Continent and its lost liberties—for England and her fifteen millions of population cheated for years to come of peace and its accompanying plenty—Pitt, as we shall see in the next chapter, sorrowed unto death.

Lord Harrowby fell in descending a stone staircase of his new house in Park Lane, and the shock was too much for his already weak nerves, so that he desired to resign his office after some weeks of illness, but his colleagues insisted on a further interregnum. After a retirement to Bath, where the news of Pitt's bad health reached him, he begged his friend to come down and accept a suite of rooms, which, being on the ground floor, would preclude fatigue and,

at the same time, give opportunity for drinking the waters, but the Parliamentary discussions on Lord Melville's case kept Pitt in town and helped to increase his weakness and agitation.

Lord Harrowby ultimately found, to his regret, that he was unequal to a renewal of duties at the Foreign Office. No less a personage than Lord Malmesbury had expressed himself anxious that the seals should continue to be held by one whom he considered peculiarly fitted for the post, and had gone so far as to offer himself to perform the work at Whitehall, while leaving the patronage in Lord Harrowby's hands.

Although not strictly within the province of this volume, Lord Malmesbury's life can scarcely fail to be of interest wherever foreign affairs are under consideration, and we shall, therefore, be guilty of pardonable digression if we show what sort of man formed this high opinion of Lord Harrowby.

After an Oxford education and residence in Holland, Sir J. Harris went, in 1768, on an embassy to the Court of Madrid, and in 1771 represented England at the court of Frederick the Great. He remained there four years, and saw Poland dismembered without our Government lifting a finger to prevent it. In 1777 he occupied a similar post at the Court of Catherine the Great, and remained there until 1782, when his health broke down. Originally a protégée of Lord Shelburne, he arrayed himself politically under the standard of Mr. Fox, for whom he had the greatest personal veneration and affection. Nevertheless, in 1784 he accepted Pitt's nomination to the Hague, and did so with the

full concurrence of his political leaders. For a short time Sir James Harris had been Whig member for Christchurch, but never seemed to care so much for Parliamentary as for diplomatic duties. In 1784 his private fortune was said to have suffered a reduction of £20,000 during his public career, the emoluments of which were unequal to the demands made upon his purse, and so skilful were his political dispositions at this period, that in 1788 he received an apt reward by being created Baron Malmesbury.

In 1793 Fox's acknowledgment of the French Revolution severed the political tie between two men whose private friendship remained intact, and Malmesbury followed the Duke of Portland and Burke in their secession from the Whig party.

In 1794 Lord Malmesbury went to Brunswick to solicit the Duke's daughter in marriage for our Prince of Wales, and afterwards was employed by Pitt and Grenville in their several attempts to conclude peace with France.

Deafness closed his diplomatic career at this point, but in 1814 he rendered Lord Castlereagh valuable assistance as to arrangements connected with Holland and Prussia, and their situations in the restored European system.

At 74 years of age Lord Malmesbury died, in 1820, and was buried in Salisbury Cathedral. The scenes in which he had been actor, and the great men whose deeds he had witnessed, rendered his diaries perhaps the most interesting diplomatic records of modern times.

With all his unrivalled knowledge of foreign affairs he was essentially a diplomatist, and never held the coveted Foreign Office seals.

It is evident, then, how great was the value of a commendation such as he extended to Lord Harrowby, whom, as we have seen, Lord Malmesbury desired to retain, at all hazards, in his position.

It was left to the grandson of Lord Malmesbury to occupy the position of British Foreign Secretary in 1851, when the skill of his kinsman yet lingered in the memory of more than one living statesman.

Lord Harrowby's Foreign Office career led him to see the necessity for vigorous measures of national defence. The hydra of European discord assumed a chameleon-like uncertainty of name and appearance, but the objects were alike the same which Lord Grenville as Foreign Minister declared he could make no peace with and Hawkesbury vainly tried to pacify; while Harrowby, the man of trusted judgment and moderate views, determined to combat them to the bitter end. Against such trickery as the Treaty of St. Ildefonso prepared in 1796 for England there could be, when it was divulged, but one reply consistent with national honour. That this was given by men of the Harrowby stamp should not be forgotten when cheap popularity is sought to be raised by railing at their measures seventy-six years afterwards, and by looking at the whole question as one of expense without reference to the solid results gained.

In July 1805 Lord Harrowby, having recruited his health, rejoined the Government as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and after the catastrophe of Ulm he was sent to Berlin upon a mission of great importance.

It was for the purpose of convincing Prussia of the necessity that existed for her action.

It is possible, without any undue stretch of imagination, to conceive the nature of Lord Harrowby's feelings when at a great distance from home in times of slow communication. Weighed down with the responsibility of the fulfilment of schemes for which, in their inception, he had been responsible, he was indeed exposing a slender stock of health to grave trial. When moreover, all Pitt's and his own carefully-conceived dispositions fell down like houses of cards, and there was nothing for it but to retrace his steps and break the intelligence to the fast-failing Prime Minister, small wonder that with return across the channel came a firm resolve never to undertake so wearing a task again.

Sir George Jackson has left evidence in his letters of the bad health with which Lord Harrowby was afflicted during his embassy to Berlin. The persistence displayed during harassing duties, and in the face of hopeless Continental intelligence, is greatly to the credit of the British envoy, so that Mr. F. Jackson, the English representative at Berlin, scarcely makes a just estimate of Lord Harrowby's talents when he describes him as a peevish valetudinarian. The wonder to most men's minds will be that under such disadvantageous circumstances Lord Harrowby should have, in this short time, laid the foundation of a Continental reputation, of which, as we have elsewhere narrated, Lord Brougham learnt but one flattering opinion during his tour abroad. On this occasion Lord Harrowby had all the British Foreign Office Staff placed under his direction, and

results were expected from his mission which would doubtless have received realisation if he had not, so to speak, met Austerlitz on his arrival in Germany, whilst the demonstration which the Prussians made after France had infringed the neutrality of their territory was speedily hushed up in retreat, as tidings of Russo-Austrian disasters arrived.

Lord Harrowby's nervous system came to be sorely tried by the overwhelming sense of responsibility on this occasion, and this, added to the sense of failure caused by no fault of his own, and the tendency of events altogether setting in contrary to English interests, made the idea of any future mission of this description totally and entirely distasteful to Lord Harrowby.

The memory of how poor Pitt in his last illness asked anxiously and constantly whether the wind was in the east, harping on Lord Harrowby's return bearing, as he dared to hope, tidings of a yet uncrushed Europe, added not a little, doubtless, to the distaste for any such gigantic task as the mission to Vienna in 1815, which, calling Lord Harrowby aside, Lord Castlereagh begged him to fulfil. Lord Harrowby took office consecutively under Perceval, Lord Liverpool, and Mr. Canning, whilst, proud as he ever remained of his association with Pitt, that afterwards contracted under Perceval was likewise a source of great satisfaction.

His admiration of his old leader appears to have been intense, and one of the last tributes paid to Perceval's memory was the carrying out of a project on which the late minister set great store.*

* Lord Teignmouth tells an interesting episode concerning a visit of Lord Harrowby to the Harrow speeches the year after

It was a scheme, proposed by Lord Harrowby in 1812, to better the condition of curates in the Established Church, then shamefully underpaid, as their incomes averaged but £35 a year. Lord Harrowby's eloquence did much to set the question astir, thus increasing the inducements for those of gentle birth to enter on the duties of clergymen.

Others besides Lord Harrowby never forgot the features of Mr. Perceval's short pre-eminence in the State. The only practising lawyer * who has attained to the Premiership in the nineteenth century, Mr. Perceval seems to have been exceedingly clear in his ideas of statesmanship and mode of public expression thereof.

Mr. Plumer Ward, in his *Diary*, tells how manfully Perceval fought for his principles in Parliament. His forcible retorts staggered even Canning himself, so that

Mr. Perceval's assassination. He narrates how the eldest son and namesake of the murdered minister selected "Wolsey's farewell" as his subject, notwithstanding Dr. Butler's (the head master) endeavour to dissuade him from awakening painful memories, public and private.

No one present, the narrator informs us, was more affected than the Minister's late colleague and friend, Lord Harrowby, who was celebrating the annual gathering at the school of which he himself was not the least illustrious son.

Lord Teignmouth speaks of Lord Harrowby as one of the most independent members of the House. Whether in Parliament or on the platform, where he rarely appeared, his sentiments, language, bearing, and delivery were expressive of the most refined good taste and enlarged knowledge of men and books.—Lord Teignmouth's *Reminiscences*, vol. ii. p. 200.

* Pitt, Lord Grenville, and Lord Melbourne studied at the Bar, whilst the law was designed for Lord Beaconsfield as a profession.

the field was gained by argument and eloquence, so that the ascendancy of the Prime Minister was a cause of astonishment to his opponents, who had learned to believe they had but inferior men before them on the Treasury Bench. All that vituperative and reckless abuse could effect was afterwards brought into play for the purpose of defiling Perceval's fair fame as a statesman. But the testimony of such a man as Lord Harrowby remains to give a truer impression to posterity, who likewise may consult the pages of Mr. Spencer Walpole's excellent biography, and there learn the unvarnished truth, stripped of the venom of political partisanship and totally bereft of undue flattery.

Lord Harrowby appears to have been again and again the man chosen to fulfil tasks requiring tact and the higher qualities of diplomacy. Thus Lord Grenville begs Wilberforce to let Harrowby take up the Slavery Abolition Bill in the Lords, saying that with his advocacy the chances would be at their brightest. Again, when Mr. Brougham* (afterwards Lord Brougham) was travelling on the Continent he heard no English diplomatist held in such repute.

Although the fatigues and anxieties incumbent on the duties of British Plenipotentiary at Chatillon, Paris, and Vienna were beyond Lord Harrowby's strength, he subsequently, in 1815, undertook a mission to Belgium for the double object of first seeing the Duke of Wellington and learning from him the character of British hopes, and afterwards interviewing Louis XVIII. at

* *Wilberforce's Correspondence.*

Ghent. The sudden nature of the crisis consequent on Napoleon's escape from Elba had precluded the Duke's coming to England from the Congress of Vienna. Allusion to the details of this mission will be found in a later part of this book, but its fulfilment by Lord Harrowby shows how the remainder of the Cabinet shared the high opinion of his diplomatic talents which led Lord Castlereagh originally to desire that he should represent England at the Congress.

The possession of such intrinsic merits made Lord Harrowby's counsel invaluable to a minister like Lord Liverpool, who ruled by the exercise of tact and moderation, so that from 1812 to February 1827, when the Premier died, the post of Lord President of the Council was filled by the former friend and colleague of Pitt and Perceval.

Appreciation of the glorious talents and noble career of the former are commemorated by a monument, close to Sandon, in memory of England's great Prime Minister.

Lord Harrowby's name is also indelibly connected in history with the Cato Street Conspiracy in 1820, inasmuch as the plot to assassinate the ministers was planned to find its consummation in his dining-room. It was a custom in those days—one, moreover, only discontinued in 1853—for the Cabinet to dine alternately at one another's houses, and on the night in question the warning of danger fortunately preceded the proposed meeting. Consequently, the conspirators were alike foiled in carrying out their nefarious scheme, and suffered the subsequent mutilation which a bar-

barous custom still allowed to follow execution for treason.*

If the fostering of such a conspiracy justified the extreme repressive measures since charged against Lord Liverpool's Government, the horrible revenge taken by the State upon lifeless bodies proves a necessity to have existed for a change of practice in criminal punishment such as went far to justify any agitation for its removal, if conducted upon constitutional principles.

A story thoroughly characteristic of Lord Harrowby's natural nonchalance has been handed down to us through the diary of Mr. R. P. Ward. The Ministers were on their way to the annual Mansion House dinner on Lord Mayor's day during the public discontents of 1819.

During the drive the Duke of Wellington's carriage-windows were broken, and the Duke of York reproached for the possession of £10,000 a year.

"Who are you?" cried the mob, when the President of the Council appeared. "Lord Harrowby," quietly replied the imperturbable nobleman. The mob hesitated, not quite knowing whom they had to deal with. "Are you not ashamed of being Lord Harrowby?" at length they shouted. "Not a bit," said the victim of democratic discontent, and calmly passed on, unmolested as those with courage and self-command often are on such occasions.

* Thistlewood and his accomplices were the last men hanged, drawn, and quartered in England. The Duke of Wellington, Lord Sidmouth, and Lord Castlereagh, were the three whom the conspirators most desired to kill.

At Mr. Canning's death the administrative career of Lord Harrowby came to a close, but not the service that his excellent qualities enabled him to render the State.

As an orator, the chief memento of his eloquence and argumentative power remains in the shape of a comprehensive speech on Lord Grey's Reform Bill as it first came into the House of Lords. Lord Grey had represented to the House that an agitation existed in the country such as it was necessary to appease, and declared that the Bill must pass as it stood. To this doctrine Lord Harrowby offered the strongest opposition. He declared that as the Constitution enjoined divided power and responsibility between the Crown, Lords, and Commons, so would it be an abdication of duty were not each House to assert its influence and, above all, express its opinions most fully when such radical changes were proposed.

He objected to the disfranchising clauses as they stood, and to the principle on which they were framed. He thought that the noble Earl should have commenced his reform at the other end, and have given additional members to new populous constituencies which included both wealth and population, and then made room for them in the House by disfranchising boroughs low in the scale of wealth and population. He would likewise have granted additional members to the counties.

It had been argued that with the march of democracy would ensue an era of peace. Nothing, Lord Harrowby declared, could be adduced less in accordance with the teachings of the past. Indeed, the story of

England's own history tended to destroy any such illusion. The Commonwealth may be considered as a product of popular aspirations as opposed to kingly prerogative, yet its foreign policy placed English arms on the highest pinnacle of European fame.

The American war was, at first, Lord Harrowby declared, undoubtedly a popular one, and the possession of the only free constitution in Europe had not precluded Great Britain from sustaining a conflict with France, which, in magnitude, nature, and results, was unexampled in the history of the world.

He concluded with a stirring peroration, and begged the House to give Lord Grey an opportunity of availing himself of that which Mr. Burke called the great ruler of human affairs, viz. a compromise between extreme opinions.

This speech* should be read in full by every lover of oratory. It had an ultimate effect, for the speaker was appealed to from both sides as an apostle of moderation.

He was by no means against a less violent and well-considered change. Lord Harrowby, in company with most moderate men who had enjoyed like opportunities of observation, thought, and research, saw that in 1831 the time for a concession to the unenfranchised millions was expedient, if not necessary. He deprecated yielding to mob law and violence, but exerted all his energies to secure a compromise which should preclude the creation

* *Hansard*, book vii. 1881. Specially corrected by the late Lord Harrowby himself.

of peers threatened by the Whig Government, and settle the question on a firm basis. In conjunction with Lord Wharncliffe he acted as medium of communication between Lord Grey and the Tory Peers. The origin of such action was a representation made to him through Lord Kenyon and others, who were in want of a leader to express their desire to avoid a conflict between the two branches of the legislature, and yet preserve the Constitution whilst effecting the unavoidable reforms.

Ultimately, the followers of Lord Harrowby gravitated to the lead of the Duke of Wellington, but a perusal of the eighth and last volume of the *Wellington Despatches* will convince anyone of the perspicuity and wisdom of both William IV. and Lord Harrowby.

Neither the extreme opinions of the Tories nor the excesses of the political unions led either moderate and statesman-like mind to recoil from the necessities of the moment.

"Reform must be passed," said the King, "substantially in the form Government had proposed, and on behalf of which the popular excitement had been aroused"; but speaking to Lord Salisbury, the King remarked: "The reform must take place, but it was another question whether it should have gone so far."

"Do not a second time resist the second reading," said Lord Harrowby, "because the deep feeling evinced for the measure has been substantially aroused since our previous action. Without reform, the door must be shut against any Conservative Government. Remove the cause of popularity which Lord Grey's Government

enjoys, and the affection and esteem of the country will revolve to its natural leaders."

All this proved to be true, and the dismal prophecies of alarmist politicians were doomed to be falsified.

The letters and memoranda of the time do certainly go to warn one against the dangers of extreme views on political matters formed in apparent haste, and expressed without moderation.

Out of the differences of this excited period Lord Harrowby stands forth as the exponent of moderate counsels ; and so great seems to have been his moral influence, that, notwithstanding his inability to show Lord Grey a large or compact party following, yet he succeeded in allaying the intensity of a crisis which, but for the prominence of the arguments he adduced, might have led through resistance to a wholesale creation of Peers, and the consequent degradation of the Upper House, so shielding the Constitution from a wrench which must have shaken it to the foundation.

The constant comparison between William IV.'s position and that of Charles I. which Tory writers made at this period seems of itself to condemn the nature of the measures they would have desired to see adopted.

On the other hand we have seen how not only did Lord Grey and the King fear they had gone too far, but that the Nestor of Whig politics, Lord Grenville, could never be persuaded in his retirement of the wisdom of the Reform measure ; nevertheless, it does seem probable that had extreme counsels on the Tory side prevailed, civil war would have ensued. The crisis was certainly grave.

It was said of Lord Harrowby that he had twice saved Europe. First when he induced Lord Castlereagh to proceed to Chatillon in 1814, and again when the Duke of Wellington was known by the English ministry to be in danger of assassination ; inasmuch as a conspiracy to destroy him existed amongst the French officers in Paris. It was impossible to acquaint the Duke, who would have straightway insisted on remaining. “Let him succeed Castlereagh,” was the happy thought suggested by Lord Harrowby, and executed straightway to national advantage.

Successively a member of Pitt’s, Percival’s, Lord Liverpool’s, and Canning’s administrations, Lord Harrowby’s name is one indelibly connected with the first half of the nineteenth century.

Lord Harrowby had married a daughter of the first Marquess of Stafford, and his eldest son has undergone a Parliamentary career worthy of his father’s fame. By the action of that son the way was cleared for a settlement of the Burials Question in the House of Lords, much in the same way in which the subject of this memoir had soothed the passions of another generation when civil war threatened the realm.


And that the continuity of family talent should be complete, it is worth recording how high are the hopes of those desiring to see the grandfather and father live again, in the person of the present member for Liverpool, Lord Sandon, whose masterly conduct of the amended Education Act through the House of Commons was justly considered amongst the prominent Parliamentary achievements of Lord Beaconsfield’s Cabinet.

Digression though it be, this allusion to family prowess will not altogether seem out of place to those whose pride in national statesmanship leads them to look for guidance amongst the old historic families, each member of which, in these days of Liberal competition and free opinion, must both win his spurs and show cause why he should retain them.

The former Foreign Secretary of Pitt died in 1847 at the ripe age of 85.



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Lord Mulgrave.

L O R D M U L G R A V E.

MARCH 1805 TO JANUARY 1806.



PRINGING from an old family whose members have long held leading positions both in Lincolnshire and Yorkshire, Henry Phipps, Lord Mulgrave, succeeded his brother Constantine John as third lord in 1792. This brother had been Member for Lincoln during days preceding the American War of Independence, and filled various Government offices of importance and responsibility.

Both Lord Mulgrave and his younger brother Edmund were trained to the profession of arms, whilst each of them formed early acquaintance with the rising star of the senate, the immaculate and pre-eminent William Pitt. Lord Mulgrave had the further advantage of Lord Grenville's good will, that statesman, as we

shall see, taking early opportunity to employ the talents of his *protégé*, who was created an English baron in 1794.

Handsome, open-hearted, and full of energy, Lord Mulgrave in the year 1795 won the heart of Sophia, daughter of Christopher Thompson Maling, of West Herrington, Durham. That the lady of his choice was refined and beautiful the picture by Hoppner remains to show, and the goodly knight proceeded to offer that life-long devotion which, by some commonplace minds, is relegated to the pages of Scott and Bulwer, and yet is to be found amongst the true-hearted of all times and all grades of society.

Lord Mulgrave, before he was married, served as a regimental officer in America and the West Indies, and during 1793 hearing of Lord Hood's occupation of Toulon, was induced by the Admiral to act as Brigadier-General of the garrison, composed as it was of the waifs and strays of several nations. This command was exercised with great tact and success. Soon, however, superseded by General O'Hara, Lord Mulgrave had to leave his somewhat ragged regiment to encounter the buffettings of a changing fortune.

The action of Lord Hood at Toulon was challenged by Major Maitland in Parliament during 1794, and the defence of that gallant sailor was undertaken in the Commons by Mr. Pitt himself, so far as the charges affected his Lordship personally. Lord Mulgrave, on his part, speedily disposed of critics who averred that there had been a promise to restore the Constitution of 1789 when the English entered Toulon. (The National

Convention had in 1789 limited their action, so far as Government was concerned, to a declaration that the King of France should henceforth be styled King of the French, but had confiscated clerical property, and allowed the mob to destroy the Bastille. It was to this Constitution that Frenchmen no less distinguished than Talleyrand himself were wont to revert longingly, even when after the hundred days it was clear that a Bourbon monarchy had once more become necessary. This predilection is again and again manifest in the correspondence of eminent Frenchmen, with which Lord Bexley's papers abound.) Lord Mulgrave, moreover, showed that the idea of his having attempted to defend fifteen miles of improvised fortification with 1,800 men against 10,000 was untrue, and that the most distant post was not two miles from the centre of Toulon.*

It is, moreover, impossible to scan the lately published pages of Lord Lyndoch's life and fail to apprehend how Lord Mulgrave's loss at Teulon was fatal to the cause England had at heart.

We can only hope that the few lines which mere justice leads us to pen on this subject may lead to a correct appreciation of Lord Mulgrave's soldierly talent, as will a perusal of his political career elevate his name as regards the senate and the council-table.

The *Quarterly Review* (vol. 87, p. 266) tells us how Lord Mulgrave served under the Duke of York, when a

* Gifford's *Life of Pitt*, vol. iv. p. 99.

diversion was made by the British in the Low Countries, which, dependent on concerted action with Prussia, failed to effect its purpose when that country recoiled from her most recent engagements.

This must clearly have been during the operations of that campaign which, early in 1793, was participated in by a British division. This English force shared in the successful fighting at St. Amand, on May 8th, 1793, and Valenciennes, May 23rd, 1793.* The after-collapse of the allies in Holland must be, in all fairness, traced to continental disunion, caused by the discovery of how formidable the Republican armies of France were becoming—a conviction, however, which had previously dawned on Europe after Valmy (September 20th, 1792) and Jemappes (November 6th, 1792).

Prussia agreed in May 1794 to provide 62,000 men to be subsidised by England and Holland.† This measure, agreed to in May, was ignored altogether by the Prussian king in June, a fact which should not be forgotten when the English failure to hold their ground in Brabant is narrated.

Lord Malmesbury's mission to Berlin failed, as Lord Mulgrave's to the Archduke Charles five years later, and Lord Harrowby's in 1805 were destined to fail, so that “Slow to conceive, slow to execute,” seems to have been the motto of Foreign Office officials before the days

* Lord Mulgrave could have been in Holland at no other period, as in the autumn of 1793 he was at Toulon, and during 1794–5 in England, and engaged in Parliamentary duties.

† Lord Malmesbury's *Letters*, vol. i. p. 565.

when electric telegraph and railways sharpened diplomacy up generally.

When Lord Malmesbury arrived Prussian recusancy had already been resolved on.

How not to do it, however, can certainly be learned from reading of the tedious and unaccountable delay to which our envoys were sometimes exposed, and at the very moment when success depended on expedition.

The foundation of Lord Mulgrave's diplomatic reputation, which ultimately led him to the Foreign Office, was laid during a mission to the camp of the Archduke Charles in the autumn of 1799, and the projects, for the realisation of which he was sent to carry out, would, it is reasonable to believe, have been successful but for the delay which the Foreign Office of that day imposed on Lord Mulgrave's start from England. The objects of the mission were vital, and yet the British envoy was kept waiting nearly a month, so that it was the second week in August before Lord Mulgrave reached Cuxhaven.

Constant appears to have been his travelling, and ceaseless his energy. We meet with him in the camp of Marshal Suwarow in Italy, at Berlin, and then with the Archduke Charles's army, and finally taking counsel with the Austrian prime minister, Count Thugut, and paying court to the Emperor and Empress at Vienna. During his earlier peregrinations Lord Mulgrave saw enough to convince him that the army of Austrians and Russians posted in Switzerland were in great danger of being attacked, separated, and outnumbered. This

opinion was enjoined on the great Austrian leader on September the 1st, and communicated to the English Government on the earliest opportunity, whilst Lord Mulgrave made it his duty to personally inform both Marshal Suwarow and Baron Thugut of his fears, which one and all—Archduke, Russian general, and Austrian statesman—refused to believe possible of fulfilment, and therefore declined to alter their preconcerted plan of action.

On September 25th Massena drove the Russians and Austrians out of Zurich after a struggle which resulted disastrously for the allies. Lord Mulgrave's prognostications were, therefore, fulfilled to the letter, and as he himself emphasised it, he was a diplomatic Cassandra. But the fulfilment of his prophecy destroyed all hope of the mission on which he set out proving successful. The nature of events which followed threw the Austrians and Russians on the defensive, and after various parleyings and interviews with great people at Vienna there was nothing left for Lord Mulgrave but to speed homewards to the wife and family anxiously expecting his return.

In those days a journey to Berlin, Switzerland, and Vienna was not the mere pleasure-trip that modern appliances and scientific inventions have now rendered it.

Lord Mulgrave's account of the assemblage at Hamburg is most instructive and amusing, telling as it does of the stirring times during which his journey was accomplished.

Republican refugees from all parts of Europe were there. Insolvent debtors from England, *émigrés* from *la belle France*; Turks and Christians crowding the

streets in a perpetual stream, their countenances busy, or in some cases, Lord Mulgrave tells us, designing in appearance.

Such was Lord Mulgrave's description of the population in the first great German town through which he passed. Then we have a lively account of Berlin, from which city, however, the special envoy hurried with such haste that we are left without the advantage of one of his pointed criticisms on men and politics.

We next hear of his Lordship in close converse with Marshal Suwarow, whose noble and frank bearing coupled with kind manner, he highly commends, as contrary to the received opinion of that soldier current in London. Altogether the political gleanings of this mission are thoroughly instructive.

Life at Vienna is admirably described in the letters from which this account is gleaned. We are told of work in the morning amongst generals and diplomatists, of dinner at 3 p.m., visiting and friendly meetings until 7 p.m., when either the German theatre or opera, the evening concluding with homely gatherings, at which strangers — and Englishmen in particular — received hearty welcome from the citizens of a nation allied alike by interest, similarity of race, and general good-fellowship.

It was clear that, after the catastrophe of Zurich and the fulfilment of Lord Mulgrave's fears, his reputation had risen in the eyes of Thugut and the Archduke, in an equal ratio to that in which it was destined to increase in England. Had but his advice been followed, the course of European events might have been

changed * and his beloved friend Pitt not have sunk to his early grave amidst fading hopes and disappointed expectations. But to use the philosophical words quoted by Lord Mulgrave, “ Things without remedy should be without regard,” so we must contentedly await the development of events, and turn for a moment towards the social aspect of Lord Mulgrave’s character, which the letters written to his wife during this enforced separation reflect. The whole series breathe one elevated spirit of respectful affection, the expression of which, flowing naturally and eloquently from Lord Mulgrave’s pen, are the more delightful reading.

It seems to the writer faint and unworthy praise to call them the outcome of a noble and refined mind acting on the warmest heart it is possible to conceive. The sentiments expressed therein, public and private,

* The retreat of Suwarow before Massena was followed in a few months by the conquering advance of Buonaparte into Italy, which, culminating at Marengo, left Moreau’s left flank secure during his advance into Germany. Moreau’s success in 1800 was, as a military exploit, worthy of the General who conducted the retreat from Germany in 1796. At the outset of the later campaign Moreau had opposed to him the Archduke Charles, who doubtless designed the general plan of campaign. It was, however, over the Archduke John that the decisive battle of Hohenlinden was gained on December 3rd, 1800. General Krag had become commander-in-chief of the Imperial forces, but was not present at Hohenlinden. The absence of the redoubtable Archduke Charles pressed heavily on Austria. Besides the advantage naturally accruing to the carrying out of his own designs, the Archduke Charles might have been less shackled by the Viennese Foreign Office than was his successor.

go far to show why it has been that in a self-governed nation (such as England could then claim to have been for at least 120 years) the people have ever elected to be swayed socially and politically by their natural rulers.

Lord Mulgrave was by no means a frequent speaker in Parliament. His first attempt in the House of Lords was, however, described by Lord Grenville as the most brilliant first appearance that was, perhaps, ever remembered,* high praise, be it noted, when coming from such a quarter.

As the chosen friend and colleague of Pitt, Lord Mulgrave's name would have never been forgotten by those who interest themselves in the ways and thoughts of the present century when yet young, even if talents and services recognised by the historical student have remained overshadowed by the giant memories of an eventful age. Those who ponder over Lord Mulgrave's whole career, may say with Tennyson in his *In Memoriam*—

“He makes by force his merit known,
And lives to clutch the golden keys,
To mould a mighty state's decrees,
And shape the whisper of the throne.”

It has been said of Pitt that he possessed few friends, but in his case, as in that of many highly wrought and refined natures, the few become the dearer. We hear of Lord Mulgrave's brother, General Phipps, as

* *Life of R. P. Ward*, by Hon. E. Phipps, vol. i. p. 29.

at Walmer with Pitt when, during Addington's ministry, he gave his time and thought to drilling a volunteer battalion.

From the terraces of that sea-girt home might the friends have discerned distant signs of the very preparations they were leaguered to defeat. There doubtless the inadequacy of a purely defensive war had dawned upon their imaginations. Spurred on to action perchance were they by the sight of the noble forms that studded the Downs, and whose presence made the neighbouring hamlet of Deal a place of passing, if not strategic importance. We know of excursions made along the coast, where Martello towers were continuously posted, and how Pitt himself perceived the necessity for fortifying Hythe and its neighbourhood. Perchance the scene changed to the high ground above Wimbledon where, in the fair spring season, the same friends, in additional converse with Lord Mulgrave, looked out on the undulating country and drank in the breezes as they blew straight from the Surrey hills. There, may be, was canvassed the desirability of a union with Fox, and consequent hope of national unity.

Through all these different circumstances no friend was more trusted, none more constantly consulted, than the accomplished Yorkshire nobleman, who so soon was to hold high office.

When the selection came to be limited to Pitt's old party the path at least lay simply before him who was, of necessity, the mainspring of all action. The management of his colleagues, and reconciling their conflicting interests, had always been a strong point

with Pitt, so that in his last years of office there was little to dread from that quarter.

Amongst these chosen adherents, Lord Mulgrave deserves a mention beyond the sparse notoriety which accrued to him through the passing politics of his time, inasmuch as not only was he an enlightened lover of literature and art, both of which he liberally supported,* but perfect in all the relations of private life, so that it is scarcely to be wondered at that Pitt discerned his high and noble character.

No Holland House or Bowood† was open to members of the Tory party, where their social virtues might receive due appreciation, and leave interesting materials for future history, but Lord Mulgrave's conversational powers appear to have been of a character that in any such gathering he was fitted to shine, whilst his letters are open to perusal,‡ and will be found to combine refinement of expression with an original style.

Lord Mulgrave abjured slavery very early in the day, and was a consistent supporter of Wilberforce until the abolition was carried.

Towards the close of Mr. Addington's Government we

* Lord Mulgrave first described the talent of Jackson, the painter who, by birth the son of a tailor near Whitby, rose to be a distinguished R.A. For the nobleman to whom he owed his advancement he painted—by leave of Lord Carlisle—a copy of the famous “Three Marys,” by the brothers Caracci, known so well to the visitors at Castle Howard.

† Seat of the Lansdowne family.

‡ *Life of R. P. Ward*, by Hon. E. Phipps. (Murray).

find Lord Mulgrave stirring up his native Yorkshire on behalf of a return to power of his friend Pitt; first in the castle-yard at York, where the verdict of the intelligent part of the audience was in unison with that expressed by Lord Grenville when Lord Mulgrave made his maiden speech in Parliament. “Who will beat that?” shouted the enthusiastic Yorkshiremen, proud of their countryman.

Thence went the eager politician to Beverley and Hull to excite the people on behalf of Pitt the unequalled statesman, whose presence was more than ever needed in moments of threatened invasion.

“I do not like this itinerant mountebank oratory from a stage,” said Lord Mulgrave, “but I believe it is necessary.”

Ireland then, as in later times, was the difficulty of England. A premature insurrection had broken out,* and the future was darker than even Lord Mulgrave’s keen vision could pierce. “Fanatics and Jacobins have got the start in exhortation,” writes the Yorkshire nobleman, “and hence the public speeches of gentlemen become more desirable. The Government of Ireland I do not think stronger than that of England, either in wisdom or firmness, and neither have the confidence of the people, without which such virtues have but half their effect, so that Pitt’s mind and temper are alone equal to feel and act upon this great and important truth.” Thus do we see the key-note struck

* Emmett’s Insurrection.

of a political change which the measures of the Addington Government, canvassed and fairly dissected in detail, could scarcely warrant.

When the new Government came to be formed, Mulgrave's elsewhere-mentioned efforts to reconcile Pitt and Grenville were very real and continuous, the mutual friend being ready to sacrifice his own political prospects for the purpose of gaining the desired end.

Thus it was that, hurrying often to Pitt's, where he hoped to meet his friend, he underwent many a long and weary wait in the good cause. Lord Grenville, it is certain, was very loth to heal the connection, and at one time it did appear that Mulgrave's mediation might succeed. But the King stood firm on the subject of concessions to the Roman Catholics which, as Lord Grenville thought, public honour and policy were alike interested in granting, he made what must have been to Mr. Pitt's former Foreign Secretary *the great sacrifice of his life*, one, moreover, followed by life-long fidelity to the principle which, like Pitt, he had soon to leave in temporary abeyance whilst serving king and country.

When the Government came to be formed, a staunch supporter was found in Lord Mulgrave until when Lord Harrowby, shaken by a fall, was obliged to resign the Foreign Office at a most critical moment. Bereft of Lord Harrowby's assistance, Pitt called to his side another friend in the person of Lord Mulgrave.

The new Foreign Secretary soon found means of justifying the alacrity with which he accepted office. His State papers show effective and polished writing,

and the history of the year 1805 teems with evidence of Lord Mulgrave's devotedness to his duties and courage in their performance. Soon after taking office he had to justify before Parliament the seizure of Spanish treasure-ships when war had not actually been proclaimed between the two nations. This was one of those cases such as occurred in Servia in 1876. France was passing men through Spain, who were utilised in Ferrol, either for the purpose of manning Spanish war-ships or for home defence, so that there was, in effect, an act of hostility to England on the part of Spain, whose object was to release the French fleet from blockade.

But it was agreed, on the other hand, that neither international law or morality warranted the course taken by England who had become the aggressor, and had, therefore, provoked the declaration of war which ensued.

Lord Mulgrave was held to have made an excellent case for Government. He spoke at great length and laid stress on the fact of French aid having reached the Spaniards in Ferrol when at peace, and he dwelt, moreover, on the well-known fact that Spanish subsidies were regularly paid to France, so that his speech may be said to have bristled with argument, and to have been strong in evidence.

The attitude of the Opposition led by Fox and Grenville at this period is important, inasmuch as they themselves were soon to be put to that test of office which has stultified the sayings and paralyzed the actions of other gifted ministers. To commence with, they

decisively condemned the seizure of the treasure-ships. Fox, moreover, at this time, declined to bring forward Catholic emancipation, because such a motion could not be effective in the hands of one outside the Government, and yet in a few months, as minister, he was to be found tolerating the very grievance which he had condemned in Opposition, and regretted his inability to remove.

But the Opposition likewise signified their disbelief in the general fear of invasion, inasmuch as Lord Grenville wrote from Dropmore, saying he feared no attack on our shores, and saw no reason to leave his solitude, whilst Fox deliberately judged that the public fears were exaggerated and uncalled for.

After Napoleon had been crowned King of Italy, on the 26th of May 1805, he wrote to George III., and suggested that peace should be made between the two nations. It is remarkable, however, that at this moment he made no definite proposals, and confined himself to vague generalities.

As his official paper had just proclaimed that no peace could be made with England not founded on the basis of that Treaty of Amiens which required the immediate evacuation of Malta, Lord Mulgrave could not see his way to treating this advance *au sérieux*.

The Foreign Secretary's reply was terse, courteous, and to the point, and set forth, that much as His Britannic Majesty appreciated the blessings of peace, he had duties to fulfil towards his allies, whom, with the Emperor of Russia, he must consult on the subject.

Immediately after war broke out again, in 1803, the

famous scheme for the invasion of England took shape in France, and had hovered over England until the time we write of. Boats drawing a few feet of water were built on all the principal rivers of France, and even on their small tributaries, where there was scarcely sufficient water to float them, whilst dépôts were appointed on the coast, and Boulogne was made head-quarters of the flotilla.

Unfortunately, it happened that Mr. Addington's Government were not prepared for the sudden renewal of War, inasmuch as Lord St. Vincent had ventured on certain reforms of abuses at the Admiralty, which, of necessity, left the service in a transition state, inasmuch as a deficiency of workmen and materials was at first felt, and a suspension in the routine of the dock-yards occurred at the moment it was most desired to build new ships.

In the words of James' *Naval History*, "Earl St. Vincent, by his measures, did much temporary evil, but he also did much permanent good."

On Mr. Pitt succeeding to power, Lord Melville filled Lord St. Vincent's office, but the naval administration was henceforth directed by Sir Charles Middleton, a veteran whose scientific skill was only equalled by his experience in shipbuilding and dock-yard matters, and England is indebted to him for an invention brought forward at the crucial moment when French naval power was at its strongest. By means of this scientific advance, hulks in ordinary were made ready for sea in at least half the space of time, and at less expense than had previously been the case.

When Lord Melville retired,* Sir Charles Middleton went himself to the Admiralty, and took the title of Lord Barham. An octagenarian at the time, his appointment

* The First Lord selected originally by Pitt was the brilliant and distinguished statesman, Lord Melville, who, as Mr. Dundas, had spoken with effect in all the greater debates for nearly a quarter of a century. The playmate of his earlier career, Pitt had learned to regard this staid supporter with an attachment which bordered on strong affection ; and when, in April 1805, charges first rumoured about began to take consistent form, the Prime Minister's surprise was only equalled by the strong and determined stand which he showed himself ready to make against all detractors. When, however, Lord Melville refused to meet the charges of misappropriating public money by any refutation that could lead to public satisfaction, but talked in a mysterious tone, which, as the King said, appeared to him rather to make matters worse—(he declared all vouchers connected with the transactions had been destroyed, and if in existence that it would not have been for the public advantage to produce them. Lord Stanhope thinks he alludes to secret service money)—Pitt was obliged to concur with sorrow in Lord Melville's resignation of his rank as Privy Councillor.

Lord Melville, in the King's opinion [March 1805, Jesse's *Life of George III.* vol. iii.] given after deliberate consideration, had allowed his secretary, Mr. Trotter, to derive benefit from balances of the public money. This was in direct opposition to a rule of public conduct which Lord Melville had himself promulgated. The nation was directly mulcted of interest, the capital of which, although returned to the penny, had been used in a way which laid Lord Melville open to the charge of personal malversation, such as political opponents were not slow to make.

It was not to be expected that it should be otherwise when the overthrow of Mr. Addington's Government had hinged upon an assumed weakness in the management of this very Admiralty department whence these grave scandals emanated, and to the administration of which Lord Melville had returned. The events in question had occurred four years previously, and towards the close of Mr. Pitt's seventeen years' rule. It is, however, Lord

was much commented on, and Lord Sidmouth, who had rejoined Pitt, gave vent to the feeling. It appears, however, that but for Lord Barham's skill and science it would have been impossible to cover the seas with our line-of-battle ships and frigates as occasion demanded, and yet have a fleet in reserve for each and every contingency.

All this was done before and after Trafalgar ; and when the so-called feeble war-measures of Pitt are again called in question, it may be well to take account of the perspicuity which placed the right man in the right place, and, in conjunction with our naval heroes, saved this country from further danger of invasion.

An interesting picture of the intervening time when Pitt had arranged his Continental alliances, and had taken, through Lord Barham's and Nelson's co-operation, measures to pursue, and if possible destroy, the combined fleets of France and Spain is subjoined.*

Stanhope's deliberate conviction, after searching all available documentary evidence, that Lord Melville gained no personal benefit from these irregularities.

* An American traveller writes as follows :

" In our passage to Portsmouth we sailed close to the fleet, which lies moored at Spithead. I counted between 60 and 70 sail of ships, besides brigs and smaller vessels. Amongst them were several ships of war from 74 to 110 guns.

" The *Victory*, the flagship of Lord Nelson, lay moored off St. Helens, three or four miles from us, and with a glass I could plainly distinguish her ports. She had white sides, and with her three tiers of guns, made a most formidable appearance. We passed near the *Royal Sovereign*, another 110-gun ship, commanded by Admiral Collingwood.

" As we approached Portsmouth, I was forcibly struck with the

Lord Mulgrave may be described as the minister of expectancy, for he had but to watch the train laid during

magnitude and extent of its fortifications. . . . There was a flag flying on one of the churches, which, as we were told, denoted that Lord Nelson was on shore. A crowd of people was assembled on the batteries to see him embark, and some of our passengers as we came up to the harbour, hired extra boats to land them for the same purpose.

"Lord Nelson, who had been doing business on shore, preparatory to his contemplated expedition, endeavoured to elude the populace, who were assembled in great numbers, in the street through which he was expected to pass. He went out through a back door and through a bye lane, attended only by Admiral Coffin and a few private gentlemen. But by the time he had arrived on the beach, some hundreds of people had collected in his train, pressing all around, and pushing to get a sight of his face. He was elegantly dressed, and his blue coat was splendidly illuminated with stars and ribbons. As the barge was pushed from the shore, the people gave him three cheers, which his lordship returned by waving his hat."

This was the last act of respect which in life Lord Nelson received from his countrymen. He was leaving England for ever.

Nelson's previous chase of the escaped Brest and Toulon fleets, and salvation of British West Indian Colonies by the magic of his name, was fresh in the memory of all. His return and juncture with Collingwood had foiled Napoleon's plan of immediate invasion, so that the Imperial eagles winged their flight towards the German frontier, and totally fresh schemes occupied the fertile mind of that great leader.

And Nelson was, at the moment described, going forth, as Lord Stanhope tells us, sent by Pitt to Trafalgar, there to crush the danger which an equally strong hostile fleet must ever be to England.

But the elements fought on the side of our sea-girt home, and Napoleon's communication with his fleets was slow and uncertain, whilst the Directory had previously rejected an invention which purported to render their Boulogne flotilla independent of wind

his predecessor's *regime*, and prepare for action according to the turn of events. It is no discredit to the new Foreign Secretary that as the whole of Pitt's vast energies were concentrated on the office which he filled, Lord Mulgrave's lucid despatches, and the steady hard work which he performed have not received from historians of the period that recognition which their merit deserved.

Pitt and Mulgrave received together the first reports of General Mack's capitulation at Ulm. At first they refused credence, but a day or two later a Dutch paper was placed in Lord Mulgrave's hands, containing a full account of the battle with Marshal Ney, which brought about the surrender of 28,000 men,* who were undoubtedly the flower of the Austrian army.

Gloomy as was the news, a glance at the map was yet calculated to inspire hope into the minds of Pitt and Mulgrave, who hoped that the Prussians, and knew that the Archduke Charles, might be gradually closing in on the French, who would also have to meet the Russian army and a third Austrian corps.

It was on the latter combination that Napoleon marched to throw all his strength, although according to

and waves alike. [Alison's *History of Europe*.] This possible change had been mentioned in England so early as 1798 [by the then Lord Stanhope to Mr. Wilberforce as likely to be introduced by France] and was the first historical allusion to steam navigation.

* October 20th, 1805. Metternich pays a tribute to General Mack's administrative talents, but doubts his capability to lead an army.

Prince Metternich,* the choice of accepting the battle lay with the allies, and that, therefore, upon the precipitancy of Alexander, who put aside the Austrian Emperor's counsels, must be charged that subsequent halt of the Prussians, and fatal military disaster which ensued.

Between the catastrophies of Ulm and Austerlitz, a gleam of light shone over England and Europe, Nelson destroyed nineteen French and Spanish sail of the line off Cape Trafalgar.†

It is not within the scope of this work to enter into details concerning a victory which is at once the pride of England, and a study for lovers of naval tactics and masterly seamanship. Followed as this action was by Sir R. Strachan's capture of the retreating French ships, England was at last safe from the long threatened invasion.

But the events on the Continent were crushing hope and spirit out of Europe. Austerlitz† was fought, the peace of Presburgh signed, and Prussia allowed con-

* Metternich's *Autobiography*, vol. i. p. 58.

† October 21st, 1805. Those present at Trafalgar who have lately either narrated or recorded their personal impressions (which, of necessity, must have been those of boyhood), tell us how the forest of masts seen on the horizon sent a thrill through every breast, when the enemy's fleet was discovered on the morning of October 21st, 1805. Little more can they record beyond uninterrupted and determined advance, until the smoke of battle screened ship from ship. For a full and detailed account, however, contained in account of events from 1799 to 1815, see *Personal Narrative*, by S. Lovell, R.N. (W. H. Allen and Co.), p. 48.

‡ December 2nd, 1805.

temptuously by Napoleon to feign a friendship and neutrality which her conduct had already belied.

In England, on the other hand, the prospect was indeed lowering, for a long war, or the alternative of submission to Napoleon, lay before her, whilst her naval hero Nelson was killed, her greatest minister Pitt was dying, and the decaying energies of the Senate's ornament, Charles Fox, were apparent.

Abroad, long degradation and demoralising servitude had predisposed the smaller European states—Switzerland, Saxony, and even Holland*—to cringe to Napo-

* The Low Countries were, from the commencement of hostilities, loath to give up their trade and communication with Great Britain, so that, despite rigid French regulations, continual intercourse was carried on. We have the personal evidence of the same American traveller, Mr. Silliman, whose description of England in the autumn of 1805 has been lately referred to. He tells us that the Dutch, in direct opposition to their own interests, enacted laws against England, and then paid their French conquerors for relaxing those laws. Moreover, that the Gallic officials enriched themselves by this means.

The traffic was carried on as follows :—Dutch boats, commanded, manned, and owned by Dutchmen, cleared out from Holland as Prussian, and sailed under Prussian colours. They stated their destination as Embden, a neutral town, and the captain deliberately kissed the Bible, and swore that to be his destination. The boat then proceeded directly to the Thames, and when she returned the same perfused farce was enacted. The natural predilection of the Dutch for gain, if not for England over France, was never entirely crushed out, and the above is inserted to show how bound hand and foot the nation was by a system at once corrupt and demoralising.

Perhaps, however, the worst and most degrading side of that rule was seen in the conduct of Napoleon to the officers and sailors

leon, until they were part and parcel of the Imperial system.

Napoleon himself when, in the midst of his success, he heard of Trafalgar* replied bitterly that he could not be everywhere, and could not again be brought to talk or think of naval affairs, but contented himself by endeavouring to deceive the French legislature† by saying he had lost ships in a storm, and further threw out allusions to Admiral Byng's fate, saying he would teach French admirals how to conquer.

In France the ominous and lowering discontent which had existed before the campaign in Germany, passed off, and our neighbours revelled deeply in their beloved glory.

The public temper in Vienna and London was, however, worthy of the nations whose respective capitals they were, for whilst in Vienna sympathy and sorrow for the troubles of their beloved Emperor was the chief sentiment, in London Pitt's popularity returned, and the horses were taken out of the carriage when on his way

of his gallant fleet which succumbed to Nelson at Trafalgar. Madame de Remusat in her *Diary* describes how they never could obtain justice of any description.

This is also fully borne out by the author of James' *Naval History*, who is eloquent on the wrongs of those poor French sailors who nobly did their duty, and were acknowledged so to have done by opponents. It was indeed a sad reception that awaited poor Admiral Villeneuve, when after his sojourn in England he returned to his country, where he was murdered whilst awaiting an interview with the Emperor at Rennes.

* Dyer's *History of Europe*.

† James' *Naval History*, book iv. p. 115.

to the Guildhall.* The immediate cause of this ovation was undoubtedly Trafalgar, but it must have cheered the Prime Minister on what appeared a desperate course.

The genius of Pitt has been by some held to have waned before that of Napoleon, who designed and carried out his own schemes, whilst Pitt perforce entrusted his to other hands. Had it fallen to his lot to find a Wellington, or even an Archduke Charles, with complete sway over the forces which his diplomacy had conjured into action, events might have shaped themselves otherwise, and the world have been spared ten years of ceaseless bloodshed and disorder.

But there was no chosen leader. Moreover, Prussia by being a laggard in the field, injured the chances of her allies, and laid seeds of a speedy overthrow.

At home matters looked black in the extreme, and we hear of Lord Mulgrave concentrating all his efforts in securing the speedy return of British troops, who had been sent to the north of Germany for purposes of co-operation.

It is true that since Trafalgar the proportion of English line-of-battle ships was as two to one over the French, but the overpowering prestige of Napoleon on the Continent rendered a naval coalition possible whenever the conqueror should have time to turn his mind to the matter.

For the moment it is true that all fear of invasion had passed by, and the Mediterranean remained free from

* November 1805.

the danger of becoming a French lake, but of Pitt, Lord Mulgrave sorrowfully admitted to Lord Malmesbury he had little hope, and of the Continent none.

The Prime Minister was sinking under symptoms which, to use one of his physicians' words,* were those of old age rather than of a man at forty-six.

Wilberforce says Austerlitz killed Pitt as much as the wound at Trafalgar killed Nelson. One would incline, however, to believe also that the long and anxious years of office had worn a constitution which was never of the strongest, and that troubles at home concerning Lord Melville's impeachment, combined with those abroad, weighed down the weak body.†

To the last the indomitable spirit was there. Dr. Baillie told Mr. Henry Thornton that the last stage of Pitt's existence was passed in a typhus fever, which destroyed consciousness and intellect. His own servant, moreover, related how, for many weeks before his death, a terrible restlessness had afflicted him. The minister appears to have fretted for Lord Harrowby's return from

* Sir Walter Farquhar.

† H. S. Thornton's MS. diary. Mr. Thornton was the personal friend of Pitt, and although sometimes differing from him politically, held the highest opinion of the talents and character of the man. Mr. Thornton was member for Southwark for thirty-two years, notwithstanding that the famous Mrs. Thrale of Streatham—and Dr. Johnson's friend—advised him to have nothing to do with a borough notoriously fickle in its Parliamentary affections. The drawing-room of Mr. Thornton's house at Battersea Rise was designed by Mr. Pitt, and remains, as Sir James Stephen tells us, a sole monument of his constructive powers.

Berlin, and spent much time walking up and down his room during the nights. Sometimes his servant would remonstrate with him, but could never induce him to put out the light or to remove the packets of papers which covered the bed.

There is certainly reason to believe that anxiety for England and sorrow at the distressful European prospect was an immediate cause of this restlessness, and indirectly of Pitt's death.

Mr. George Rose, an intimate friend, related with great feeling to the House of Commons, how, towards the end of the great minister's life, he had murmured, "Oh, my country," showing that the ruling feeling was to the last uppermost in his mind. Many are the thoughts and opinions that crowd on to the memory when the name of England's greatest counsellor is recalled to mind. Reflections such as must recur again and again.

But one characteristic feature of his presence and authority over the Parliament remains to this day.

He is universally admitted to have upheld the dignity of Parliamentary debate. There was a majesty in his own presence, which the talents of Nollekens* and Hoppner † have by no means inadequately conveyed. As an orator, Lord Monboddo, ‡ the famous Scotch philosopher, says of him "that an individual had arisen

* Nollekens the sculptor's head and shoulders of Mr. Pitt.

† Hoppner, the painter.

‡ Lord Monboddo at seventy-five, had ridden from Edinburgh to London and back.

in the eighteenth century, who reproduced the periods of Cicero and Demosthenes."

Mr. Windham, moreover, after hearing one of Pitt's marvellous displays, has left an opinion on record that until then he had not conceived the heights to which oratory could soar, or of the power it possessed to stir the innermost depths of the soul.*

The career of Lord Mulgrave may be divided into two distinct parts.

First, the military, as above narrated, and which closed after the mission to Vienna in 1799, issuing distressfully for the public cause, and yet drawing attention to the talents and foresight of the envoy; and, secondly, the political, which is the more immediate object of this memoir to narrate, meeting as it did early reward and honour in the shape of that Foreign Secretaryship which at a moment of doubt and difficulty Pitt evinced his confidence by bestowing on Lord Mulgrave.

We have so far traced the political career of our hero up to the point when, left alone with Pitt's unaccomplished schemes on his hands, he and his colleagues were unprepared to remain in office.

To no one probably did the momentous change consequent on Pitt's death come home with such redoubled force as to his Foreign Secretary. The converse

* Such was the European fame of Mr. Pitt, and the affection entertained for him by those who had been in contact with his presence, that Count Woronzow, the Russian Ambassador, lamented with tears to Lord Mulgrave the premature loss of one so precious to the world.

between the two men had become close to a degree, cemented as it was by common hopes destined to suffer bitter and overwhelming disappointment, so that the possibility of retaining office without the presence of a master mind to guide, and in the face of Fox's claims, never entered Lord Mulgrave's head, as his own recorded Cabinet vote shows. Doubtless his worship for Pitt's memory led to Lord Mulgrave forming this opinion.

Perhaps the intercourse which most operated to create this intimacy between Pitt and Lord Mulgrave took place in the year 1802, when both the friends were at Bath, and the Modern—for by that name, as expressive of fame unique in the period during which he lived, was Pitt known amongst his intimates—was believed to be benefiting slowly from the waters.

Few there are acquainted with the quaint old streets and houses of the Somersetshire watering-place so famous during our Continental wars, who have not peopled Bath in their own minds with the forms of departed wits and men of fashion. Far, however, in advance of any of these whilom denizens of the handsome and cleanly city, must rank the residence of Pitt and the brilliant coterie of statesmen who sunned themselves in the light of his gifted presence.*

Chief among these, doubtless, was Wilberforce, who himself used the waters medically, but even he was not

* Lord Harrowby, Lord Bathurst, and Lord Wellesley were specially and personally favoured, whilst Lord Hawkesbury and Lord Castlereagh Pitt accounted ministerially indispensable when he took office for the last time.

on closer terms than Lord Mulgrave, who combined the radiant affection of the friend with the sympathy of an unswerving colleague, being specially leagued together with the Prime Minister in Foreign Affairs.

But it became necessary to yield to national desire and place Fox in office.

There is nothing more certain in politics than that great ability will have its swing, and that leading minds must rise to the uppermost level even when every indiscretion and Parliamentary excess has been indulged in. Mr. Fox was an example of what we mean when, although not destined to become Prime Minister, he took the Foreign Office seals from the hands of Lord Mulgrave, and did so as taking the office of his choice by right of being, after Pitt died, incomparably the first politician in the kingdom, when the nation demanded that his talents should be exercised on its behalf.

Lord Mulgrave's opposition to the Government of all the talents was tempered at first by deep sorrow for Pitt's death, and afterwards by concurrence in two leading principles of Lord Grenville,* viz. Abolition of the

* Lord Mulgrave had struggled hard to keep Pitt and Grenville from political separation. His high opinion of the latter's statesmanlike qualities coincided with that of Lord Harrowby, and it is remarkable that he never mentions the current story that Lord Grenville shrunk from the Premiership in later years in order that he might retain the Auditorship of the Treasury and with it a permanent salary. Good work performed on behalf of his country during a long and unselfish life should relegate to contemptuous oblivion such suggestions, even if the pens giving them publicity be guided by the minds of those who should know better.

Slave Trade, which the latter nobleman's Government led Parliament to declare against, and Catholic emancipation, which eventually destroyed them.

When the Duke of Portland's Government came to be formed in 1807, Lord Mulgrave undertook the naval administration of Great Britain as First Lord of the Admiralty, a duty performed, as the pages of James' *Naval History* go to show, to great national advantage.

Lord Mulgrave held continually in view the necessity of keeping naval supremacy for England.

Whether by neutralising Napoleon's projected naval alliances, scheming to destroy his fleets, and so rendering his contemplated battle of Cannæ impossible, the same diligent forethought was constantly exercised. To Lord Mulgrave, moreover, England owes it that the talents of Lord Cochrane—afterwards Earl of Dundonald—were not allowed to remain unknown to the world. He placed him in command, which enabled Cochrane to put into practice his famous project for the destruction of the French fleet in Basque roads, and although the scheme was but partially successful, the engagement drew attention to naval talents, second only to those of Nelson, which might otherwise have been lost to their country.

Lord Mulgrave must clearly share with his colleagues responsibility for failure of the Walcheren expedition. The fleet, however, which, as First Lord of the Admiralty, he had despatched to the Scheldt, was equal in point of equipment to any task demanded of it.

Lord Mulgrave, however, as a member of the Cabinet, ran into the prevalent error of underrating Lord Castle-

reagh's talents, though with regard to the dispute between that statesman and Mr. Canning, which destroyed the Portland Government, from first to last Lord Mulgrave bore witness that Mr. Canning believed Lord Castlereagh to be fully cognisant of the Cabinet decision concerning him.

Moreover, Lord Mulgrave ever appreciated the grand qualities of Mr. Canning's mind, confiding in him as a colleague, and being proud of him as an Englishman.

Mr. Perceval's Government was not formed in 1809 without Lord Mulgrave filling his previous position at the Admiralty, but delicacy of health soon warned the First Lord that sooner or later he must seek comparative repose. Thus it came to pass that he surrendered the Admiralty to Mr. York, and accepted the post of Master-General of the Ordnance, which, with a seat in the Cabinet, he retained until 1818.

The Ordnance Office was of ancient origin ; once the armoury and dwelling of the so-called Purveyor of Helmets and Keeper of Tents, the office was placed by Henry VIII. under the management of a Master-General.

When artillery came into vogue it was at the Ordnance Office that this arm of the service was organised and administered ; and the separate existence of such an institution is said by Mr. Kinglake to have proved in later years a cause of weakness. Be that as it may, the office was well filled by Lord Mulgrave, who watched over the British artillery during the period that Wellington fought the battles of Salamanca, Vittoria, Orthez, Toulouse, and Waterloo.

As he performed this important duty in the most

effective way, the efforts of Mulgrave towards the deliverance of Europe should rank with those of the Duke of York, Lord Bathurst, and the Prime Minister—Lord Liverpool—even if previous services at the Admiralty were not indelibly inscribed in the history of Great Britain.

This office was filled by Lord Mulgrave until 1818, when his own opinion that the Duke of Wellington ought to find a place in the Cabinet, led to an appeal to Lord Liverpool, suggesting that the most fitting position was clearly the Ordnance.*

Lord Liverpool had married Lord Mulgrave's first cousin, so that closer contact improving friendship the two statesmen remained most thoroughly in accord during the course of a long and varied political career.

Many of our readers may have formed an opinion that the expedition to Denmark, and the seizure of her fleet, were not acts to be justified by international law. They may again, in their own minds, have condemned the divided counsels and lack of information which made a failure before Walcheren possible, but they cannot but remember how grand a fleet Lord Mulgrave sent forth on each of these occasions to represent Great Britain.

In his hands the results of Trafalgar were maintained,

* Very general appears to have been the appreciation of Lord Mulgrave's disinterested action on this occasion. The Duke's brother, the Right Hon. Wellesley Pole, spoke in a letter of his conduct as romantically honourable, and full of consideration for others and contempt for his own interests. The Prince Regent, moreover, only consented to the change on condition that Lord Mulgrave remained in the Cabinet.

and the great naval battle rendered impossible, in which, before a combination of the nations in league with France, England was to be robbed of her naval supremacy, and to forfeit once and for all the independence against which Napoleon railed so bitterly. It fell, moreover, to Lord Mulgrave to correspond officially with the great Collingwood, when failing health was warning the hero of his coming death. Collingwood's last words almost were written to Lord Mulgrave in approval of the British resolve to defend Spain and her liberties.

Lord Mulgrave, with his ready forethought for the need of others, on hearing indirectly of the noble old sailor's ill-health, despatched a letter relieving him temporarily from the harassing duties of active service. That letter was never opened, and Collingwood died at sea in ignorance of the First Lord's considerate forethought.* Thus did it happen that Lord Mulgrave's

* We insert an extract from the last official letter received by Lord Collingwood from Lord Mulgrave, as evidence of the First Lord's naval forethought, and a specimen of his anxiety for others, expressed in the simple but excellent writing which distinguished his penmanship. Dupont the French general had surrendered with 16,000 men to the Spaniards, and had covenanted for the embarkation of his men to French soil. Collingwood and Mulgrave busied themselves with the careful protection of British interests.

"Upon hearing of the nature of the capitulation with Dupont, I thought it expedient to suspend (to such extent as you should judge necessary) the recall of ships from the fleet under your command, as well as on account of the necessity of having a naval force sufficient to support the principle you had so justly stated, of the impossibility of suffering so large a French force to pass the sea, as to prevent any part of that force going in ships of war, which (upon

name came to be associated with Collingwood, as it was in the future to entwine itself with that of Dundonald.

the experience of the former French Government) might be detained and equipped to act against this country. It is also necessary, as long as any probability shall exist of the embarkation of Dupont's army, that you should have the means of supplying a convoy sufficient to ensure their being transported to the port to which they shall be respectively destined at the period of the departure of each division. Upon these considerations a discretion has been left to you with respect to the proportion of ships which you will send home. The consideration of the exigencies of the service, and the object of economy in the relief and repair of such ships as may require to be sent home with that view, cannot be better provided for than by the discretionary instructions which the change of circumstances has induced this Board to send to you.

"I trust the brilliant success achieved in Portugal (Vimiera) will tend materially to the early deliverance of Spain, as well as to the perfect security of Portugal, by the final reduction of Junot and of the Russian fleet in the Tagus. We are in hourly and impatient expectation of those events. I read with great uneasiness and regret the concluding part of your letter, in which you express some doubts of the continuance of your health to the end of the war, and I earnestly hope that the service of the country will not suffer the serious inconvenience of your finding it necessary to suspend the exertion of your zeal and talents. It is a justice which I owe to you and to the country, to tell you candidly that I know not how I should be able to supply all that would be lost to the service of the country, and to the general interests of Europe, by your absence from the Mediterranean. I trust you will not find the necessity—and without it the whole tenor of your conduct is a security that you will not feel the inclination—to quit your command whilst the interests of your country can be essentially promoted by your continuing to hold it.

"I have the honour to be, with the highest esteem and consideration, my Lord,

"Your Lordship's most obedient and
faithful servant,

"MULGRAVE."

Lord Mulgrave always clung to the more moderate section of the Tory party. The more his career is studied the clearer will it be seen that he followed out Pitt's principles, and desired to place no restrictive bonds on his fellow-countrymen.

It may seem remarkable to the reader that the statesman who filled such prominent public positions in moments of crucial importance, should not be more generally inscribed on the roll of those made illustrious from their connection with the Great Peace.

Now a study of Lord Mulgrave's character will lead to the conclusion that he was one of those refined and instructed men who had, nevertheless, not attached sufficient importance to cultivating the considerable power of expression which his occasional efforts prove him to have possessed, efforts which secured the exceptional approval of no less an authority than Lord Grenville, who declared Lord Mulgrave's opening speech in the House of Lords in 1794 to be the most successful he had ever heard made on such an occasion. A mind well stored with literature and a taste cultivated and refined might fascinate the fastidious Pitt, but not foreshadow the qualities of practical statesmanship which a comparatively silent administration of the Foreign Office and Admiralty were not calculated to make fully known.

Sir James Mackintosh, in one of his great essays, has shown how, with increasing popular sympathies, the designs of statesmen must ever be better and deeper understood when set forth with the charm of an eloquence at once powerful and illustrative.

It has been granted to some in all ages to possess

this gift of oratory. Whenever exercised with discretion it has not failed to sway the counsels of men, and its very success has served to create an impression that talk rules the world. This is well known by critical observers to be not altogether the case.

Much that originated in the study of the philosopher or at the counter of the financier has been taken by this aforesaid disclaimer, and made part and parcel of his system, and it has received at his hands a notoriety it could not have altogether attained by other means, whilst the matter and its attendant philosophy is not his but the production of another mind.

In Lord Mulgrave's character a most remarkable power of discernment was combined with a warm, eager, and generous disposition.

His selection of Graham and Hill, afterwards Lords Lynedoch and Hill, as his aide-de-camps at Toulon is only surpassed by his excellent after-judgment when Lord Palmerston was introduced into office, the talented John Wilson Croker placed at the Admiralty, and Lord Dundonald (then Lord Cochrane) encouraged in pursuit of that profession to the summit of which he was destined to climb, whilst it is remarkable that every one of these eminent men nourished a regard for Lord Mulgrave himself.

Moreover, besides possessing a remarkable, sound understanding as to the common affairs of life, a poetical vein existed in Lord Mulgrave's composition. His lines on Trafalgar consist of various stanzas, but these we have selected seem to have a true poetic ring about them.

“ On bold Trafalgar’s cape, exulting fame
 Proclaimed the dawn of that eventful day
 When, chased o’er half the globe by Nelson’s name,
 The French and Spanish squadrons stood at bay.

“ To check the hero’s course in glory’s way
 Superior numbers waked the rash desire,
 The double crescent, formed in dread array,
 Poured on the English fleet concentrated fire.”

* * * *

“ Old Ocean sees his fav’rite son expire,
 And on the troubled bosom of the main,
 Tempest more fierce than war’s destructive fire,
 Howl o’er the remnant of the vanquished train.

“ Th’ ill-fated captures, from their anchors torn,
 Yield to the glory of the angry skies,
 Whilst on the rising waves, triumphant borne,
 Th’ avenging blast the victor’s fleet defies.”

Pitt added the following on the ground of Collingwood’s name having been omitted :—

“ With Nelson joined, and sacred to renown,
 Time shall record the second of that day,
 Who, to the glory of his sovereign’s crown,
 Secured the lustre of its brightest ray.”

The whole poem will be found in the *Memoir of Mr. R. P. Ward*, vol. i. p. 172.

The whole poem was set to music by Doctor Arne. The brightest ray alluded to consisted in Collingwood’s efforts on behalf of the endangered French and Spanish seamen. Pitt’s lines, therefore, commemorate an act of humanity rather than they celebrate a triumph.

If Lord Mulgrave had never done anything else than to secure Lord Palmerston's brilliant talents to his country, he would have deserved a fame which he otherwise earned by his own public service.

It is worthy of passing remark that Mr. Perceval soon after offered the Chancellorship of the Exchequer to Lord Palmerston, but with a proviso that Mr. Milnes, M.P. for Pontefract, and father of the present Lord Houghton, should have the refusal. Mr. Milnes had proved himself an orator, but preferred the rest of a Yorkshire gentleman's life to one of political unquiet. He lived and died plain Mr. Milnes, and when he refused a peerage the yeomen around his Yorkshire estate of Fryston constantly said, within hearing of the writer's father, how proud they were of their squire who refused to become a lord. The eminent talents—poetical and political—that have distinguished the son forced, however, on him a position which his high social influence has enabled him to fulfil to manifest advantage of the State, and it fell, strange to say, to Lord Palmerston to confer a barony on the son of his early rival.

Lord Mulgrave, as before mentioned, continued in office as Master-General of the Ordnance until 1818, when he delivered the situation up to the Duke of Wellington.

Henceforth his life was a private one.

The statesman who consecutively filled the high offices of Foreign Secretary and First Lord of the Admiralty through critical periods of history, and who was honoured and beloved by all who knew him, can never be said to have spoken or written a word person-

ally injurious to his political opponents. His convictions, nevertheless, appear to have been very strong, and his enthusiasm for the principles of Mr. Pitt's policy unbounded.

"Wait," he says to his brother-in-law, Mr. Ward, who had just entered Parliament and been fascinated by the fire of Fox and eloquence of Sheridan—"Wait until you hear Pitt, and so learn what the power of oratory really is."

It is impossible not to remark on the perspicuity of Lord Mulgrave's style of writing, which, without being ornate, was yet chaste and always intelligible. He lived, it is true, at a time when more attention was given to such matters than in the turmoil of modern life is, perhaps, possible. But posterity is none the less benefited by the perusal of such admirable compositions as are to be found in Mr. Phipps' *Life of R. P. Ward*, the *Life of Lord Lynedoch*, and, above all, in the charming collection of private letters from Vienna, previous extracts from which have been given. They combine the grave and gay most delightfully, and the reader, lucky enough to be entrusted with an insight into the depths of these treasures there, reads on to the end, strangely fascinated, if not absolutely entranced, by the unflagging interest which the writer has aroused. Austrian life in 1799 absolutely rises up before you, and the aristocratic and official obstinacy is there faithfully portrayed, which, finding a counterpart in stubborn bravery on the field of battle, yet indicates the faults of policy which from time to time made Ulm, Austerlitz, Wagram, Solferino, and Sadowa possible.

And then the allusions to foreigners struggling to speak English to milord are irresistibly comic. One lady remarks, "Your king is vera happy. He makes war, surrounded with many lords and blood ladies," alluding to the Princesses who graced George III.'s court; a paraphrase of ladies of his blood, or the blood, as it is commonly called, which taxed Lord Mulgrave's diplomatic gravity to the utmost.

But it is his remarkable service at the Ordnance that seems to us never to have received adequate public recognition.

Mr. Rosenhagen, financial agent with the Duke at Brussels in 1815, speaks of the Ordnance Office officials as convinced of the desirability of doing all things in a high and expensive way. Now Lord Mulgrave, as their chief, was not only the very man to discourage such an unwholesome view, but contrived to get such good work out of these aforesaid grand gentlemen, at a time when England had sent forth the flower of her army, fully armed, to America, that he caused to assemble on the plains of Belgium the efficient park of field artillery which enabled the Duke of Wellington to fight on fair terms at Waterloo. For this the Duke specially expressed his gratitude to Lord Mulgrave (*Life of R. P. Ward*, vol. i. p. 488).

But that this result was obtained is to a degree due to the services performed by Lord Mulgrave's brother-in-law, Mr. R. P. Ward, then Under-Secretary to the Ordnance. Having filled a similar position with éclat at the Foreign Office under Pitt, and being the author of a successful treatise on international law, Mr.

Ward had early laid the foundation of a political and literary reputation, the latter of which the publication of his popular novel *Tremaine* ultimately crowned.

Mr. Ward's memoir, by the Hon. E. Phipps, ranks as a standard historical reference, containing, as it does, reliable information as to the politics of his time. It is published by Murray.

It is impossible to take leave of the subject of Lord Mulgrave without recording the fact that his brother, General Phipps, remained for some years one of the best-known figures in the House of Commons. His connection with Pitt at Walmer, and subsequent acquaintance with all the great men of either party, rendered the General a person of equal notability and popularity. His picture by d'Orsay exists, to convey to a fresh generation the features of one of those old-fashioned men of his time who become scarcer day by day. The General died unmarried in September 1837.

We take an unwilling farewell of Lord Mulgrave as one of the pleasantest characters which these researches have unfolded. But it is satisfactory to think of him closing his long life in leafy, shady Mulgrave, famous for its beautiful woods and contiguity to the sea.*

Some lovers of the beautiful who have visited High Whitby's cloistered pile, may perchance have pursued their travels as far as this noble retreat, and whoever

* The Mulgrave woods cover the sides of two deep ravines opening down to the sea. On a high ridge between the ravines are ruins of the old castle. A striking view of Whitby Abbey is seen from part of the park.

has been fortunate enough to gain an entry into the house, must have there seen the original portrait of Pitt, by Hoppner, painted for Lord Mulgrave, besides other pictures of interest, including that of our hero.

The soldier-statesman's last political act was to send his proxy to the Duke of Wellington when Catholic Emancipation was decided on, but he died in April 1831, before the great Reform Bill was finally passed, and during its agitation was suffering from a tedious illness, from which he never recovered.

His last years, however, were on the whole passed in great contentment, the apt reward of a busy, useful life.

Lord Mulgrave's son became Lord Normanby, and was known as a distinguished Whig statesman, and colleague of Lord Palmerston.

However inadequately the father's noble character may have been described here, the task has been lightened by the pleasant and instructive details of a life at once pure and useful to the State.






Charles James Fox.

C H A R L E S J A M E S F O X.

JANUARY 1806 TO SEPTEMBER 1806.



BORN in 1749, Charles James Fox was second son of Henry Fox, first Lord Holland, by the Lady G. C. Lennox. His father had been one of the gay courtiers of George II.'s time, and subsequently developed high talents, and gave evidence of great Parliamentary abilities.

The education he gave his son was the best procurable in England, and whatever the shortcomings of the youth during such instruction, he became the best read man who before or since has held the seals of the Foreign Office, a position nominally the highest he ever attained.

It was as Paymaster of the Forces that Henry Fox had laid by most of the large fortune which enabled him to act the too indulgent father towards his children, one of

whom at least, the redoubtable Charles, was injured for life by being taken from Eton to a round of continental dissipation, during which the gambling-table occupied no mean portion of our young statesman's time. It was not much for Henry Fox to pay £150,000 for his favourite son, but in so doing without a murmur the future happiness of that gifted child was irreparably injured. Lord Holland—for to the barony of that name was Henry Fox promoted—lived and died an unpopular man. Cynical beyond even the wits of his time, when death overtook the owner of Holland House, it was only in his own family that he was mourned, and to do him justice, there he was universally beloved.

His enormous gains, although compiled according to the vicious custom of the time, through contact with public duties, were such as to render Lord Holland an object of jealousy rather than reprobation. Feared when in office, he suffered unrelenting hatred during a retirement which he knew well how, in a worldly sense, to render delightful.

Such was the training under which Charles Fox had grown up. Educated both at Eton and Westminster, it was at the former college that he remained celebrated for his love of mischief, combined with proficiency in manly amusements.

At Oxford, dissipation and literature were somewhat incongruously intermingled, and at an early period he, as has been already indicated, contracted that habit of high play which proved the bane of his life.

Without attempting to discover the demerits of Lord Holland, it is clear that he was an over-indulgent father,

and condoned Charles Fox's extravagance, not appearing to see any great moral fault in gambling furiously.*

* Many of our readers have doubtless revelled in the delights of Mr. Trevelyan's research, which presents characters, separated from us by more than a century of time, in colours as bright and with an individuality standing quite as clearly out of the canvas as ever did a portrait of Rembrandt or Titian. We learn there of a society, political and domestic, such as leads us to ask why at that time all combinations of mortals should have been so bad.

Mr. Trevelyan is severe on George III. and the party of king's supporters who, in default of any hope of a stable Government, he endeavoured to gather round him.

When, however, it is remembered that between the gigantic and perilous domination of the great Whig families (whose ancestors accomplished the Revolution of 1688, and, therefore, claimed authoritative and continual sway), and a partial reaction towards increased Court power, there was no intermediate influence possessing elements of religious permanence, the value of King George III.'s high moral example should be the more fully acknowledged.

The Established Church appeared dormant, and a paralysis afflicted the energy of her children. It was not, moreover, until 1784 that the efforts of John and Charles Wesley bore fruit in the shape of permanent organisation [the Wesleyan Conference]. Whitefield, it is true, was doing all that individual effort could accomplish, and afterwards with the co-operation of Lady Huntingdon, was enabled to leave visible results behind him when in 1770 he went to his long home.

Bnt for an agency radiating from the Court, our Established Church would not in these cold and listless days have received an external impulse of any description. Certainly not such as that the moral example of George III. presented. If people in 1768-1770 really were all so depraved as Mr. Trevelyan tells us, surely the above compensatory consideration should be duly weighed when registering wholesale condemnation of an influence not deemed at the time to be unconstitutional in the sense we should now understand the word.

No self-denying coterie of rich, refined, and highly educated men

The stigma of living beyond means persistently and inordinately squandered at the gaming-table cleaves to a man, and however guiltless he (as doubtless was Charles Fox's case) may be of wilfully corrupting others, it is certain that the parents and guardians of his contemporaries will, in what they believe to be the interests of those committed to their charge, endeavour to limit his influence, and in so doing damage (may be irretrievably) first the reputation, and then the character, of the unfortunate youth; and this we state after due allowance for eighteenth century customs and morals.

Much of King George III.'s later and unconquerable aversion to Fox as a counsellor may undoubtedly be traced to this source. Fox was the chosen friend of his eldest son, the Prince of Wales, and when rumour of

had before 1770 banded themselves together for the purpose of spreading the religion they possessed and gloried in throughout the masses of society—then practically unleavened by Christianity. Wilberforce and his associates had not yet become famous in England's story, while the Dissenters needed a nucleus around which to rally. Therefore it is that the mere State religion—if you care to call it so—which King George III.'s supremacy tended to support, alone visibly represented the moving power of humanity around which had encircled the high and soul-inspiring principles of our Reformation and Revolution alike.

Lord Bexley (when Mr. Vansittart) told the Bible Society how, when the King desired to evince his affection for a trusted counsellor, the gift he bestowed was a small manual of devotion, proving that if as Sovereign he raised the individual to distinguished rank and high employment, as his friend he recommended religion to his heart. Such was the Sovereign whose conduct was a beacon of light to his people in times of darkness and uncertainty.

the gifted youth's extravagance, exaggerated as these matters always are in the babble of London society, came to the King's ears, he was the less prepared to condone the tone taken up in Parliament by Fox when he seconded Lord Chatham's advocacy of the recalcitrant Americans.

Trumpet-tongued as his opposition to Lord North had been, all the arts of eloquence and of Parliamentary skill were placed at that minister's disposal when Fox made one of the great political mistakes of his life and assented to a coalition with the man he had publicly denounced in the House of Commons.

If a possible combination of public events could allow Fox and North, or Fox and Pitt, to act together in 1805, what becomes of the bitter and overwhelming flood of denunciation which had accompanied scathing and destroying sarcasm, unsurpassed in the history of Parliamentary warfare ?

The general tendency of Mr. Fox's policy when at the Foreign Office under the Coalition Ministry was to support Russia in preference to other countries, and between various expressions of admiration for the Russian Empress's talents, he again and again tells Lord Malmesbury that St. Petersburg was in his eyes the most important diplomatic post. This direction of his sympathies led to his famous and successful efforts to check Mr. Pitt's Russian armaments in 1792, and it will be seen that his Foreign Secretaryship in 1806 tended in a like direction.

In homely language and natural style is told the story

of Fox's quarrel with his Whig associates, by Lord Malmesbury. How Burke first despaired the man without whom his party might be weakened, to be fatally bitten by French principles. How the Duke of Portland wavered, but again and again fell under Fox's personal influence ; and how Windham hesitated to take the plunge and break with one so skilful and eloquent ; and, when the breach was made, how unwillingly the Whigs separated from him whom they felt to be their strongest Parliamentary debater—all is told as in a letter from man to man, leaving on the face of each communication the imprint of truth as of the writer's prudence and sagacity.

Those who, to preserve the Russian alliance, would not have hesitated to follow Fox even in his meditated renunciation of our maritime rights threatened by the armed neutrality, were fairly staggered when they were enlightened by Burke as to the real character of the new French political creed.

Any attempt to give an idea of Fox's burning eloquence* has doubtless failed, because, like that of Burke and Pitt, it must have been heard to be realised.

* “ The force of Fox's oratory cannot be adequately described, and can be only felt by those who have heard him on important occasions. His speeches were luminous, without the appearance of concerted arrangement ; his mind seemed by its masterly force to have compassed, reduced, and disposed the whole subject, with a confident superiority to systematic rule. The torrent of his eloquence increased in force, as the subject expanded. . . . The distinguishing characteristic of his arguments was profoundness ; his general aim was the establishment of some grand principle to

“What is that fat gentleman in such a rage for?” said Lord Albemarle, when, as a child, he heard one of these historical orations.

Another youthful hearer tells us he came away impressed by the majesty with which the speaker’s wrath clothed itself. “Brougham was right,” said Macaulay, “to speak of Fox as a great orator, but he was THE great debater.”

Critics were anyhow at one in the opinion of Fox’s transcendent talents, and that it was not until the young William Pitt opposed himself to the coalition, that any speaker was found to stand up against him. From that moment to the beginning of 1806 they were constant opponents, and selected champions of the Demosthenic arena.

“Not an excellent statesman,” was urged against Pitt’s public funeral by his rival.* Fox incurred some obloquy for what appeared to be ungracious and ill-timed conduct.

On the other hand, his sincerity is above all suspicion,

which all other parts of his speech were subservient, and his genius for reply was singularly happy . . . and in the greatest warmth of political contest few expressions escaped him which can be cited to the disadvantage of his character as a gentleman. . . . Fox was always elevated above his subject, and by impetuosity of oratory animated his adherents and threw alarm into the minds of his opponents.”—Adolphus’ *History of England*, vol. ii. p. 194.

* Sir A. Alison and Lord Russell declare Fox to have made use of these words. According to *Hansard*, they were Windham’s. There was, we are told, a disposition to condone conduct in Windham’s case for which Fox suffered some censure.—*Alison*, vol. vii.

when it is considered how cheaply might the incoming minister by his concurrence in the proposal have purchased popularity. The high-minded Windham stated his views on the subject, and reached like conclusions. Taking into consideration the two periods of office into which Mr. Pitt's career had been divided, he could not subscribe to his being termed an excellent statesman.

Fully believing that posterity will finally decide these two speakers to have been wrong, it must yet be admitted that the parallel drawn by Windham between Pitt and his father, Lord Chatham, was at least plausibly correct. One had succeeded in his undertakings, the other had failed.*

Moreover, when Lord Castlereagh in reply could place the matter at issue on no higher grounds than one of feeling, it may freely be admitted by the most enthusiastic admirer of the dead patriot, that neither Fox nor Windham were actuated by demagogic feelings.

They saw—not as we see now—knew not that, as time wore on, evidence of masterly forethought would illumine the otherwise dark conclusion of a then misunderstood career.

Probably no reputation has gained more year by year than that of the Heaven-born minister, whose objects reached attainment, despite failures which overwhelmed the man.

The Constitution owes present preservation to him who

* Fox's contention was that an unfortunate system of government had pervaded the whole reign.

defended it from attacks abroad, and prepared meet instruments for its reform at home. Fox should not, however, suffer in reputation because he failed to see through the mists and darkness of general and complete uncertainty.

The unanimous decision of Mr. Pitt's late colleagues in favour of immediate resignation placed power practically in the hands of the Whigs. The Government of Lord Grenville has been termed a coalition, and inasmuch as it contained within its limits Lord Sidmouth's friends, it may be, perhaps, plausibly described as such.

On the other hand, Mr. Windham had but returned to the party from which he had seceded in 1793, with Burke and others, in consequence of the encouragement given to the Jacobin extravagances. The King appears to have made no personal reservations, and only to have stipulated for the Catholic question being left in abeyance. To this the new Foreign Secretary, Charles James Fox, assented

The writer is here exclusively occupied with the administration of that office which brings England's greatest debater into the scope of these pages. At a moment when the most successful and eloquent biographical pen of the day has begun to reproduce a gigantic career such as Fox's, it would be folly to wander away from the details, without a recital of which this volume would necessarily be incomplete.

Fox's administration of the Foreign Office is to be remembered as forming a series of honest endeavours to act up to those principles which he had professed in

Opposition. True it is, that he had declared a private individual's advocacy of the Catholic claims as likely to prove fruitless, and had so left it to be inferred that in office he would remove them, but the King's *non possumus* stood in the way of discussion, and Fox decided on bringing his impaired energy but still unrivalled faculties to the aid of his isolated country.

So far as the immediate Foreign Policy of the country was concerned, it was found impossible to depart from the general lines chosen by Mr. Pitt, but Mr. Fox laid down in Parliament three courses as open to him.

The first was, to make immediate peace, though he did not himself suggest that the moment for a pacification had absolutely arrived.

The second was to act entirely independent of the Continent, and pursue objects exclusively British.

The third, and the one which he indicated as about to be followed by the new Government, was to cultivate what yet remained possible in the way of alliances in Europe, and to lean towards the still powerful Government of Russia.

Austerlitz had stricken Austria harder than her ally, whose losses were but as a wound on the foot to a giant,* and it will be seen that in effect this was but picking up the thread of that policy which Fox's great predecessor had favoured.

It was not the fault of the minister, but rather of those

* The Emperor Alexander stipulated to withdraw his troops behind the Russian frontier.

timely necessities which the exigencies and realities of office led the Whigs to allow.

Mr. Fox justly blamed Prussia for lack of good faith in the case of Hanover, where Napoleon had contemptuously allowed Frederick William to recoup himself as a set-off against the losses which a policy of subterfuge and delay had ensured at the hands of France. Russia, although encouraged by Mr. Fox to ally herself with this country, was not immediately or actually subsidized, but encouraged to expect pecuniary assistance in certain cases. Herein may be perceived the first visible difference between Mr. Fox's and Mr. Pitt's rival policies. A difference, however, which was at Tilsit made use of by the Emperor Alexander to justify an abandonment of his alliance with Great Britain.

The negotiations for peace with France may be considered the last act of Mr. Fox's political life. They have been here carefully extracted from the State papers of the time.

In February 1806 Mr. Fox was told by a foreigner, in a private interview, that an assassination of Napoleon was imminent. This informant, one Guillet de la Grevilliere, declared that it had been considered necessary for the safety of sovereigns generally to kill the Emperor of France.

Mr. Fox immediately informed Talleyrand and conveyed to him his horror at having thus held converse with an avowed assassin, who, although safe from arrest according to English law, should be placed at some seaport far from the French frontier. Talleyrand answered that the Emperor recognised the high

principles on which Mr. Fox had acted, and he enclosed an extract of a late speech of Napoleon's offering to treat on the basis of the Treaty of Amiens.

"It may be agreeable to you," says Talleyrand in the beginning of his letter, "to receive news from this country. You will see our wishes are still for peace."

Mr. Fox returned answer that "in order to avoid chicane, and as a better basis of negotiation, the object on each side should be a peace honourable for both parties and their allies, and calculated to secure the tranquillity of Europe."

This was indeed speaking in generalities. Lord Yarmouth was in France, and although possessing no official position, had held conferences with certain members of the French Government, and so far as he could gauge their wishes, and through them those of Napoleon, no objection would be placed in the way of a peace based on the principle* of each country retaining its conquests. Moreover, a subsequent letter from Talleyrand to Mr. Fox confirmed this basis of the proposed pacification.

The third Lord Holland was the chosen negotiator for England, but he gave way to the Earl of Lauderdale † when the dangerous condition of his gifted relative, the Foreign Secretary, became evident.

The funds rose considerably on receipt of this news, telling of possible peace, and in city circles Lord Lauderdale's success was evidently believed in.

* *Uti possidetis.*

† Lord Lauderdale left England on August 2nd, 1806.

When, however, the British envoy neither met with a flattering reception at Paris, or did Napoleon show the slightest intention of desisting from projects of Continental aggression, it became clear that the mission could have no effect. Napoleon appears to have thought that the logical sequence of previous statements made in Opposition would lead the Whig Ministry to make peace on the terms he might choose, and at the same time condone the rapacity of his intentions.* He talked of employing the means entrusted to him by Providence for the purpose of asserting the liberties of the seas, of restoring commerce its liberty, and securing the repose and happiness of the world. This, moreover, at the very moment† when he was about to receive the English proposals.

Mr. Fox kept two leading ideas in his mind whilst conducting these negotiations.‡ They were, firstly, to retain our hold on Sicily, which the King of Naples, as our faithful ally, had just reason to expect us to do ; and secondly, to forward our Russian connection and alliance.

This, as we have seen, he did not propose to do by means of subsidies.

In this tendency to support the Emperor Alexander the Foreign Secretary may have possessed an incomplete forecast of what actually happened in 1812. It was obvious that efforts undertaken in a struggle near the Muscovite frontier must have proved more ex-

* Bacher, French *Chargé d'Affairs* to the German Diet.

† August 1806.

‡ *Life and Opinions of Earl Grey.*

hausting to the French armies than campaigns on the Rhine or the Danube, and the distance from the base of operations, which Napoleon's genius could not lessen, must have occurred to Fox when he adhered to this alliance.

It is desirable to give prominence to the fact that at no time of his extraordinary career were Napoleon's pretences more preposterous and ungovernable than at the moment when he was destined to have the mist removed from before his eyes as regards the true character of the new English Government.

It had, however, been the weakness of Mr. Fox's Parliamentary career, that he had aroused hopes in Opposition, which no spell of future office was likely to enable him to fulfil.

Constant and persistent opposition to Government had generated a habit leading him to condemn the acts of his opponents, if not to rejoice at their failures. Lord Russell, in his life of Fox, has recorded how he spoke of Trafalgar. He said : "It is a great event, and by its solid as well as brilliant advantages *far more than compensates for the temporary relief which it will certainly afford Pitt in his distress.*" And yet Pitt's distress was on account of their common country, the well-being of which was really desired by Fox with all the strength of a really noble heart.

It is illustrative of the extremes that party has been held to carry men into, when Lord Brougham* should

* Lord Brougham's *Statesmen of the Time of George III.*, book i. chap. on Pitt.

say that he believed Pitt would have been for peace if Fox had declared for war, leaving it to be inferred that Fox would have done likewise ; and that Mr. Wilberforce should once have found it his duty to tell the Whig Opposition that he believed they did not desire to see an invasion, but wished just as much evil to their country as should serve to turn the Government out.

To prove what an honest-minded man Fox really was,* when in power and his nephew Lord Holland desired him to relinquish the cause of the Sicilies, and even of its King, our faithful ally, that by so doing peace might be secured, he spoke as follows :—

“ No, young one ; it won’t do. It is the way the French fly from their word that disheartens me.” †

The price paid for our inestimable system of Party government has again and again been that of seeing our public men committed to extreme opinions, which are not the result of any meditative and deliberate resolve, but the outcome of some momentary burst of passion and indignation, in which higher wrought and nobler natures are frequently led to indulge. When, however, this great Whig leader had to choose between the maintenance of what men might term his consistency and the dictates of national honour, he did not hesitate

There is reason to believe that previous exaggerations when in Opposition had, in Mr. Fox’s case, been caused

* When Lord Brougham made the above comment he was himself estranged from the Whig party, and in the frame of mind to see party spirit in other men’s actions.

† Lord Russell’s *Life of C. J. Fox.*

by the feeling that the hand of authority was against him, and that his entry on office was forbidden. Indeed, the King had once refused to accept Fox as Minister, even at the risk, as he declares, of civil war.*

The peace negotiations with France coming to a close, a corresponding fall of the funds occurred, and the Whig Government found ready support from Castlereagh, Canning, Hawkesbury, and Harrowby, leaders of the Opposition, in the renewed preparations for war which became an unfortunate necessity.

It is to the credit of Mr. Fox's administration of the Foreign Office that the proceedings of Prussia after Austerlitz received the reprobation which they deserved. "The conduct of Prussia," said Mr. Fox, "has been a union of everything that is contemptible in servility, with everything that is odious in rapacity."

The absorption of Hanover as a set-off against French encroachment was an act of bad faith towards England, inferior only in its perfidious meanness to the repudiation of Prussian engagements with Austria, which Hardenberg, the Prussian Minister, calmly told Metternich were made but to be broken.

Mr. Fox sternly reproved the Prussian Government, and prepared for that state of warfare which might ensue.

But it has not been inconsistency in foreign affairs (to which charge every English statesman who has been in Opposition becomes more or less liable) that has vexed the righteous soul of politicians of a certain shade.

* Lord Russell's *Life of Fox*.

It is Fox's revolt from what may almost be described as a trades unionism amongst the upper classes of the early nineteenth century, which meets with condemnation from *Quarterly Review* writers, quite as powerful as that bestowed upon the details of projected reforms or rejected opinions on Continental policy.

For instance, Lord Dudley and Ward, a future Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, an individual as incapable as a politician could possibly be of nurturing party bitterness of any kind, laments the unnatural forsaking of all the great Whig's antecedents which led Charles Fox to bespatter the social advantages of his own order. Inconsistency, without the existence of which, it was argued by the *Quarterly Reviewer*, Fox could neither have gained his own position, nor possibly even have ever thoroughly disclosed his peculiar talents to the world. For it was not so much as a minister that Fox's name became notorious as the denouncer of class prejudice and constitutional wrong.

The Reformer who defames his class by exposing their weaknesses, will ever be open to such obvious retort, although it may be permissible to note that but for the Hampdens and Russells of history, liberty would to this day have remained in general obscurity.

The history of the House of Lords and its continued influence over the British Constitution, affords the aptest of all illustrations of our meaning.

The Russells, Howards, Fitzwilliams, Stanleys, Campbells, Gordons, Cavendishes, and other historical houses have on the whole consulted national interests

before their own, and have often exposed themselves in so doing to the taunts which assailed Charles Fox.

They may not always have been justified in their conscientious conclusions, because danger to liberty may proceed from a totally different quarter of the horizon than that from whence men expect its appearance.

Such was the cause of Burke's decided action against French principles, which, sheltered by the tree of Liberty, were, but for his advocacy, about to receive the sympathy of a great historic party. Such the lesson of the experience which forced Fox in office to follow in the main Pitt's foreign policy. There was real national gain in the fact that Fox worked his full will at the Foreign Office.

It was thereby known, when Lord Lauderdale returned from Paris, that no mere expediency kept the nation in arms, but an engagement in a struggle with one determined to crush England's energy, and destroy her very existence. It was henceforth, and after this fact had been elicited,* that Lord Russell holds the followers of Grenville and Grey to have been bitterly mistaken in their opposition to a war proved necessary by the action of their own Government,† inasmuch as naval and military operations were by no means checked during the Whig rule, and Lord Grenville's ministry looked in

* Lord Russell's *Recollections*.

† Objection to the Peninsula contest and doubt as to its issue has been elsewhere given as explanatory of the Grenville-Grey conduct after 1807.

vain for a scene where British resources might be advantageously expended.

Sicily was defended, and an inroad into Calabria, planned by Sir John Stewart, who met and overthrew the French general Regnier on the plain of Maida, whilst it was here that the prowess of British troops first reasserted itself, and the famous struggle where bayonet crossed bayonet has not been forgotten in the louder clang of arms which, until 1815, so constantly resounded through Europe. And yet when the Whigs resigned office no permanent military results had been obtained, and isolated expeditions under Fox and Howick shared the fate of ultimate impotence with which Brougham and Macaulay have branded those of Pitt.

So far as the struggle with Napoleon is concerned, its necessity was shown by the failure of Fox's negotiations for peace, but justification of the original republican quarrel rests, we frankly own, on different grounds, and is subject to controversy, such as the old Whig traditions have provided food for. We may, for instance, read in the life of Lord Shelburne how the opposition to the French war was justified. England's conduct in acting with Europe to suppress French liberties, it was there declared, had inspired a military spirit throughout that chivalric nation, and so unnecessarily laid the seeds of the long strife, heavy debt, and untold slaughter, together with the ultimate want and social disturbance which fell upon England.

The advantage of this theory is that its futility can never be clearly demonstrated, as it might have been if Fox and Shelburne had been called to office in 1793,

but it will ever, specially in this matter, be open to the man convinced against his will to be of the same opinion still.

But if asked to assert a reason why a contrary view should on the whole prevail, we might point to the evidence laid before our readers in the biographical notice of Lord Grenville already given.

But we can do more, and rely upon the ultimate and unwilling decision of that party *par excellence* being the one of peace, as it then was a mainstay of religion in England, viz. that of Mr. Wilberforce.* Again and again did these excellent men hesitate. More than once they gave votes against particular Government measures which they believed to tend towards war, and yet slowly, certainly, regrettfully, they had to come back to support the great minister, too much engaged with the enemies of his country to do more than trust to the good sense of Englishmen for that countenance so strikingly afforded him.

Fox, however, by his contrary action, if followed in the House of Commons by but at most seventy Whigs, established such a title to their affection, that not only has the worship of his name become enshrined in the party belief, but each and everyone of the compact minority was declared to be ready to die for him.

Such was the enthusiasm with which Fox inspired his following, whilst it is but simple justice to admit that he led the Opposition under somewhat unusual circum-

stances. He, in the first place, was understood to be excluded by his Sovereign from taking office, a disability not calculated to make his language more measured, his opinions better considered, or to induce a spirit of sober responsibility.

Again, the unrivalled power of declamation, added to the gift of rendering potent effect to feelings of indignation, which he possessed, was stimulated by what seemed to him very like persecution. He had but been setting forth opinions which were known to be held by millions of his fellow-countrymen, and propounding theories which have since been accepted by the nation.

It may appear to many of us, as it certainly does to the writer, that the prompt decision of Pitt and Grenville in the first instance saved this country from a revolution. But that a Fox should have arisen and proclaimed the evil of bad laws unrepealed, and of wealth and intelligence unrepresented in Parliament, is none the less matter of everlasting satisfaction.

Indeed, the Opposition had drifted into such a condition of impotency that, had it not been for the ceaseless advocacy of this passionate and eloquent man, all remembrance of electoral inequalities and indefensible laws would have been forgotten in the coming European triumphs, and redress have been relegated to the time of inevitable revolution—to that sudden shifting of the scene which must perforce have succeeded an era of over-strained repression.

The later Whig traditions have, therefore, been of inestimable value to England. It is not for us to decide how far the pendulum may have swung beyond its

natural scope. It is part of the philosophy of a finished politician to have studied each phase and section of national history, and he can have learned his task but imperfectly who lightly consents to change for its own sake.

There is, fortunately, an innate Conservatism bound up with the Whig belief which, of itself, has a restraining power, and bids us to hope and believe that England can never become Radical in the sense of forsaking her Constitution for that political Will-o'-the-wisp, Equality—that specious form of Liberty which must sap the foundations of government and exchange them for the quicksands of mere popular will.

Such a career as Fox's could never have existed and not left a mark on the future of his country. It is open to doubt if the emanations of such a mind were not directed for a beneficent object by the Supreme Being who created its superiority and allowed its sway.

All that he asked, aye, and more, has been surrendered, and England is England still, in possession of the unrivalled freedom which she enjoys at home, together with unimpaired prosperity and influence abroad. Some there may be who dread for the future, and would feign stem the aspirations which they believe to have been unwisely encouraged, but an unswerving adherence to the Constitutional settlement made at the Revolution will yet guard English order and freedom from each passing danger, however threatening it may appear. It is difficult, at any rate, to learn upon what other foundation a faithful disciple and student of Mr. Fox's matured opinions could rest.

Fortunately the African Slave Trade question was in that position which, unlike religious equality, electoral reform, and the restoration of peace, was, so to speak, ripe for the reformer's sickle.

Pitt had dealt the monster many an ugly blow; Lord Grenville had never hesitated; there were ready sympathisers on the Opposition benches, where Canning in the one House, Harrowby and Mulgrave in the other, were eager to carry, as they ultimately did, a majority even of Tory ability.

Amongst Fox and Grenville's own party Lord Sidmouth was lukewarm,* and doubted the expediency of action. Windham, the generous, noble-hearted Englishman, had been seduced from his allegiance, and was a foe to Abolition. He had been deeply moved by the massacres of white men which had been perpetrated in St. Domingo. Nothing, however, daunted Fox, and he continued to grapple with the task by moving a resolution in Parliament, which may be described as the death-knell of slavery, and, at the same time, a last official act of the speaker.

It was in the following words †:—

* Mr. Addington had been created Lord Sidmouth, joining consecutively the Governments of Pitt and Lord Grenville. His following being a compact and reliable one, Lord Sidmouth's Parliamentary power was considerable, as was his administrative experience valuable. The irrepressible and witty Sheridan said of him that “the measles was so far like the Doctor that we must all have it once.”

† A closely corresponding motion was made by Lord Grenville in the House of Lords.

"This House, conceiving the African slave trade to be contrary to the principles of justice, humanity, and sound policy, will, with all practicable expedition, proceed to take effectual measures for abolishing the said trade, in such manner and at such period as may be deemed advisable."

Mr. Fox's motion was carried without a division, and in the House of Lords Lord Grenville voted in a majority of forty-one against twenty.

Mr. Fox had already felt the fatal malady of dropsy stealing on him, and his ready attention to the dearly loved project is, therefore, more to his credit and everlasting renown.

The great Parliamentary genius, when in failing health, lay surrounded by all the charms that love and attention can scatter. He was idolised by his relations, and had friends wherever the influence of his presence had been felt.

For thirty years had he been connected with politics, and had captivated the hearts of all who had come into contact with him. As a keen sportsman * he had the sympathy of that never diminishing multitude, who in England, Scotland, and specially in Ireland, are moved by loyal feeling towards those who partake in like pleasures and revel in like tastes. Field sports have ever been a strong bond of union between those who partake therein, and Fox's care to notice and encourage the efforts and share the joys of youth was not the least

* Cricketer, hunting-man, and good shot.

commendable quality in a character which becomes the more charming as it is more extensively studied.

It is delightful to think that at the close of an eventful life, during which the individual had lived in an atmosphere of trial and temptation, that the poor suffering body was soothed by the consolations of that religion which its owner had, in the wildest moments, never repudiated ; in days of paramount influence, if of carelessness, never wished to deprecate.

It is nothing more than the truth to proclaim that with the real character of Jacobinism placed before him, he would have decided against it as vile and un-English.

He saw, or thought he saw, Liberty where chaos was reforming.

There is some reason to believe that before death he at least recognised the evils of the system which succeeded the Republican Government, although Holland House bears ample witness of the sympathy subsisting between the Buonaparte and Fox family. Charles Fox had hastened over to Paris at the peace of Amiens, not contented until he had seen his hero ensconced in the Consular dignity.

It is, however, a curious fact, and one which it is difficult to explain, except by putting it down to accident, that Fox should have found his own portrait turned face to the wall.

If the after-conduct of Napoleon in 1806 concerning the proposed peace did not open Fox's eyes, and show him the spectre early descried by Pitt in its naked hideousness, it can only have been because the drama

was enacted before a vision blinded by the approach of death. But we know that the minister received early information of Palm the Nurembergh bookseller's condemnation and execution because he had allowed Gentz's pamphlet, urging continued resistance against Napoleon, to receive circulation.

Nothing more antagonistic to Fox's nature and principles can be conceived than this act.

Whether policy or predilection had most inclined Fox towards Russia and France it is difficult to say, but the tendency of his policy was undoubted.

Tilsit was left for Mr. Canning to cope with, and so discover the reliance to be placed on the Muscovite despot's alliance when put to the touch. Charles Fox had on the other hand, we may believe, never forgotten his pleasant sojourn in Paris with Lord Holland, whilst his generous nature induced him to remember the ever ready welcome his family had received from the noble and hospitable French nation, then uncorrupted by the fatal theories and opinions which hastened the Revolution.

His personal coinciding with his political feelings, thus tended towards importing an article of faith into the counsels of the Whigs, which, if it reduced their voting power in the House of Commons to a minimum, yet led to the belief that any one of the number would have died for Fox.

It has been urged against this extraordinary individual that he had previously agitated the strongest passions of the nation in favour of electoral reform, and when in office allowed the question to sleep. It is, however, no fault of his that the pressure of immediate danger

from without should have been so enormous as to preclude due attention being given to Home affairs.

The electoral question was not, unfortunately, in a progressive condition. Mr. Pitt had been unable to ventilate the moderate and statesman-like views which he held on the subject, and the same all-absorbing instigation of national preservation had precluded Lord Grenville from indulging desires which, it is historical, were very near his heart.

Much of the good feeling between English politicians of different views takes its kindly hue from the example of this great tribune of the people, who studiously avoided private controversy, and was above all things natural, kind, and unaffected.

It might, indeed, be said of such as him, in language used by Lord Houghton when extolling the men of old—

“ Great thoughts, great feelings, came to them
Like instincts, unawares ;
Blending their soul’s sublimest needs
With tasks of every day,
They went about their gravest deeds
As noble boys at play.”

Moreover, Mr. Fox possessed the unfailing resource of literature, in contemplation of the delights of which he occupied every spare moment. The statesman had chosen for himself a residence at St. Anne’s Hill, near Chertsey, which must have been in some degree a solace when leaving his beloved Holland House, ever open to him although the latter place naturally continued.

Indulging his taste for choice shrubs, which luxuriated

amidst classic temples such as Mr. Trevelyan tells us Fox rejoiced in, the prospect visible therefrom must have brought much contentment and delight to those visiting this now classic spot. The dome of St. Paul's and the outline of Westminster Abbey are seen from Mr. Fox's retreat; whence also Norwood, Sydenham, Shooter's Hill, Hampstead, Highgate, Bushey, and the spire of Charles II.'s visible church at Harrow, all come within range of the view. Although many features of the country are now somewhat changed, the pleasant range of Surrey Downs on one side, and the winding Thames on the other, still add their charms to a prospect nature will not allow to be robbed of its glory.

It was here that, during the leisure which occasional absence from Parliament allowed, the society of books became a natural delight.

Mr. Fox, as a man of letters, gave but one fragment to the world, his history of the early part of James II.'s reign being lost, so to speak, as an historical work, in the blaze of fame which attended Macaulay's later efforts, and is not nearly so well known as its merits deserve. Macaulay, nevertheless, attained his success under more advantageous circumstances for communicating with the owners of literary information than Fox had within his grasp. Moreover, the older Whig statesman held peculiar views as to the compilation of history, and adopted mere unadorned narrative, scrupulously correct as to detail, whilst his conclusions—and herein lies hidden the pearl of price—were the matured and studied results of quiet, contemplative retirement.

We are, for the moment, taken aside from the heated atmosphere of Westminster, and enlightened with the views of Charles Fox, the philosopher and thoughtful upholder of England's free constitution. Far more, therefore, than any of his impassioned speeches, should this work become a text-book for the great national party, call it by what name you will, which must one day be found striving to preserve the liberty secured to us in 1688, alike, may be, from the pressure of half-taught popular clamour, and the less powerful pretensions of oligarchic faction.

Mr. Fox's volume contains little of the fiery eloquence which violently swayed the political passions of his countrymen. At times, it is true, he rises to the occasion, and leaves us an eloquent description calculated to fix the event narrated permanently on the reader's memory. For instance, when scorning the base conduct of Charles II. and his counsellors for receiving money at the hands of Louis XIV. through his minister Barillon, he makes the following reflection :—" How little could Barillon guess that he was negotiating with one who was destined to be at the head of an administration which, in a few years, would send the same Lord Churchill, afterwards the great Duke of Marlborough, not to Paris to implore Louis for succour towards enslaving England, or to thank him for pensions to her monarch, but to combine all Europe against him in the cause of liberty ; to rout his armies ; to take his towns ; to humble his pride ; and to shake to the foundation that fabric of power which it had been the business of a long life to raise at the expense of every sentiment of

tenderness to his subjects, and of justice and good faith to foreign nations. It is with difficulty the reader can persuade himself that the Godolphin and Churchill here mentioned are the same persons who were afterwards one in the cabinet, one in the field, the great conductors of the war of the succession. How little do they appear in the one instance, how great in the latter ! ”

The last sentiment will scarcely commend itself to those who, judging by Mr. Fox’s opposition to the American and French wars, believe him to have been a veritable apostle of peace at any price ; but it is not in one particular that the views of this book differ from those sometimes (and we admit not without plausible references to Mr. Fox’s spoken sentiments) enunciated as forming a foundation for the popular creed.

In the first place the judgments passed on men’s actions are tempered with a gentle spirit of charity and gentleness quite in unison with the writer’s nature. Mr. Fox, moreover, avoids reference to contemporary authors, poets, and thinkers who flourished during the times of which he descants, whilst, although the volume contains many well-considered dissertations on men and things, it must have become, when finished and brought to maturity, a valuable and unbiassed account of the Great Revolution, and the causes which brought it about.

That some of his considerations bear upon our own times a reference to the subjoined extract will show, and it is just as certain that the revolutionist and the constitutional subverter will be unable to appeal to Mr. Fox for justification of his action, as it is that when the historian dives fairly into the literary treat reserved for

him in Mr. Fox's account of the early part of James II.'s reign, he will scarcely find historic precedent there for the repudiation of Mr. Pitt's foreign policy for Parliamentary opposition to which Mr. Fox has linked his name in history.

The great Whig leader abhorred all notes when compiling his literary work, and the text of his manuscript was written chiefly by Mrs. Fox.

In the introductory chapter to his *Early History of James II.*, page 7, Mr. Fox speaks thus:—"A sagacious observer may be led to expect the most important revolutions, and from the latter he may be enabled to foresee that the House of Commons will be the principal instrument in bringing them to pass.

"But in what manner will that House conduct itself? Will it content itself with its regular share of legislative power, and with the influence which it cannot fail to possess whenever it exerts itself upon the other branches of the Legislature, and on the executive power, or will it boldly, perhaps rashly, pretend to a power commensurate with the natural rights of the representative of the people? If it should, will it not be obliged to support its claims by military force, and how long will such a force be under its control? How long before it follows the usual course of all armies and ranges itself under a single master?

"If such a master arise, will he establish hereditary or elective government? If the first, what will be gained but a change of dynasty? If the second, will not the military force choose the King or Protector (the name is of no importance), and choose in effect all his successors?"

The reflections here evoked are worthy the consideration of those who believe greater freedom to be attainable when the direct popular power in the Legislature receives unrestricted strength.

Mr. Fox clearly thought otherwise, inasmuch as he limited his aspirations for change to those within that constitutional grasp which the Settlement of 1688 provided for.

This publication, to the merits of which we have attempted to render justice, was clearly the result of deliberate thought and preparation, inasmuch as Mr. Fox, when in retirement at St. Anne's Hill, was accustomed to write snatches of sentences and various abstract ideas on the backs of envelopes, and on fugitive scraps of paper which Mrs. Fox would straightway convey to their positions in the history. This book, moreover, was written after the sowing of those wild oats, the incidents and companionships connected with which Mr. G. O. Trevelyan has so graphically described. Mr. Fox meditated other literary labours, amongst which were an *Essay on Poetry, History, and Oratory*; and it will be interesting to learn hereafter, from the historian, whether these floating ideas were ever committed to paper.

Not the least charming side of Mr. Fox's character consisted in his conjugal affection. How thoroughly he entered into Lord Howick's sense of loneliness when, in the whirl of London without his wife, can be read by anyone interested in the subject.* Such sympathy was

* *Life and Opinions of Earl Grey.*

founded upon a parallel attachment of his own for that partner of his joys and sorrows, whose name was lovingly murmured in the dying statesman's last adieu to the world.

And what a bright light society such as his must have shed over a party in the country-house of the Duke of Bedford at Woburn.

The author of Lord Grey's life tells us, “Fox is in the highest spirits. It is quite delightful to see such a man in the midst of a society which he appears to like, so unassuming, good-humoured, and cheerful. Everything seems to be enjoyment to him.”

It is pleasant to read how constant and devoted were the attentions of his nephew, Lord Holland, towards the close of this cherished existence.

Lord Albemarle has left us an interesting picture of how Fox, when stricken by increasing weakness, loved to play with children and be with them. Following his wheeled chair would be troops of little ones who sunned themselves in the rich benevolence of a nature gentle at home, as in the Senate it had been fierce and uncurbed.

The general scope and tendency of Mr. Fox's policy during his short tenancy of the Foreign Office is the more immediate object of this dissertation.

It may succinctly be described as a Policy of Peace, but not without honour, and of humanity at any price. The negotiations with France and the Parliamentary condemnation which Slavery received will remain the best remembered events of his last Foreign Office administration.

Mr. Fox did not let his hankering after a Russian alliance, and peace with Napoleon, lead him to encourage Russia in her subservience to the conqueror. When it was really known that the Prussians contemplated a seizure of Hanover, Fox spoke out boldly, and sent the young English diplomatist, afterwards Sir George Jackson, to Berlin, on a mission, where he was commissioned to speak plain truths to the temporising sovereign and his ministers.

Sir George, in an early part of the second volume of his correspondence, tells a good story of how within three months of Mr. Fox's death he saw him, then a complete invalid but still able to perform official duties.

Mr. Fox received young Jackson in bed, and discoursed at length and with great animation on the subjects of the mission. But Mrs. Fox had been taken by surprise and when the diplomatist entered sought refuge in an adjoining cupboard.

Warmer and more intricate drew the discussion, until Mrs. Fox in despair called out, "Oh, Mr. Fox, the young man is gone, is he not? I am so cold." With a smile and hearty good wishes for the future, the young Jackson was dismissed, and ever treasured up in his memory the interview with one so strangely fascinating, and yet so decided in views of men and things

Adair was another of Fox's diplomats who, in the time of the coalition with Lord North, had been sent to Russia. His affection for his chief is historical, and when, years after the times we speak of, in company with Rogers the poet, he was visiting Chiswick, he

wept bitterly when shown the room where his patron died.

Men loved Charles Fox as a creature, whatever their opinions might have been of him as a politician. Even the very bailiffs who, in the midst of their vagaries, came to seek both Fox and his friend Hare, could scarcely fail to be moved to laughter when asked if they were hunting the Fox and the Hare. Canning declared him to be, on the whole, the wittiest man he ever met, and with this estimate Pitt agreed.

At one time so low were the pecuniary prospects of the first Lord Holland's son, that his many friends were induced to subscribe for his relief. "How will he take it?" they anxiously asked at Brooks'. "Why, half-yearly to be sure," answered the cold-blooded but witty George Selwyn.

It must, however, be stated in any biography of Fox, and noted on his behalf so far as it goes, that self-restraint was sufficient to prohibit him from dissipation at any time during his various terms of office. In fact he knew what was due to his position, and if at other times, alas! he yielded to the weakness of his will and the infirmity of his nature—sinning may be the more in that through an innate fascination he carried others with him in his irregularities—there was never absent a manly if tardy perception of the evil effected, combined with an honest desire to counteract the same.

His influence, for instance, over his nephew, the young Lord Holland, was of the best description, and entirely for good.

Perhaps the most characteristic story which Mr.

Trevelyan tells us of Fox, is that of his kindness to the Clapham schoolmaster who had come on chance to hear the speaking. Mr. Trevelyan says that of course the man of sums and spelling-books was a Tory, but, whatever his creed, we can quite understand that a part of it ever afterwards was a belief in Fox. After all, the personal guides us to an estimate of our fellow-creatures, and if the most blinded Tory standing unnoticed and weary of waiting in the lobby at Westminster is taken in hand and shown the lions by a genial and thoroughly informed political opponent, he will read the emanations of that man's mind with greater patience, if not approval, than when his very existence seemed vile and unpalatable as seen through the mists of party distortion.

It was this love of humanity, which, seizing the first outlet to indulge its generous bearings, made Fox so charming.

With Pitt there remained a reserve which, if it savoured of the divinity said to hedge in a king, yet held him aloof from much of the personal sympathy which renders life a delight.

It is with something of wonder, therefore, that, with a disposition such as Fox's in command, we read how bitter was the contention and violent the recrimination over Foreign and Domestic Policy when the Government of all the talents first came into office.

In later days such indulgence of speech has by general consent been banished from Parliamentary discussions when conducted by responsible Statesmen, and relegated to the hustings where words are not meant or

believed to carry a full import. Observers put down their acrimonious discussions to the absence of Pitt's dignified control, to catch the true spirit of which has been since desired by all Parliamentary Leaders.

Anecdotes in abundance flow from the pen of one who has pondered over the history of a man at once gifted, simple, and generous. His very faults were rendered less inexcusable to those around him by a light-hearted anxiety for others, which never forsook him. His benevolence was exercised even to weakness. Once, when at a balloon ascent with his brother, General Fox, a man attempting to seize his watch was caught in the burly statesman's powerful grip. "Oh! spare me, Mr. Fox!" said the reprobate; "I have a wife and children at home." Fox was foolish enough to give the man a guinea and pass on, but not with his watch, which the professional duties of the thief did not seemingly allow him to overlook.

But Fox's rich benevolence was, perhaps, best of all displayed when, at the close of his life, the Foreign Office duties were irksome and beyond his strength. The young Lord Holland had refused the peace mission to Paris, on the results of which his uncle had based so much, desiring—and, indeed, desired by all—to be with his uncle.

"So you would not leave me, young one, to go to Paris," said the fond uncle, "but liked staying with me better. There's a kind boy!"

But he never for a moment forgot his political cares, or ceased to believe in the possibility of peace with French aggression, until the rude awakening came upon

him but a short time before death. It is strange how the trust in Napoleon had ever co-existed with a blind trust in Russia, the two ruling political sentiments remaining strong to the last.

When the failure of Lord Lauderdale's mission became certain, Fox was too ill to gauge the full importance of such an event, and was only thinking of how he should screen his beloved wife from the pain which the knowledge of his dangerous condition would give her.

"Does she think there is danger?" he asked of Lord Holland.* "If not, it will be so much worse for her afterwards," or words to that effect.

Everything that love could devise was done for the sufferer, who seems to have been soothed by the works of art, both in painting and sculpture, with which the house at Chiswick abounded.

But notwithstanding that the sufferer bore up bravely, the great life was ebbing away, and weakness had placed the statesman beyond the reach of human skill.

The death of Mr. Fox has been described by

* Mr. Fox was believed to have married Mrs. Armstead, a widow, as early as 1780. The following lines, placed on her breakfast-table in January 1799, should at once confirm that theory, and prove the ardent affection which existed between them :—

" Of years I have now a century passed,
And none of the fifty so blessed as the last,
How it happens my troubles thus daily should cease,
And my happiness thus with my years should increase—
This defiance of nature's more general laws
You alone can explain, who alone are the cause."

the Princess Lichtenstein, in the first volume of her charming work, *Holland House*, with a pathos which approaches even Stanley's account of Dr. Arnold's last hours. It is almost impossible to read it without tears involuntarily rising to the eyes. The scene, moreover, was not rendered less weird and terrible by the eccentric Lady Holland announcing Fox's death to the anxious crowd outside the apartment by walking amongst them with a white apron thrown over her head.

It was said of Mr. Fox's funeral in Westminster Abbey, that never had there been seen more great people unhappy, whilst Mr. Trevelyan has told us how the news of his loss shot grief into hearts whose interest in the man was only as the friend of the oppressed and poorer classes.

His career is a great English fact and possession, so that we can well afford to sink all differences in presence of the tombs of those whose ends, after all, were not diverse, even if they sought to compass them by different means.

Pitt and Fox both desired the happiness of the English people, and the proximity of their graves in the venerable Abbey was no inapt fulfilment of the popular desire such as allowed the poet to say with general approval—

“Where, turning thoughts to human pride,
The rival chiefs lie side by side ;
Drop upon Fox's grave a tear,
'Twill trickle to his neighbour's bier.”




LORD HOWICK (EARL GREY).



SEPTEMBER 1806 TO MARCH 1807.



F Fox's power of dominating debate represented the sword of Whiggism, so most surely did the classical and philosophical acquirements of Charles Grey serve as a shield whereby the most telling blows of its opponents were turned aside. Born in 1764 of an ancient Northumberland family, at Falloden, near Alnwick, this celebrated Whig acquired a correct and refined taste during an education at Eton and Cambridge. He was wont, however, afterwards to declare that he owed most of his knowledge to study and reading indulged in after leaving the University. In 1784 the grand tour followed as in due course it always did when parents were in the position to afford such a luxury, and in Mr. Grey's case it was undergone as a member of the Duke of Cumber-



Lord Bowick.

land's suite. Two years afterwards he took his seat in Parliament as Member for Northumberland, the county where his family had resided since 1372.

The first we hear of the future statesman in Parliament was when serving on the proceedings directed against Warren Hastings, and afterwards, as outvying even Fox in Liberalism, by joining the Friends of the People, an extreme organisation of the time.

But in Parliament it was Charles Fox's example that formed the politician's public character ; his precepts that inculcated method and instilled policy into the able mind readily prepared by nature to receive such instruction, so that consequently, when Mr. Fox was removed by death, Lord Grenville did not hesitate to appoint Lord Howick Foreign Secretary. Not only did he know better than any man what were Mr. Fox's designs, but had gained a great Parliamentary position by attention constantly paid to that statesman's advice. "Stay and listen to the dull speakers as well as the attractive ones," was the unvarying rule laid down by the great master of Parliamentary warfare. In common with the rest of the Whig party Lord Howick had an almost reverential respect for Mr. Fox's maxims, and love for his memory. It would, however, be eminently misleading to estimate Lord Howick's views by the ordinary Whig rules of conduct, inasmuch as he possessed certain abstract ideas, to which he clung with a tenacity that stands as landmark in the sea of uncertainty which the individual observer is launched on when attempting to estimate Lord Howick's political conduct. Such tenacity in clinging to theory savours somewhat more of the *doctrinaire*

than the practical politician. In his case, if the mountain refused to come to Mehemet, Mehemet would most certainly not go to the mountain. Illustration of our meaning will be conveyed to the reader's mind during the next few pages, but his pertinacious determination to consider each event in foreign affairs by itself, and without reference to past or other special circumstances, will effectually explain what some writers have attributed to party conduct and feeling.

Like his great adversary Lord Liverpool, there is reason to believe he was just as free from partisanship as human nature would admit. His theory, that no possible war could be justifiable on grounds of expediency, or except when necessity or an unjust attack on an ally compelled, would account for his leaning towards peace during the earlier stages of the French war, but not for the spasmodic criticisms directed against the foreign administrations of the Duke of Portland, Mr. Perceval, and Lord Liverpool.

When in office with Lord Grenville his conclusions appear to have been more practical, and although these two powerful intellects parted company when, as Lord Grey, he refused to concur in proscribing Napoleon's rule (and held such views to be antagonistic to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries), he must yet be held to have done good work in Lord Grenville's Government, when head of the Admiralty, before Mr. Fox's death, and afterwards as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

As an orator, Lord Howick may not have attained the higher flights revelled in by Fox or Canning,

but he was a clear and logical speaker; exceedingly nervous, and yet never hindered by this peculiarity of temperament. It would be unjust, moreover, not to ascribe his opposition to the Spanish war to that prevailing sentiment which likewise, undoubtedly, moved Lord Grenville to believe that Napoleon would find gigantic means to drive us from the Peninsula whenever his affairs in Europe allowed. This, however, having been admitted, and the value of his Opposition criticism on some other occasions duly acknowledged, we fail to follow the lines of those principles in foreign affairs which Lord Howick undoubtedly pursued according to his conscience and judgment.

It was otherwise in home affairs, and excellent as we hold to have been the way in which he took up the thread of Mr. Fox's Continental desires in 1807, it is impossible not to regret that circumstances did not admit of the introduction of the moderate measure of Parliamentary Reform, which relief from danger of immediate invasion (gained for us at Trafalgar) might have rendered practicable.

As was the case with Lord Liverpool's speeches and writings, so we may speak of Lord Howick's Parliamentary utterances as mines of information. He read constantly, and had the peculiar and unusual facility of improving spare moments when waiting for a friend, so that none of his time might be wasted, and it necessarily followed that whatever conclusions he reached were based upon a solid foundation.

A few specimens of his opinions scattered through this biography cannot, then, be out of place.

Mr. Grey, for instance, before he became Lord Howick, made a great speech on Parliamentary Reform in 1793 ; but as the period chosen for his motion was but a few weeks after war had commenced with France, it did not receive that attention which the importance of the subject deserved. He commenced with a history of the question, which, strange to say, originated in two attempts to repeal the Septennial Act, made in 1733 and 1745, inasmuch as the duration of Parliament for seven years has been preserved through all the changing scenes which the representation has passed. The only cause, however, that seems to have saved us from more frequent elections, was because in 1733 and 1745 the Jacobites were constantly plotting against the succession. Mr. Grey showed on the occasion in question how Mr. Pitt had himself agitated the question, first in 1782, again in 1783, and lastly in 1785, when he was Minister. The eloquent Flood, moreover, had taken up Reform in 1790, and had been compelled to desist in face of the hurricane arising in France.

Mr. Grey himself declared that a pure and uncorrupted House of Commons, emanating fairly and freely from the people, would remedy any injury gained from contagion with those dreaded French principles, which, he urged, none in their senses would propose as a model for imitation, and he proceeded to fortify his desire for Reform by the declared support of Lord Chatham and many great legal authorities.

He then dwelt on the weakness of a system which allowed Rutland to send as many members to Parliament as Yorkshire, and concluded by fulminating against

borough liberty and corruption, as a remedy for the latter prescribing a more popular election, such as the experiences of Queen Victoria's reign have, we regret to say, not proved to be altogether efficacious.

When Mr. Addington's ministry succeeded that of Mr. Pitt in 1801, Mr. Grey spoke as follows of the late ministry.

To those who composed it he imputed all the misfortunes which overwhelmed Europe; all was, on their side, disaster and disgrace, while the mighty genius who governed France, trusting to the resources of his own mind, restored life and energy to the Government, led on his armies to victory, and laid his enemies at his mercy.

Opposition criticism this, however, which must be taken *cum grano salis*, and read in conjunction with Lord Howick's conduct when Foreign Secretary a few years after. In company with Mr. Fox and other great men in our Parliamentary history, the Opposition view of foreign politics has been found incapable of an approach to realisation, even when every opportunity is afforded for its adoption in office.

At Fox's death, as we have forecasted, the foreign affairs of the nation fell into Lord Howick's hands, but the Grenvilles—Lord Grenville as Premier and Mr. Thomas Grenville, First Lord of the Admiralty—assisted in the direction of general policy.

France, by means of her ambassador, General Sebastiani, had acquired an influence over the Ottoman Porte, which, as later historical light has shown, was but preparatory for that proposed partition of Turkey, so important a part of Napoleon's scheme.

The possession of Constantinople being judged indispensable to the empire of the world, it was thought desirable to hinder Napoleon in this quarter at least, and to despatch an English naval force to Constantinople, and there, as the ally of Russia, do what we could to substitute the British and Russian influence for that of France.

It happened that, contrary to treaty, the Turks had removed the Governors (or Hospidars as they were called) of Wallachia and Moldavia, who, according to agreement, were to be Russian nominees, and secure in their office for seven years. These Sultan Selim replaced with rulers, suggested by Sebastiani. This was too much for the Emperor Alexander, who invaded the Principalities with 40,000 men. Decided successes followed over the Turks, whose armies were in a transition state from the Oriental to a European and more civilised mode of warfare.

When the Sultan found how hard matters were going with his troops he hesitated, and replaced the Hospidars, and did so when the remedy came too late, for the old desire for encroachment on Constantinople had inspired the Russian War Office, and their armies still pressed on, to the terror and amazement of the Pachas in the capital. All of a sudden the scene changed. Threatened by Napoleon on the Vistula, Alexander recalled his troops, and leaving the old Turkish party masters of the situation, deferred further aggressions on the Balkan peninsula until a more convenient season. But such conduct left French influence at Constantinople supreme over that of England and Russia alike.

It was to counteract this, and to insist on a free passage for Russian and English ships of war, that Sir John Duckworth was sent on his minatory expedition.

Something, moreover, was expected of England in return for the Russian alliance, which the English Foreign Office refused to subsidize.

Sir John Duckworth, the admiral in command of the squadron, acted as follows:—Pre-supposing a state of war, he ran the gauntlet of the Dardanelles, incurring little injury or loss of life, and half-way up the channel succeeded in capturing or destroying a Turkish line-of-battle ship and several frigates.

When at Constantinople, or rather at the Princes Islands, a parley took place, which proved General Sebastiani and the Turks to be better negotiators than the English admiral and ambassador combined.

The consequence, moreover, of delay in attacking Constantinople from the sea was that General Sebastiani rallied the Turks to prepare for the worst, whilst fortifications were improvised as if by magic, and by the time that Mr. Arbuthnott's indispositions left the diplomacy to Sir John Duckworth, the enterprise was assuming an entirely different complexion. It is, at this distance of time, a satisfaction to think that an English admiral did not act when a destruction of part of Constantinople, combined with a slaughter of helpless non-combatants, might have ensued, but no permanent occupation could have been maintained without troops destined to act in co-operation. The late Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, then a young diplomatist, told Sir Archibald

Alison* that the Turks were at first prepared to give way, but on time being allowed them, rallied to Sebastiani's passionate appeals, so that, as events turned out, the French ambassador out-maneuvred both the ambassadors of Russia and England, and defied the British fleet into the bargain.

Not only did the Turks refuse to surrender their fleet without fighting, but they imprisoned a boat's crew of the frigate *Endymion*, and refused to give them up.

The fact appears to have been that Sir John Duckworth had been sent out on a coercive errand, which depended for its success on resolute and immediate action, but that when it came to the point Mr. Arbuthnott, the English ambassador, would not take the responsibility of bombarding and scattering death and desolation amongst a defenceless population. The consequence was, that after a useless conflict on the island of Prota, Sir John Duckworth took advantage of the first fair wind to retrace his steps through the sea of Marmora, and into the dreaded passage.

Between the 19th of February 1807, and the 2nd of March, French engineers had assisted the Turks to repair their fortifications, and to plant additional pieces of heavy ordnance in position.

On nearing the castles of Sestos and Abydos, where the channel is little more than half a mile in breadth, the English admiral saluted the Turks, hoping, no doubt, that the gunners would believe an amicable

* Alison's *History of Europe*.

arrangement to have been arrived at. The reply came, however, in the shape of enormous stone and marble shot, which, breaking the masts and decks into splinters, inflicted severe wounds. The squadron, consisting as it did of five line-of-battle ships and six frigates, suffered heavily in effecting this passage, a loss of 29 killed and 138 wounded* being a large average for an operation of so short a duration. Still the ships were above water.

The Government appear to have been mistaken in confusing the admiral by undecided orders, given through an ambassador, and in having furnished him with inefficient means for enforcing their demands.

The desired result of Sir John Duckworth's attempt to intimidate the Turks into relinquishing a French alliance, and allowing British and Russian commerce to pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, was thus by no means gained. Sebastiani was looked upon as a deliverer, and when Russia became Napoleon's ally the Sultan gladly joined the two nations in their hostility to Great Britain.

So it came to pass that the Opposition at home had specious cause for objecting to Lord Howick's policy in this matter. The fault lay in trusting to a threat which could scarcely have been acted on without laying the seeds of future embarrassment, and was not likely to

* A friend of the writer's, wounded in the neck by a splinter, was condemned to a suffering life, but evinced great literary power. From his (Captain John Furneaux's) *History of Treaties*, the author has received valuable help in compiling this book.

be promptly carried out on the joint responsibility of an ambassador and an admiral.

The object of this expedition having clearly failed, it was unfortunate for the Home Government that a British army* should have been forced to leave Buenos Ayres, and to surrender their settlements on the La Plata, and that, moreover, immediately after the Constantinople fiasco, an ineffectual attempt to re-establish English military predominance in Egypt must be recorded.

Thus did political opponents gain a vantage-ground from which they might launch their bolts against those who had not given a magnanimous support to Mr. Pitt, and were about to reap as they had sown.

But there was never, for one moment, any hesitation on Lord Howick's part as to the projecting of measures framed to uphold the honour of England. All party exaggerations and Opposition extravagancies are naturally forgotten when men of the Grenville-Howick capacity find themselves at the helm—men, be it remembered, whom no less a personage than the great Marquis Wellesley afterwards (and notwithstanding differences as to the conduct of the war in Spain) meditated acting with politically—the statesman who of all others most desired to promote at any hazard the universal safety of England's empire.

The recital of these minor events has a special in-

* 7500 strong.

terest here as bearing on the character of Lord Howick's administration of the Foreign Office, but they have been obscured by the commotions which threatened to agitate Europe with the opening of a renewed conflict.

Whilst it is manifest to the simplest intelligence that the ministerial effort, Whig or Tory, to gain a military foothold for England failed from no fault of their authors or executants, but from the circumstances of the case.

Moreover, it is patent that Lord Macaulay's strictures directed against Pitt's military failures are equally fitted to be levelled at those of Lord Grenville's Whig Government.

But the threatening aspect of Europe attracted all Lord Howick's energies.

In the first place Prussia evinced hostility against France, and her king put forth a manifesto which was practically a declaration of war against Napoleon.

Metternich tells us that this was undoubtedly an outbreak of national feeling in Prussia,* but it does appear a fatal error to have seen Austria crushed and Russia cowed before taking the field.

Frederick William's manifesto was at once a justification of Mr. Pitt's Continental policy, and a recantation of the opinions forced by Napoleon on Prussia. French politics, it affirmed, had been for fifteen years the scourge of humanity. Holland, Switzerland, and Hanover, in their

* The young Prussian officers sharpened their swords on the French ambassador's doorstep.

then debased and depraved conditions, attested the truth of all that had been affirmed against a system of usurpation and exaction.

The murder of the Duke d'Enghien had been unavenged, and Prussia in particular laboured under assumption of military sovereignty by France in portions of her own dominions. Independence was but a name under these oppressions, and the recurrence of such an infringement of neutral territory as had occurred at Anspach might be expected whenever Napoleon so willed.

Prussia, on the other hand, as the paper affirmed, had kept her faith with France, in return for which she had been repaid by distrust, perfidy, and mortifying indignity.

There was nothing in the above statements that was not equally true in 1805, when Mr. Pitt, Lord Harrowby, and Lord Mulgrave were striving to unite the Powers on behalf of European liberty, or again in 1806, when Mr. Fox uplifted his voice for Hanover. The concurrent appearance of a Russian proclamation showed the German king to be morally allied to Alexander, even if geographical distance was destined to preclude practical advantage. Napoleon, who had been for some weeks on the frontier, swooped down upon his prey with all the advantages that superior forethought, strategy, and numbers could give. Auerstadt and Jena* opened the way to Berlin, from which city the unhappy Prussian

* Jena, 14th October 1806.

monarch, accompanied by a division of his army, had fled towards the Oder and the advancing Russian forces. Defeat in detail was again to be the result of this new uprising. Before proceeding on this march northwards to meet Russia and the remnant of the Prussian armies, Napoleon announced to the world that he would make no peace with England till he had deprived her of the means of disturbing the tranquillity of the Continent any more.

Thereupon he issued his famous Berlin decrees, forbidding any country under French influence to trade with Great Britain, and ordering the imprisonment of all English subjects dwelling under his power.

At home Government had dissolved Parliament, and prepared to strengthen themselves by Parliamentary refreshment for coping with events over which they could, alas ! place no control.

The temper of the new Parliament was shown to be exceedingly national, and it upheld the Government in their foreign policy as a whole. The Opposition criticisms on the conduct of the late negotiations with France likewise fell through after a perusal of the official papers subsequently submitted to Parliament, where it was clearly demonstrated that in the French Senate documents had been suppressed which bore on the vital parts of the controversy.

The original offer to negotiate came from France, and the ensuing rupture was the consequence of a departure from every principle to which she had previously pledged herself.

Lord Howick, moreover, enlightened Parliament on the subject of the Prussian disasters. So infatuated had been the Government of Prussia, that its resolution to commence hostilities with France was not made known at St. Petersburg until fifteen days before the Prussian troops were crushed at Jena. The unpreparedness and confusion in the Russian camp can be therefore thoroughly accounted for.

The British Government early* submitted to Parliament their intention to issue Orders in Council as an answer and reprisal to the Berlin Decrees, which had not only placed Britain in general blockade, but rendered her citizens liable to seizure in Napoleon's so-called territory. The British reprisals enacted that no neutral vessel should be permitted to trade between ports under French control without liability to capture, whilst British ships were likewise prohibited from so trading.

This action, leading as it did to cause of complaint and ultimate quarrel with the United States, was, strange to say, preceded by the transmission to America of a treaty of commerce. The policy of this measure has been questioned, but its subsequent ratification, and as many thought undue extension, by the succeeding Government has justified the Grenville-Howick action in this matter.

At this moment Napoleon was absolute master from the borders of Turkey to the banks of the Vistula;

* 7th January 1807.

whilst not only were the naval stores of the Baltic open to him, but the seafaring populations of Venice, Genoa, Spain, Holland, and Prussia were at his beck. With a population of at least fifty millions to draw his armies of invasion from, it could not, therefore, have been the passing campaign in Poland alone that occupied the anxious minds of English ministers.

That temporary curtailment of trade fell heavily on many an English merchant, but it became necessary for Great Britain to ask special sacrifices from her sons in pursuit of honour and safety, which she could leave no stone unturned to obtain.

Tentative the measure must necessarily have been, and its subsequent withdrawal was not effected until French commerce and that of her allies had bitterly repented the initiatory measures of commercial prohibition on which, under Napoleon's guidance, they had embarked.

On the 7th and 8th of February 1807, and after previous skirmishes at Pultulsk and elsewhere, the forces of Napoleon and Alexander met at Eylau.

The battle was most obstinately contested, and the half-starved masses of Russians only left the field because want of food made a retreat to the line of the Pregel an absolute necessity. By the retiring Muscovites Prussian Poland was denuded of the fruits of the earth. Carrying little or no commissariat, the barbarian hordes that then composed a Russian army slowly marched along, consuming every kind of provision, and, we may add, spreading dirt and disease throughout the region of

their encampment, and it is a fact that General Beningzen, the Russian commander, the night before Eylau, could obtain nothing to eat but a dish of boiled potatoes.*

However, the Muscovite zeal and determination had in no wise abated, and the Emperor sent his cavalry guard to join the army in Poland, and otherwise reinforced an army which had not suffered discomfiture or disorganisation in the field.

Such was the European position when Lord Grenville's Government resigned the offices they had worthily filled.

To particular and individual measures of this Administration exception might doubtless be taken, but the general tenor of Lord Howick's measures appears to have been sound and patriotic. It is easy to found a plausible theory to the detriment of the Whig Government, and to found it upon the assumed alienation of Prussia and Russia, who, according to Mr. Canning's Parliamentary contention, might have been secured as allies by prompt and decided action. This was very fully debated in 1807, and it was shown that, so far as Prussia was concerned, her seizure of Hanover evinced an hostility towards England on the part of her Government, which it was impossible to explain away satisfactorily, even by the notorious influence which Napoleon possessed, and did not scruple to exercise. Russia, undoubtedly, looked

* Account of Sir Robert Wilson.

for the subsidy without the granting of which in times of European ferment and disorder Great Britain could not hope to wage a Continental war with effect. This policy, however, as we have stated hereafter, was practically forced on Lord Howick.

An agreement cannot be here registered with the conclusions of Sir Archibald Alison, who imputed the disorganisation of the Continent and the ultimate defeat of Russia to British abstinence from European affairs. Just before leaving office Lord Howick should, it was urged, have made a great effort to support Alexander, and so keep him from joining hands with Napoleon. But granting, as every reader of history must, that Mr. Fox's policy of refusing to subsidise Germany or Russia represented the national feeling when a change of Government occurred in 1806, how, we may ask, could a British cabinet suddenly resolve to take a contrary course, and carry out fresh plans, which depended for success on alacrity such as telegraphic communication could only have afforded?

The original line of action chosen by the Whigs may have been unwise, but it was forced on them by a reaction caused by the conspicuous collapse which had overtaken a contrary policy at Austerlitz.

Moreover, it is probable that nothing could have prevented a temporary alliance between Napoleon and Alexander.

Towards the close of 1807 Lord Howick was called up to the House of Lords at the death of his father, a distinguished officer, who had been prominent in the American War, and so ennobled an ancient name.

Lord Grey had previously married a daughter of the first Lord Ponsonby, of Imokilly, and retired into the House of Lords, there in Opposition to sustain his own peculiar and decided opinions for twenty-three years.

If the identical opinions of Mr. Fox were not represented by Lord Howick, there is no doubt that the name of Lord Grey has been ever since looked upon as the perpetuator of Whig traditions, recurring to most of us in the form of old country gentlemen in blue coats and gold buttons, together with memories of Althorpe and the Pytchley hunt.

In Lord Grey's hands this great traditional power was wielded mainly on behalf of justice and humanity, but, to reach a conclusion, the noble Lord's mind had to pass through a logical and theoretical process, which sometimes was ill-adapted to the practical needs of the moment.

It is scarcely possible to consider each abstract question in politics and not to connect it to a degree with events of the past. Lord Grey's rooted distrust of Mr. Canning is a case in point. The noble Lord seems to have believed that Mr. Canning's reflections on the conduct of his predecessor in the Foreign Office were in 1808 disingenuous, and therefore unjust. But it is impossible for the historian not to perceive, even in querulous and purposeless recrimination, a repetition of the conduct which animated the Whig party after Pitt's death, when, as described in the words of one present, the strife was bitter to a degree.

Mr. Canning, be it also remembered, was defending his own policy when led to carry the war into his

enemies' territory. It is certainly difficult to justify the morality of Sir John Duckworth's attack on Turkey any more than that upon Denmark, unless each venture can be proved necessary and not merely expedient on account of national safety. This was the contention, combined with a charge of having meditated a similar raid upon Lisbon, that irritated Lord Grey against Mr. Canning. That the latter statesman was inclined to find fault somewhat prematurely, can be shown by his remark on this occasion when lamenting the omission of an allusion to the battle of Maida in the King's Speech, a special motion on this subject having been prepared by Mr. Windham.

Few can ponder over the domestic measures recommended by the ministry of which Lord Howick was so moving a spirit, and not regret that their term of office was shortened by circumstances which, perhaps, would have proved fatal to any Whig ministry during George III.'s active rule.*

* When, in 1786, Mr. Pitt put the finances in order, he established a Sinking Fund by placing annually aside one million, derived from an estimated surplus of £900,000, the remainder to be provided annually by taxation. To this fund he hoped to add the annuities falling in from time to time, and one tenth of any sums borrowed by the State for war or other purposes. This sum of money was to accumulate at compound interest—as Mr. Pitt calculated—with determinate and accelerated velocity, and be applicable for the gradual extinction of the National Debt. To confine its use to this object the fund was to be vested in certain commissioners.

Mr. Fox quite concurred in the wisdom of this measure, but argued that Parliament could abrogate any measure, and the inviolability of the fund would therefore be subject to the will of a powerful finance minister.

When Mr. Pitt by his talents and courage had relieved England from the too powerful sway of the Whig families, he was perforce driven to strengthen the kingly prerogative.

It is impossible to read the history of Mr. Pitt's, Lord Grenville's, and the Duke of Portland's last administration without coming to the conclusion that England was then a limited monarchy in the true sense of the word, but that the power of the Sovereign's will had, so to speak,

In 1786 the Sinking Fund was only $\frac{1}{238}$ of the whole debt, but in 1806 it was as much as $\frac{1}{63}$ of the then national indebtedness.

So far, therefore, Mr. Pitt's calculations were fully justified by this remarkable financial result attained in twenty years.

Sir Archibald Alison tells us that if the Sinking Fund had not been infringed on by any Chancellor of the Exchequer before 1846, the whole National Debt would then have been paid off at that time. Be that as it may, in 1807 Lord Henry Petty, the youthful Whig Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed a scheme devised on the hypothesis that war was to be the normal condition of Great Britain for many years, and that heavier taxation would soon become impossible. It infringed the principle of raising all interest within the year, and proposed to mortgage the war taxes in future years. It cannot be urged that either party would have stood by Pitt's and Fox's rule that debt deferred cannot be debt discharged, as the Opposition plan propounded by Lord Castlereagh would have infringed the same principle and touched the Sinking Fund sooner than Lord Henry Petty's.

This abrogation of the financial maxims of Pitt and Fox, which ultimately got our finance into considerable confusion, was therefore determined on directly those great statesmen were in their graves.

The financial power of the nation had so much to do with its conduct of the war, that we mention this fact to show how anxious were statesmen, one and all, as to the sinews of war when, as in England, the limit of taxation was believed to have been reached.

reasserted itself, and attained an equality unsurpassed by Lords and Commons, which has been found incompatible with more modern theories of Parliamentary government. For the benefit and fame of Great Britain, it may have been well that such balance existed, but the prerogative was undoubtedly exercised to limit civil and religious liberty.

An implied promise had been given by Pitt, Cornwallis, and Castlereagh, when they concluded the union with Ireland, that measures of Catholic relief should follow.

On the principle, moreover, that unity is strength it seemed absurd to place men under penalties when you relied on their allegiance, and on this argument Lord Howick relied when he submitted his measure to Parliament.

However, the King persistently refused to concur, and the general election that shortly followed proved the constituencies of those days to be enthusiastic in his support. George III. lived many years too late for carrying out any prolonged opposition to the nation's will, but, as in this case, he inflamed their prejudices, and concurred in the perpetuation of a system admittedly behind the times.

Lord Howick appears to have believed that a stormy interview with the King had not passed without the Sovereign yielding the outworks at least of his position, but when the ministry, as we have forecasted, proposed to Parliament the relaxing of certain military disabilities which they considered necessary in the then state of war, George III. not only refused to concur, but has since

been proved to have straightway corresponded with the Duke of Portland, who undertook to form an Administration and ignore the Roman Catholic claims altogether.

Lord Howick's was no ordinary character, for the due understanding of which the social and political gleanings of Holland House might be searched, and yet the great Whig noble's views and aspirations remain misunderstood.

That his was a single-minded and disinterested spirit no reader of history can deny, and that it was beautified by that fidelity in friendship and amiability in private which has gained credit and admiration for the political party with whom he acted, is also certain.

As Foreign Secretary he strove hard to maintain the honour of England, whilst in Opposition he ventured on unflinching criticisms directed against measures he believed to be unwise ; and if the verdict of history must sometimes be adverse to his judgment, there is ample reason for granting full forgiveness even where error is most palpable.

Lord Grenville, rather than Lord Grey, gave vent to the feelings of the two Whig noblemen as to the attack on Copenhagen, and it is difficult not to recognise in Lord Howick's Foreign Secretaryship reason for this silence, together with a justification for possible decisive action not reconcilable with strict interpretation of international law ; provided that such exceptional conduct were only adopted when the safety of England herself was in question, or in the case of a renewed naval combination (such as that in which Denmark was to be forced by France to participate) ; and again, when, as at

Constantinople in 1806, the stronghold of Eastern Europe was apparently about to be delivered into hostile and all-powerful hands.

Following the lead of Lord Grenville, but accentuating that nobleman's arguments with forcible and illustrative comments, Lord Grey consecutively condemned the expedition to the Scheldt (founded, as he declared it to be, on a design submitted to himself when Foreign Secretary and rejected as impracticable), and the Peninsula War, both in its inception and mode of operation ; carrying his criticism so far, indeed, as to appear desirous both to comment on military matters and to be trenching on the dangerous ground of political prophecy.

It is, however, fair to Lord Grey to say that, at the moment we were attacking Antwerp and the Scheldt, Sir Arthur Wellesley was protesting his inability to proceed into Spain, from a lack of transport and commissariat, which contemporary observers naturally set down exclusively to inefficient home management, but which history has declared to have been attributable neither to inadequate numbers nor feeble organisation, but to the difficulties inseparable from England and Spain working together in the field without one uniform system. When Wellington became Captain-General of the Spanish armies this difficulty became mitigated, and the efforts of Mr. Dundas, Lords Liverpool and Bathurst at the War Office bore their natural fruit in the shape of improved means of transport and supply, although, as will be afterwards shown, the want of specie remained a difficulty until the last.

It must not, however, be forgotten, and in justice to Lord Grey's memory due prominence should here be given to the fact that he chose the precise moment when Wellington needed encouragement from all parties at home, to own (and proclaim from his place in Parliament) both the judgment formed after Talavera to have been mistaken, and to acknowledge that England had at last found a general worthy of the high spirit which animated her people.

The impression prevailing on Lord Grey's mind as to the treaties of 1814 and 1815 will account for the opposition which he, in common with Brougham and others, directed against Lord Castlereagh's foreign policy. He states in a letter to Lord Brougham,* written at the end of December 1815 :—" Of the execrable principle of these treaties, and the scandalous fraud by which the country has been led on to support measures the real object of which has not only been concealed but denied —the public will take no heed if they can only entertain a hope of a continuance of peace, and if not of a diminution of their burdens, at least that they will not be augmented. But if the people can be made to understand that our triumphs have produced no security, that we must support a ruinous establishment in peace to maintain our guaranty of the Bourbons—with the risk of a new war and all its consequences, if the French should again rise against them—I think it still possible that something may be done."

* *Memoirs of the Life and Times of Lord Brougham*, written by himself, vol. ii. p. 301.

Lord Grey was then writing under a misapprehension which the logic of events speedily removed, but it is well that such mistaken forecasts should be clearly shown never to have possessed solidity, and in justice to Lord Liverpool and the members of his Government prominence should be afforded to the facts as unfolded by history. It is, however, worthy of remark that when Napoleon escaped from Elba in 1815, and violated the Treaty of Fontainebleau, Lord Grey supported Lord Liverpool's Government in a renewal of the war.

The settlement of the Catholic emancipation was of necessity a cause of satisfaction to him who of all others had suffered politically from its remaining an open question, as but for his scruples on this head it is clear that office was again and again open to Lord Grey.

Lord Teignmouth, in his *Reminiscences*, grants the palm of eloquence during the final debates in the House of Peers to Lord Grey.

He speaks as follows :—" Of the orators who distinguished themselves in these remarkable debates, the palm of eloquence must be assigned to Lord Grey. A standard-bearer in the cause of civil and religious liberty, he was denied the prospect of the promised land till he had shared with his followers the way-worn weariness of the desert, and the discouragement of repeated defeats. . . . And now the passage of the intervening Jordan devolved on the leadership of one who had not borne the heat and burden of the day. Yet no invidious reference to past shortcomings, no niggardly grudging of present recompense, sullied the loyalty of the allegiance or the sincerity of the tribute which he tendered to his more

fortunate rival. And whether he reminded his brother peers, as he pointed to the historical tapestry which adorned the walls of their House, of the immortal achievements which rescued them from the threatened thraldom of Spain and its Inquisition ; or congratulated the hero of a hundred battles on his crowning vindication of the rights of conscience,—the heroic strain of the veteran statesman's eloquence was worthy of the speaker and of the occasion."

Lord Teignmouth also tells a characteristic story of the Whig leader during the agitation of 1819, who, when answered somewhat roughly and contemptuously by the Devonshire nobleman, Lord Rolle, to the effect that if the cap of demagogic disturbance fitted he was welcome to wear it, drew himself up to the full extent of his stately figure, and told the noble Lord that if he charged him as accessory to the disorders in question, the imputation was false. Lord Teignmouth's evidence is the more valuable inasmuch as, being a diligent collector of historic facts, he himself witnessed many of the scenes which he described.

His volumes will, moreover, be found as far removed from partisanship as they are replete with interest.*

It would be misleading to interpret Lord Grey's exclamation made to Mrs. Manners Sutton (and noticed in the *Wellington Despatches*) as betokening any doubt as to the wisdom of his reforming course. Rather should we read between the lines of passing

* *Reminiscences of Lord Teignmouth*, 2 vols. (David Douglas, Edinburgh.)

events, and decipher other causes for alarm which might lead the most determined minister to pause. He saw society stirred to its very depths by an agitation likely to degenerate into riotous and seditious conduct amongst the less-educated classes, who clamoured for admission into the constitutional pale. To quiet the storm he feared to be forced to wield powers unused before in England's history, and to be compelled to use them against the privileges, if not the very existence, of his own order.

No one can believe that the aristocracy of England could have retained equal caste after a wholesale swamping of their votes by a creation of Peers.

All this was on the anxious mind of England's minister, who, may be, for the moment saw more vividly the wrongs and inequalities of his poorer countrymen than the rights of those—dear to him as they were—who had jealously cherished liberty for all classes in the kingdom. But the hour had arrived when men desired to burst the leading-strings of mere class prejudice, and exercise power in the proportion which they contributed towards national prosperity, and desired to do so, as after-experience has shown, with an abiding desire to preserve our National Constitution.

Lord Grey might well hesitate before setting rival, and to a degree unknown, forces into action. He was, perforce, called on to make a leap in the dark quite as much as his celebrated colleague (the fourteenth Lord Derby) who shuddered thirty-six years afterwards when about to make a fresh departure in the direction of enfranchising the semi-educated thousands.

A picture is extant of Lord Grey meditating resignation, when the Lords' opposition placed such alternative before him in competition with a creation of Peers or an abandonment of the Bill.

Haydon, the artist, has in a striking manner delineated England's Prime Minister in the official room at Downing Street. Care is imprinted on those interesting features, whose meditative cast struggles with a native benignity nothing could suppress. All the comforts of life are around, and a cheerful fire throws its glow over all. "Shall I resign?" is the question asked, and answered as we know in the affirmative, even if patriotism bade him put on harness once more, and complete the task he of all men was best fitted to undertake.

The justification of his action is written in the after-page of English history, and while it is open to believe that the change might have come with greater benefit if conferred after the institution of national education, there is hope that warning may yet be taken by the nation as to the danger of entrusting its destinies to those unfit to guide them.

If one element bids fair to usurp more than its share in governing the England of a future century, it is education. Rank has ruled the country. Wealth now holds a not altogether unwholesome influence in determining the counsels of England, but education is, we believe, destined to eclipse either by the brightness of the rays which both parties in the State are ready to diffuse. This change will be welcome to all, if only the influence of religion is maintained, and statesmanship be called to guide us but through a restricted period of

crisis before England's steps advance in the light of day. May we not venture to hope that fidelity to religion and respect for her Constitution may still make it possible to extol and justify that first step in the new direction, taken by the statesman whose character we have been contemplating.

That Lord Grey's scheme of electoral reform, foreshadowed by Pitt, was not engrafted on the statute book in the modified form which the circumstances of 1807 would have warranted, is of itself a disaster which years of peace failed to compensate.

The change had to be made at a time when an alternative of revolution stared us in the face.

The captain who takes command of a ship struggling in the trough of the sea is not responsible when he brings his vessel into port somewhat shattered. It is enough that he has guided her through the storm. Hence it will be that generations yet untold will honourably connect the name of Grey with the great Reform Bill of 1831-32.

It is characteristic of the old Whig party, and of Earl Grey as one of their greatest leaders, that he, when minister, should have never hesitated at all hazards to discourage extreme opinions amongst his followers, an example which may safely be followed by any minister, Whig or Tory, Conservative or Liberal, who desires to retain the confidence of the British nation. Not that it would be possible even to revert to the maxims of the first political reformers of 1832.

The old times have long passed into days of riper

freedom, and in turn these constitutional rights are dissolving into a degree of liberty which a majority (including many of the wisest amongst us) hail with delight and confidence. The greater, then, must remain the responsibility of statesmen whose province it is to guide these great political forces.

One page of Lord Grey's life claims a notice at our hands. His watchfulness over the public purse was constant. Whether in Opposition as Mr. Grey, when during the years 1795–96 he first desired to limit the Prince of Wales's increased allowance—as proposed by Mr. Pitt—repudiate his debts, and call on the most exalted person in the realm to contribute towards their liquidation—(in the latter of the two above-mentioned years, he went so far as to threaten an impeachment against Mr. Pitt for the subsidising of the Continent without making a detailed financial explanation to Parliament)—or during succeeding years of unremitting opposition submit to discouraging defeats, his attitude remained unchanged. Such public action may have had, as history shows, a two-fold influence.

It may have, on the whole, restrained expense, and so saved England from over-stepping the mark, and trusting too much to the elasticity of resources, which, we shall show in this volume, were in official quarters believed to have been ultimately strained to the utmost.

One cannot then but believe that to Mr. Grey's bold advocacy as the mouthpiece of a determined minority, must be granted the merit of having preserved a healthy financial balance, even if his efforts were unavailing to destroy a system of policy proved to be alone adopted to

the special occasion for which it was devised, and we state this in spite of early failures and disappointments inseparable from the circumstances which accompanied the resistance of Napoleon's aggressions on neighbouring nations. The earlier coalitions failed, it is true, and failed conspicuously, but he would be a bold man who cared to urge, with the facts before him, that in 1813 the Allies could have had the remotest chance, either of unity or victory, without British gold had been freely and judiciously spent on behalf of the common cause.

We know that the theory of such subsidising is now unpopular and voted out of date ; but if (which God forbid) the conditions of 1813 should re-appear, he will be an indifferent friend to Great Britain who shall counsel the paralysing of her great and matchless source of strength which, in combination with the determination of her children, could alone place her on a footing with the conscriptions and increasing hosts by whom she is surrounded.

Well indeed may our statesmen, warned by the past, desire to nurse our financial strength in times of peace.

Mr. Grey, then, did good service when he essayed to place a moral check on lavish expense, whilst he failed to render Mr. Pitt that credit which his discernment of England's power deserved.

The same feeling in favour of retrenchment undoubtedly existed in Lord Grey's mind when the Spanish war commenced. It is with regret that we recur to the notice of that Parliamentary action, because alone of all Lord Grey's public endeavours, it seems to us to have threatened to work permanent ill for England, made as it was when—as Mr. Hayward, in his fascinating work

entitled *Statesmen and Eminent Writers* (vol. i. p. 442), tells us—the British troops were in danger of being withdrawn from the Peninsula, and Napoleon left free to concentrate his enmity against England.

But Sir William Napier's history, much as it is open to differ with his political conclusion, has at least put forward reasonable justification at once for the under-current of public opinion and the Opposition action.

The conduct of Lord Grey on this occasion must be taken together with that of Lord Grenville, and judged accordingly. The two statesmen deliberately believed it to be impossible to save Portugal, even if in the attempt an English army suffered effacement. They, moreover, considered that such an effort would involve financial exertions beyond the scale that even England's resources warranted her in attempting to sustain.

With this belief they were clearly within the province of their position, as Opposition leaders, in placing the case as they conceived it to stand before the people. They made no allowance, be it remembered, for military genius such as Wellington developed, gauging such talent by that which had served the nation in earlier stages of the war. They moreover sarcastically and unsparingly condemned the faults of detail which added expense to the first proclamation of Britain's mission in the Peninsula, and in so doing fostered in their own minds an antagonism to Mr. Canning, which, in Lord Grey's case at least, was never entirely effaced. If he was mistaken as to the result of the Peninsula contest, it can only be said that others were either more fortunate in forecasting events, or had better gauged the conditions of strife.

Party feeling as an explanation should be scouted by all who have studied Lord Grey's noble and disinterested nature, which had a single eye to the honour of England and the happiness of the millions who inhabited this island.

A remarkable feature in the Whig minister's foreign policy was from first to last his apprehension of the necessity for watching carefully over the English interests in Turkey.

Whether by sending Sir John Duckworth to the Dardanelles in 1806, or by the influence of his voice in Parliament in February 1829, when he condemned alike the Treaty of Adrianople and the untoward event * of Navarino, as contrary to the interests of England, or again during his own Premiership in 1831–34, one universal sentiment as to the necessity of maintaining British influence at Constantinople was prominent, being that which has animated every responsible Englishman who has studied the question. It is true that in consequence of unexpected demands made elsewhere in Europe, and in consequence of a somewhat cheese-paring economy which prevailed after the Reform Bill, we were unable to send men-of-war to succour Sultan Mahmoud, when pressed by Mehemet Ali in 1833, but the inability, when it was recognised, must—judging by all his public professions—have been as distressing to Lord Grey, as we know it was to his colleague and Foreign Secretary—Lord Palmerston.

It was not so much, as those who knew Lord Grey best

* *Annual Register, 1829.*

say, that he desired the absolute integrity of the Ottoman Empire to become a watchword in the mouths of English statesmen, as that he dreaded any attempt to turn the Turks out of Europe, as, humanly speaking, certain to be accompanied by scenes of bloodshed and inhumanity. The opinion, therefore, which is imputed to him in the *Wellington Despatches* to the effect that he held, in common with Mr. Fox, a desire to expel the Turks from Europe, is proved from undoubted authority to have been mistaken, even if its incorrectness had not been manifested by Lord Grey's public conduct.

Lord Grey spent much of his life at his beloved Howick, after the final peace of Paris in 1815.

Differences with Lord Grenville on foreign policy had thrown him much amongst the home occupations of an English nobleman ; but it is remarkable that under the most depressed political conditions the Whig leaders by no means gave themselves up to constant and hopeless opposition, but resorted to the refined occupations which their minds eminently qualified them to enjoy.

There remains (so far as his conduct in Opposition is concerned) but the repugnance of Lord Grey to support Mr. Canning's Government in 1827.

The famous speech which the Earl made on that occasion conveyed, from his point of view, the anomaly of a minister who, as he declared, had for more than half a century supported every invasion of civil liberty, yet attracting towards him the more Liberal elements which a fast changing condition of thought and opinion made necessary for the carrying on of Government.

Each political leader, strange to say, saw his followers

deserting into rival camps, or standing aloof in doubtful neutrality.

Well might the Reformer, who had borne the burden and heat of the struggle, look with doubt upon the great orator chosen over his head to be Minister of England. How well can one imagine the feelings of those friends who knew the innermost desires of each, and longed to combine their talents on behalf of the common good.

Few of us live who have not known what it is to wish that the most intimate and trusted of our acquaintances may be brought into the close converse which their tastes and opinions fit them to enjoy. But when the attempt is made to effect such conjuncture of sympathies, may be under every advantage which society affords—the approach between the two individuals has not only appeared cold and formal, but has possibly never advanced beyond a certain point. How bitterly have we regretted our inability to join them in attachment whose spirits we know to share so much in common.

Such indeed must have been the prevailing sentiment of those who, overlooking all passing prejudice or party feeling, saw in 1827 Lord Grey and Mr. Canning the national leaders of the English people.

During the next few chapters we hope to familiarise our readers with the career of that great foreign minister whom Lord Grey so profoundly distrusted, and whose secret and more philosophical views on statesmanship and its application to English needs were probably never known to his Whig contemporary.

Indeed, “strangers yet” must have been recorded of the two statesmen by those who sought a common

platform for their actions at issue. It is, however, characteristic of the gradually progressive public opinion of those times to learn from no less an authority than the late Sir Henry Bulwer, that, in his opinion, but for the elevation of Mr. Canning to the Premiership and the concomitant re-arrangement of parties, Lord Grey's great Reform Act never could have been proposed when it took legislative shape, and the crowning achievement of our hero's career have been rendered uncertain of accomplishment during his lifetime. It is, however, strange to reflect that in 1807 Mr. Canning had made the self-same error which, on the occasion in question, we believe Lord Grey to have participated in. We mean that uncompromisingly and without hesitation he repudiated the policy of his opponents.

When Mr. Canning moved to substitute an entirely fresh King's Speech for that of the Grenville-Howick Government, he was pronouncing a censure which historians cannot endorse who study the questions at issue.

Lord Russell has narrated how distasteful return to office was to Lord Grey in 1831. It was, therefore, pure patriotism that led him to engage in the task of reforming Parliament, and thus entering on a bitter political contest.*

* Before the Reform Bill, glimpses of Lord Grey are afforded us in Mr. Trevelyan's life of Lord Macaulay. We are told of the Prime Minister carrying the sword of state at William IV.'s coronation, the very incarnation of aristocratic dignity. Again we see him the favoured guest at Holland House interceding for Lord Holland, who desired to be allowed a slice of melon, which his better half denied him on account of the gout; whilst finally

Lord Grey's last official act as minister was to deal a death blow to the expiring slave trade, and so complete the policy initiated in 1807.

the stately society of Downing Street opens its portals to the reader, and we learn how completely the Earl was a link between that aristocracy which the English people deliberately elect to a share of Government, and the popular aspirations so deeply stirred in those anxious times. But the Earl's own words will at this crisis best convey his thoughts and ideas. He spoke as follows for the second reading of the Reform Bill : " I have throughout endeavoured not to say one word which would excite angry feelings or add excitement to—I wish I could say—dying animosities. If I have done so, I disclaim it as being remote from my intention. But consider well what may be the effect of a rejection of this Bill. You have seen and you have felt how much the public interests have been affected by the long-continued anxiety and suspense in which the public mind has been held—how much its commercial transactions, domestic interests, its foreign relations have all sustained injury more or less It was, perhaps, the unavoidable consequence of conflicting opinions on a great measure of constitutional policy But if you reject the Bill, will the question be set at rest? Let who will be the minister, another must be introduced. Then follows another period of suspense and agitation, exempt, I trust, from violence and tumult, but still prejudicial to the interests and tranquillity of the country. To myself everything depends upon it. Having introduced the measure, I have endeavoured to conduct it with a steady adherence to its principles, and to the views upon which I had originally acted. I have been exposed to much injustice, to many, I will confidently say, undeserved attacks, to much misrepresentation, and, I must add, to much suspicion, from which I should have thought I might have been protected. But I have not been deterred from doing what I thought right. In the event of failure, a personal responsibility rests upon me which, perhaps, never was before sustained by any former minister. I may sink under it, but that is nothing. I shall have the support of an approving conscience, which has always instructed me to do what is right and leave the consequences to God."

The after-rest which he thus earned was gratefully spent in his loved Northumberland.

Lord Grenville at Dropmore, and Lord Grey at Howick, are described to us as in enjoyment of all that makes life worth living. Blest with ample means and cultivated minds, happy in their homes, honoured and respected by their friends, there could exist no more fit conjunctures of the *mens sana in corpore sano* than is evidenced by these two remarkable men. Those familiar with the contents of the volume containing the life and opinions of Earl Grey, will remember his constant anxiety to return home to participate in pleasant rides above the wild sea coast, and other home pleasures there fully described.


These delights were indeed the reward of anxious care in Lord Grey's case. He had battled with the prejudices of his own caste, and incurred political enmity which was inseparable from the violence of the passions raging over a controversy which imperilled the domestic peace of England.

The third Lord Holland's lines, however, evince the tone of feeling which Grey's merits had generated amongst political and personal adherents :—

“ Nephew to Fox and friend to Grey,
Enough my meed of fame,
If those who 've deigned to watch me say
I 've tarnished neither name.”

Earl Grey died in 1845, at the age of eighty-one.





George Canning.

GEORGE CANNING.

We are told that we have been successful because the principles on which war was undertaken has been renounced. I know of no such change. We have not succeeded by adopting new maxims of policy, but by upholding, under all varieties of difficulty and discouragement, old-established, and inviolable principles of conduct.—*Spoken at Liverpool at the close of the great French war, January 10, 1814.*

MARCH 1807 TO SEPTEMBER 1809.



ORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE* shortly before his death contributed materials of great value concerning the early life of George Canning, whose Etonian delight in classical studies, and in the periods of Grecian glory, was, as the writer in effect remarks, the sentiment of a career, and it was granted to the matured statesman to give life to his own boyish aspirations.

As a youth the ludicrous and satirical flowed naturally from his pen, whilst solid argument was conspicuous in his writing, an element tending towards literary

* *Nineteenth Century*, January 1880.

completeness which is uncommon in the early productions of youthful genius.

Probably no individual has ever derived greater advantage from Eton than did George Canning. His peculiar talents fitted him to shine conspicuously on an arena where Fox had languished, but which was yet destined to train the energies of other eminent men, as it previously had those of Grey and Grenville. (The great Duke of Wellington—Lord Wellesley, Lord Melbourne, the late Lord Derby, and Mr. Gladstone, were all Etonians.) Lord Dalling tells us that Eton developed in George Canning all his natural propensities. He was even there regarded as a born statesman.

The advantage of a fine presence and of a natural delivery are great in public speaking. They came to Canning unbidden, and were even observed in boyhood. It is open to anyone to linger near that monument in Westminster Abbey, and trace the high forehead and erect figure which stands near the grave of England's great Foreign Minister, and so convince themselves of the nobility which belonged naturally to his person.

Sprung from an ancient English family, some of whom lie buried in the grand old church of St. Mary, Redcliff, Bristol (which city, moreover, has more than one spot called after the name since rendered so famous*), Mr. Canning yet was another notable instance of the many distinguished men whose birthplace has been in Ireland, his more immediate part of the family tree

* It is there spelt Canyng, whilst the word Redcliff has no final *e*.

having thither migrated, and are now represented by Lord Garvagh. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's father provided for the education and advantages the young Canning received ; and his uncle possessing political sympathies, allied to what we now consider the creed of an old Whig, the nephew became, as Lord Dalling tells us in his *Historical Characters*, the representative of that shade of opinion in the school debating society. On Montem days, it also appears, he was the show-boy of master and student, and in the above volume the Etonian of the period is represented as saying, "Look, papa ; that good-looking fellow is Canning. Such a clever chap, but a horrible Whig. How he does give it Pitt ! "

But it came to pass that the latter minister, exercising the perspicuity which characterized his career, heard of the abilities which at Oxford had not belied his school promise. At the University his opinions, may be, became more advanced, and his name a rallying-point for those young men of talent who believed that a new era of Liberal opinion was about to dawn, when George III. was in the full swing of his kingly prerogative. It was, however, at this period that he inaugurated a life-long friendship with Lord Liverpool.

George Canning was born in 1770, and in 1793, his education being complete and the idea of a lawyer's life discarded, Mr. Pitt, through a private channel, asked for an interview with the young man of promise, who, yielding to the blandishments of one whose personal influence was unbounded, accepted the offer which was to bring him into Parliament as a Government supporter. Nor is this to be wondered

at, when, on reflection, we learn how thoroughly in accordance with the true dictates of that liberty (from first to last dear to George Canning's heart) was the policy of the minister, who, to use Sir Henry Bulwer's words, repudiated the desecration of freedom which the mob rulers of Paris had made part and parcel of a vicious system of Government.

Hence it came to pass that the Whig leaders were disappointed of the young man of promise, who, Sheridan boasted, would soon supply an antidote to the successful opening speech of Mr. Jenkinson, the future statesman and Prime Minister.

Canning suffered more than other Party leaders from a natural instability of temperament, which forbade easy acquiescence in political discomfiture, and herein lay his weakness. He could never rest unless he had carried the war into the enemies' country, and both crushed the arguments and silenced the tongues of his opponents. More often than not, it was within his power to rule the storm ; but on special occasions events fought against him, and under these circumstances he writhed under the pain of disappointment. He was not, in the ordinary sense of the words, a party man, but he fought hard for principles which he held to be right and true. Mr. Pitt was his model, and to fulfil the mission of that political guide remained his constant object.

Mr. Canning has left on record his impressions when first making a speech in the House of Commons, and their recital lends an additional interest to the early pages of Mr. Stapleton's *George Canning and His Times*.

The young orator's alarm at hearing his own voice

amidst the silence which reigned around, soon became merged in the labyrinth of his argument. Suddenly, however, looking up, he saw two prominent members of the Opposition bench laughing, apparently either at his manner or the drift of his contention.

This for a moment thoroughly disconcerted the speaker, who at the time in question was out of breath from the unwonted efforts he had made.

Recovering soon from his temporary dismay, Mr. Canning, however, once again plunged into the more controversial parts of the question at issue, and forgetting all in an overpowering desire to overthrow his opponent's case, he sat down amongst the cheers of Government supporters, but not on the whole recorded to have made the expected sensation.

Anyhow, he fared better than did the son of the famous Lord North, who himself was wont to tell how he rose in the House of Commons amidst a crowd of members expecting great things from the family name ; but after uttering a few incoherent sentences, during the delivery of which he saw nothing but the Speaker's wig, which grew to an enormous size before his perplexed vision as he sank helplessly on the benches of the House, never tempted fortune more.

In Mr. Canning's case, however, notwithstanding some disappointed expectations, his opening attempt was held to have evinced talent of a high order, so it came to pass that, turning special attention to foreign affairs, and serving as Under-Secretary under Lord Grenville, he received the training destined to render his name so famous.

At home and in domestic life the love and faithfulness constantly shown to his somewhat obscure relations present George Canning's character in its lovable and trustworthy nature. He was not only the great statesman, but the good son and faithful friend.

Thus it came to pass that when Miss Scott, a lady of fortune, bestowed her hand on the rising statesman, there was conferred on Mr. Canning the reward of solid if silent merit, at the same time releasing him from the financial cares of a life destined to be spent in his country's service.

A volume might be written on the lives of Mr. Canning's children and the devotion of his wife, which of itself would fill more space than can be here allotted to a sparse notice of a noble career.

But the name of one son lives indelibly in the pages of Kaye and Malleson, whilst the early death of another will not be forgotten by those who have read the touching poetical lament of the gifted father.*

* CANNING'S LAMENT ON HIS SON'S EARLY DEATH.

(Written in 1820.)

Though short thy span, God's unimpeached decrees
 Which made that shortened span one long disease,
 Yet merciful in chastening, gave thee scope
 For mild redeeming virtues, faith, and hope,
 Much resignation, pious charity,
 And since this world was not the world for thee,
 Far from thy path removed, with partial care,
 Strife, glory, gain, and pleasure's flowing snare,
 Bade earth's temptations pass thee harmlessly,
 And fixed on heaven thine unreverted eye.
 Oh, marked from birth, and nurtured for the skies,
 In youth with more than learning's wisdom wise,

Some readers of Lord Macaulay's life will not forget his interview with Mr. Canning's daughter, the Marchioness of Clanricarde, who with flashing eye spoke scornfully of those politicians who deserted her father when he became Premier. The lady's beauty was as notorious as her mother's devotion to the great memory they all prized.

Mr. Canning's statesmanship and oratory has a special interest for ourselves, the latter, moreover, as forming a link between the past and present—between the times of Pitt and Fox and those of Palmerston and Derby.

It behoves us, however, in the first place as concisely as possible to present to our readers Canning the literary man, together with some idea of the individual, before plunging into the recital of his career as Foreign Minister of England, nor even estimating his forensic talents. It is, however, a fact that but for a conspicuous success in the senate, George Canning's name would stand higher even amongst the talented contemporaries with whom he lived.

As sainted martyrs, patient to endure,
Simple as unweaned infancy, and pure,
Pure from all stain (save that of human clay),
Which Christ's atoning blood hath washed away,
By mortal sufferings now no more oppressed,
Mount, sinless spirit, to thy destined rest,
While I, reversed our nature's kindlier doom,
Pour forth a father's sorrow o'er thy tomb.

In the year 1828 (one year after the father's death), Mr. Canning was followed to the grave by his sailor son, a Captain in His Majesty's Service, who was drowned whilst bathing.

His early contributions to the *Microcosm* at Eton, for instance, show high merit, whilst the famous *Anti-Jacobin* owes much of its success to Canning. At 169 Piccadilly, where those young men of talent who opposed themselves to French Jacobinism were wont to meet for the purpose of compiling the coming number, a space, we are told, was always left for Pitt; but his financial contributions were irregularly sent. Canning, on the other hand, was the life of these sarcastic and able productions now so notorious. A continual vein of quiz and banter, however, runs throughout, which, in the opinion of some critics, communicated itself to Canning's earlier speeches, and destroyed their effect. Sidney Smith, for instance, never appreciated the great Foreign Secretary's senatorial abilities, and contended they displayed shallow philosophy, and seemed to him altogether beneath the occasions on which they were delivered.

If even George Canning failed to surpass the clergyman of Combe Florey in wit, there remain published speeches, despatches, and fugitive poetical pieces to attest the merit of a genius whose political career seems to us strangely underrated.

The estimation of a great orator by contemporary opinion must of necessity be imperfect. One is apt to doubt whether the present can reproduce the wonders of the past. Men living when Pitt and Fox fought their battles on the floor of the House of Commons, stoutly, therefore, denied that a Parliamentary genius had arisen when, as the *Annual Register* complained, long speeches became again the order of the day. Canning's brilliant periods and mellifluously well-turned sentences failed to

convince those around him of the supreme excellence which public opinion ultimately claimed for his powers. Brougham, indeed, deliberately set him down as an actor.

One voice was, however, powerfully raised on his behalf. Mackintosh, who, perhaps, of all his contemporaries, observed him most closely and judged him the fairest, said of his eloquence that it possessed some qualities in advance of those professed by Pitt himself, even if in the dignity of argument it fell lower than that of his mighty model.

Probably at no one time had Canning's eloquence the continued force of either Pitt's or Fox's. It was, however, lightened by a wit, which, playful in its intention, wounded wherever the carelessly-directed shaft might chance to strike.

Oratory must be more or less judged by the effect made thereby on the public mind, and no instances either in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries can be cited where whole audiences have been smitten more thoroughly by the majesty of a great occasion than when George Canning has disbursed himself.

The word disbursed has been used advisedly, because when one of these remarkable orations was in process of incubation, the man's whole nervous system seemed oppressed with his task, and it was not until it had been performed thoroughly and well that natural spirits were recovered, and the George Canning his

* Brougham's *Lives of Statesmen of George III.*

friends loved so well was ready and able to give attention to ordinary matters.

Canning always advised young speakers to take the conversational as their basis for public speaking, and he seems to have acted on this rule himself.

It seemed as if a river pursuing a natural course, varied it only by bursting into magnificent cascades and waterfalls, represented as they were by passages of eloquence which this gifted speaker now and then poured forth.

Lord Dalling tells us that the orator's abruptly framed, rapidly delivered sentences and phrases may have been for hours premeditated in the cabinet, but in delivery had not the appearance of art.

He likewise remarks how every day leaves fewer of those who remember the clearly chiselled countenance, which the slouched hat only slightly concealed, the lip satirically curled, the penetrating eye. Few, moreover, live to speak to us of the singularly mellifluous and sonorous voice, now elevated into poesy, now burning with passion, now rich with humour, which curbed into still attention a willing and spell-bound audience.

If Canning's sarcastic wit made some enemies,* and even occasionally offended friends, it was

* Mr. Wilberforce spoke of a speech of Canning's as follows:—
“Canning invincibly comic. Went to the House unwell, but became enchain'd by Mr. Canning's admirable humour. . . . His drollery of voice and manner were inimitable. The lighting up of the features and comic play about the mouth prepares you for the burst of witticism which is to follow.”

left for lofty and classical declamation to charm contemporaries and impress posterity. The high-sounding language which upraised and sustained public spirit on behalf of down-trodden Spain in 1809, equally with the voice which, sixteen years after, was again to be lifted in the cause of Portuguese freedom, has, on each occasion, left a mark in history equal, perhaps, to that which each remarkable event should have evoked. Higher praise it is impossible to give, and one is involuntarily led to incline towards the judgment of McIntosh rather than that of Brougham. In sustaining a high and consistent

Lord Dalling was accustomed to narrate how observant Canning would be of the mood in which individual members of the House were conversing, so that he might himself hit off the prevailing temper when he addressed them. Very silent in the Cabinet, the Duke of Wellington told Mr. Greville that Canning was wont to be, but that when once aroused he maintained his opinions with extraordinary tenacity.

Even in the midst of the driest official details, the minister's native wit would break forth, and once when Sir Charles Bagot was minister at the Hague he was astonished to receive the following verse in cypher :—

“ In matters of commerce the fault of the Dutch
Is giving too little and asking too much ;
With equal advantage the French are content,
So we 'll clap on Dutch bottoms a twenty per cent.”

Jenning's Anecdotal History of British Parliament, p. 211.

Again Mr. Canning once sorely tried the regard and admiration of the first Lord Carington, who but a few weeks after he had been made a peer by Mr. Pitt, found the following chalked on his hall door :—

“ One Bobby Smith lives here,
Billy Pitt made him a peer,
And took the pen from behind his ear.”

level both as regards fluency and style of speaking, neither Chatham nor Burke approached the younger Pitt. His magnificent periods were ever at command. In this particular Sir James McIntosh despises Canning's inferiority to his great model ; and the estimate is borne out by the testimony of such contemporary opinion as it has fallen in the writer's power to consult.

There is, however, due reason to believe that the man whom neither Erskine, Grattan, nor Brougham can be declared to have surpassed, was an orator worthy the position he has earned for himself in history.

The talents of a great minister have wider scope and more striking opportunity for their exercise than those of other individuals, however eminent. It is the apt reward of success which in George Canning's case may in a degree be traced to the picture-painting of his eloquent tongue. Competent critics are not wanting to tell us of merit in the oratory of Grattan, Erskine, Plunkett, aye, even in that of McIntosh, which they do not profess to find in the glittering sentences of the popular minister, whilst as a political gladiator no human being has ever surpassed Lord Brougham.

But the oratorical honours of those past conflicts on the whole cleave to Canning, and invest his name with an historic halo not by any means undeserved.*

* "In person," says Lord Dalling, "Mr. Canning was favoured by nature, being of a good height, of a strong frame, and of a regular and intelligent countenance." The glance of his eye, and his pleasant smile were thus fancifully described by Tom Moore, the Irish poet :—

Our meaning may be best illustrated by an allusion to the time of Canning's life when his powers were least prominent. When, after the quarrel with Lord Castle-reagh, the ex-minister became generally unpopular in Parliamentary circles, and his leaning towards the Prince of Wales as opposed to the King was set down to desire for office rather than a wish to forward Catholic emancipation by every means within his power. It was at this moment that Sir Samuel Romilly came forward, and with all the earnestness of conviction proclaimed to the House of Commons that he could not consider Mr. Pitt a great man. Wilberforce straightway raised the

“ And on that turtle I saw a rider,
A goodly man, with an eye so merry,
I knew 'twas our Foreign Secretary.”

Although not always equally attentive to the closeness of his argument as to the polish of his periods, several of Mr. Canning's great forensic displays are distinguished for their unimpeachable logical correctness, showing that when attention had been turned to this matter, such defects were easily cured.

Lord Lansdoune was wont to declare (Lord Dalling's *Historical Characters*, vol. ii. p. 426) that he considered Canning, at his best, more effective than Fox or Pitt, but it would be scarcely consistent with truth to aver that the general level of oratory left to us for perusal was equal to that of the above-named champions of debate, even if the delightful bursts of wit and graceful ornament lift that of Mr. Canning into permanent life.

The turn of mind which made his private society so delightful may be exemplified by an answer he once gave to Lord Londonderry during their times of friendly converse.

The latter had seen a Dutch picture representing the exodus from the Ark, and in which the elephant came out last. “ Of course,” said Mr. Canning, “ He had been packing up his trunk.”

voice of friendship and honest belief against the continued prevalence of such views, but to Canning men looked for the colleague's and pupil's justification. It came, as the political critics of the day tell us, somewhat late, but with such overwhelming power, that Mr. R. P. Ward has left recorded an impression that never did Pitt or Fox make such a passing effect in Parliament.*

The words remain entombed in Hansard, but we reproduce the more striking as an evidence of word-painting such as the world has never seen surpassed. In Romilly's reply, with consummate skill these jewels of eloquence were decried as the result of deliberate contemplation, and as an antidote to other actions tending to separate Canning from his early political leanings; but the eloquence evolved remains fairly characteristic of a power which never deserted this extraordinary man during any portion of his great career.

When all present thought the debate had closed, Canning burst out with the following exuberant and magnificent invective:—

“ Can it be necessary in our present situation, sufficiently full of distractions and diversions, to rake up the ashes of the dead for the purpose of kindling new flames among the living? For myself, I can confidently say that we do not desire to erect an altar to the object of our veneration with materials picked from the sepulchral monuments of his rival. The character of him whom we venerate and regret shines without

* *Memoirs of R. P. Ward*, vol. i. p. 308.

contrast; its lustre is all its own, and requires not the extinction of the reputation of others to make it blaze with a brighter flame. Mr. Pitt, it seems, was not a great man. Is it, then, that we live in such heroic times, that the present is a race of such gigantic talents and qualities as to render those of Mr. Pitt in the comparison ordinary and contemptible? Who, then, is the man now living—is there any man now sitting in this House, who, by taking the measure of his own mind, or that of any of his contemporaries, can feel himself justified in pronouncing Mr. Pitt was not a great man?"

Chronologically premature as is this quotation, it is adduced to give an earlier specimen of a style our story will lead us to give hereafter more than one illustration.

The early appreciation of Canning's talents by Pitt has been held not to have been an unmixed benefit to the recipient. During eleven years the young Parliamentary genius received no check, and when opposition came Canning looked on it at first with contempt, and, when it seemed likely to prevail, with indignation. Lord Malmesbury said of him: "Had he been left to ripen gradually, and allowed to experience political hardships, his mind would have taken a better bent; but, spoiled as he has been, feared, and wanted, no place is high enough for him, and I fear he may lose many real and cordial friends for uncertain political connexion."

A precisely similar estimate is arrived at by Lord Mulgrave's brother-in-law, Mr. R. P. Ward, and it becomes necessary for the biographer to delineate alike

the light and dark shades in, on the whole, a noble and pre-eminently gifted character.

Absence from the ordinary sensitiveness of human nature frequently appears not to accompany genius. It was not so, for instance, with Napoleon, or the Marquis Wellesley, and we fear we cannot claim it for Canning.

In Pitt's nature, on the other hand, disinterestedness seems to have overborne more earthly qualities most completely; and hence the secret of the unbounded confidence and enthusiasm placed in his conclusions by cultured and thoughtful men.

Attachment to the person of an individual usually presupposes that personal vanity has in his case been relegated to a position of subjection to the wants of others. Not that Mr. Canning did not ever possess a warm following, but the difficulties incidental on his elevation to the Premiership will occur to the mind of all, and were to a degree consequent on these older faults of temperament.

After the pause in Opposition, which at Addington's accession to office first occurred, Mr. Canning threw himself heart and soul into securing Pitt's return to power.

For this purpose he became associated with the veteran diplomatist Lord Malmesbury, whose diaries contain many letters from his gifted young friend.

It is moreover clear that Canning in his hot haste overstepped the limits of the Opposition to which Pitt could accede, or Lord Mulgrave counsel him to lend an ear.

A round robin was to have been presented to Mr. Addington from influential politicians, setting forth the desirability of his resignation, and this, after the policy decided and acted on by the Government, had been stamped by the private approbation of Pitt himself, and at first been received in silence by many of those then most vaunting their hostility.

When, therefore, this so-called Paper Plot fell through, stamped alike as ridiculous and unconstitutional, whilst Pitt's dignified position had been preserved simply and entirely through Lord Mulgrave's timely warning and sage advice, Canning still could not rest content. As Lord Malmesbury's diary as well as that of Mr. R. P. Ward shows, he endeavoured to force Pitt's hand to a degree which the great politician was obliged to shrink from acting as if he approved, so that, temporarily baffled, Canning had to submit to Lord Malmesbury's pungent criticism.

"Very clever, very essential to Government, but *hardly yet a statesman*, and his dangerous habit of quizzing (which he cannot restrain) would be most unpopular in any department which required pliancy, tact, or conciliatory behaviour. He is honourable, however, and honest, and may be safely trusted."

Such was the critical comment of one whose opinion no one could disregard, and yet no single individual can be said to have contributed more towards his great leader's return to office than George Canning, the sarcasms with which he forced home forcible public appeals being numerous and effective. One, the famous "Pitt is to Addington as London to Paddington" is known to

most of us; whilst others less notorious had their immediate effect on public opinion.

It has thus fallen to ourselves to be called on to hesitate before placing the object of a preconceived admiration upon the pedestal, whereon he has better historic right to stand than several exalted individuals whose services have fallen far below the level of George Canning's.

It is, therefore, with relief that having allowed participation in the weaknesses of humanity, we pass on to tell how the young statesman was rewarded by Mr. Pitt with the treasurership of the navy, whilst we know that the untimely end of the minister alone prevented him from becoming a member of the cabinet, such reward following an able advocacy of Lord Melville's cause.

But we have likewise to tell of a restless—nay, even fierce opposition to the Grenville Government, one moreover which had such potent effect on Parliament as to necessitate Mr. Fox's presence in the House of Commons when, had he abandoned his colleagues to the withering sarcasms directed against them, he might have gained more rest at a time when it was sorely needed. After the great debater died, we have already told how unsparing was the criticism, based on a motion which would have replaced the King's Speech altogether by one of the brilliant speaker's own. Canning at this moment was probably not in the zenith of his forensic power, but to the acute observer he showed signs of developing statesman-like talents, not certainly described by Lord Malmesbury or by Pitt, who never for one moment hesitated to name Lords

Hawkesbury and Castlereagh as the two indispensable colleagues, and therefore the inheritors of his policy.

Be that as it may, the moment was approaching when foreign policy was more than ever to be the test of British statesmanship, and when, despite all faults of character or temperament, George Canning was to gain the position in which he made his name most famous.

The reconstruction of a ministry consisting of Pitt's adherents, under the leadership of the Duke of Portland, came to be a natural result of the Whig dismissal.

It was necessary to turn towards the other leading party in the State, who could repress all jealousies under the lead of a great noble, rich in the borough influence so necessary to their Parliamentary existence. An early trial of strength proved opinion to be closely divided on the Catholic question, which reappeared in the form of a motion declaring it in effect to be unconstitutional for ministers to restrain themselves by any pledge from giving the King advice they held to be conducive to public safety. 258 supported the new ministry, who were in a majority of 32, as 226 expressed themselves in favour of the motion.

George Canning was the Foreign Minister, and filled the most important position in the State.

It will be necessary to follow Continental events closer than heretofore, as, reacting on British prospects, the actions of our great Foreign Secretary were moulded in accordance, and took colour in sympathy with the development of Napoleon's plans.

In Poland the French and Russian armies received

reinforcements, the former calling out in advance the conscription of 1808. This extreme measure could scarcely be popular, and was only justifiable, from a French point of view, on the plea of expediency, which there can be no doubt did exist at that moment. The enormous drain consequent on carrying on war on the Vistula had become manifest in France. The very names of places (as Prince Metternich remarks) were unknown to the people when they read in the *Gazette* of victories gained and armies overthrown.

Under these circumstances Napoleon expressed himself prepared for peace on the same terms he had offered during the previous year. The time had not, however, arrived when the detachment of Russia from her British alliance could be effected. England continued her dogged resolve to abate no right or surrender one inch of territory. War was declared against Turkey, whom the failure of Sir John Duckworth's negotiations had left hopelessly under French influence, and between the Russian and English fleets the Black Sea trade was absolutely paralysed. On the whole, moreover, the operations in north-east Europe tended towards French success, as Dantzic was captured, and Napoleon's army left resting its centre and wings on fortified places.

On the 14th of June (the anniversary of the battle of Marengo) a general engagement took place at Friedland. The fighting had continued in a desultory way for some days, but the greater contest was none the less stoutly waged. Gradually, however, the retreat of the Russians became a fact, and Napoleon stood victor on the field which yielded him, perhaps, the greatest results of all

his conflicts. Passing through Konigsberg, the conqueror pursued the beaten Russians to the Niemen, where on a raft near Tilsit, Napoleon and Alexander met to discuss terms of peace. Vanquished although they certainly were, the Russian army of, at most, 70,000 men* could not be said adequately to represent Muscovite strength, and there can be little doubt but that the means of resistance remained to Alexander. But the seductive visions which Napoleon unrolled before his eyes straightway deluded this vain man. First displayed to his ready imagination came the long-desired partition of Turkey, so dear to every Muscovite imagination. Then there was the ruin and humiliation of England, that steadfast but, according to Alexander, calculating ally, who, as the grasping mind of the Czar conceived, had failed to fulfil her part of the alliance when a subsidy was withheld. At this distance of time it appears manifest how the alliance, concluded at Tilsit and cemented at Erfurt, was directed primarily against England.

Not only was the chain of commercial exclusion to become complete, and to comprise Denmark and Portugal within its grasp, but an advance towards British India was then deliberately projected. Subsequently 22,000 men under Orloff, together with two companies of artillery, despatched as an advanced guard, actually reached Irghis, where, for reasons unexplained but not difficult to contemplate, the idea was temporally abandoned. We say temporally because General

* Alison and Sir R. Wilson.

Duhamel proposed an invasion of India through Persia to Nicholas in 1854, and the *St. Petersburg News*, writing in 1878, declares the idea of an expedition to India never to have left the Russian mind throughout the nineteenth century, an averment which has received ample corroboration by the publication, in 1881, of the Russian despatches found at Cabul. That in 1808 it was associated with the contemporaneous subjugation and division of Turkey, then proposed, is as certain as that Russia will take advantage of every shifting scene of the Eastern Question to secure a hold on Constantinople and extend her empire into India.

The potent and decided measures taken by Canning to neutralise these machinations were not by any means approved of by the two distinguished Opposition statesmen, Lords Grenville and Grey.* Their objections are before us now, and ought not to be lightly placed aside by any asseverations connecting their criticisms with party spirit.

Bitterness had unfortunately long prevailed in the counsels of this nation, and had been evident amongst its foremost men ever since Parliamentary Government received institution. There can, however, be no more valid claim to charge faction on Grenville and Grey than to give credence to accusations of partisanship so freely made against Canning. The origin of the resolve to take forcible possession of Denmark's fleet required a justification beyond that which circumstances allowed the minister to give. No eloquence of tongue or pen

* Lord Howick had been called to the Upper House as Earl Grey.

could easily reconcile right-feeling and humane men to the destruction of 2000 inoffensive citizens by bombardment. Lord Eldon expressed his feelings as a man on this subject, without for a moment denying the expediency of the political action. The dockyards which it became unfortunately necessary to fire upon, stood in contiguity to churches and houses, some of which suffered destruction.

General Peiman, the Danish commander, had every opportunity given him for removing non-combatants out of Copenhagen, and does not appear to have availed himself thereof. Again, the number given as having perished in the city were stated by the Danes themselves, when smarting under the natural disgust which the success of Admiral Gambier's expedition invoked. It is therefore to be hoped, for the sake of humanity, that the slaughter was exaggerated; but, as the bombardment continued for the best part of four days, the sacrifice of life must necessarily have been considerable in what the Danish general chose should remain an open and inhabited city.

Large quantities of timber were destroyed by fire, and 305 houses levelled with the ground, whilst the British became possessed of all the valuable stores which laid ready for use close to the dockyard. It had been declared on the honour of England that the Danish fleet should be restored whenever peace returned to Europe. As that consummation depended on various contingencies, chief amongst which must have been the suppression of an all-conquering despot, there is little wonder that a nation possessing a history such as belonged to Denmark should stoutly refuse to comply.

The Crown Prince appears to have acted as an English ruler would have done under like circumstances.

The Danes had been absolutely guiltless of any offensive connivance against England. It was not pretended that such action was imminent, or likely to be adopted on their own free will.*

When, therefore, eighteen sail of the line, fifteen frigates, and thirty-one brigs and gun-boats were conveyed to England, a transaction had to be justified which international lawyers must have *prima facie* combined to condemn, and which can find no warrant in the pages of Vattel, Grotius, or Puffendorf. There remains but the plea of absolute and dire necessity, the production of proofs connected with which (or an equivalent) any leader of the Opposition was clearly justified in demanding. Short of abdicating their constitutional functions altogether, it is difficult to say what alternative course could have been pursued other than that taken by Lord Grenville's party.

Time appeared at first sight to destroy the Government theory altogether. Within twenty days of the Emperors' meeting at Tilsit, an expedition of overpowering naval and military strength was leaving Yarmouth roads. Granting that the story of an individual concealed behind a tent,† overhearing the secret treaty, and straightway communicating its designs on Danish naval power to the British Government, to have the credibility which its source undoubtedly deserves,‡ there

* Stapleton's *Canning and his Times*, p. 129.

† A pavilion was erected on the raft.

‡ Stapleton's *Canning and his Times*.

remains yet the difficulty of a journey to England being accomplished in time for the necessary arrangements to be made.

The Foreign Secretary was life and soul of the Parliamentary defence set up by the Duke of Portland's ministry. After biting and sarcastic references to the foreign policy of his predecessor, he plunged in *medias res*.

As to the possibility of the secret clauses being communicated to England and acted on within twenty days, it was enough, he declared, that His Majesty's ministers bore witness to the fact that they possessed reliable proof which had satisfied the cabinet. The expedition, he allowed, had for some time been waiting for other undefined purposes, and when the necessity arose was straightway directed to sail for Denmark.

Subsequently, and in a later debate, Mr. Canning asked Lord Grenville and his brother, Mr. T. Grenville, how they could reconcile their violent action against Turkey with the criticisms directed against the Danish expedition? In the former occasion British interests were alone at stake; in the latter the contiguity to our shores laid us open to an attack from the region of the Baltic, whenever our foes could combine in sufficient naval strength to effect their purpose.

Opposed by Windham, Erskine, and the Opposition generally, Mr. Canning's defence was certainly worthy of the occasion, as any reader of Hansard can discover.

The secret clauses agreed to at Tilsit were practically vouched to in Parliament by men of such standing and character as the Duke of Portland, Canning, Lord Hawkesbury, Perceval, Lord Eldon, Sir Arthur Wellesley,

and Lord Castlereagh, and it is on the undoubted and unquestionable veracity of trusted and tried statesmen such as these that the Government case rested, but the doubts of the Opposition were natural, and by no means deserve the hard judgment which certain writers have passed thereon.

Why, one is inclined to ask, were the facts not entrusted to Lord Grenville, whose experience in public affairs was paramount? That not having been done, there was clearly reason for Opposition criticism, if not for the party spirit, prejudice and passion, which unfortunately appears to have been imparted into the discussion, and to have possessed rank and file of Whigs and Tories alike.*

* The views of the journal expounding Whig opinion were more advanced than those of either Lords Grenville or Grey, and we propose to give extracts therefrom, corresponding to each section of passing history. The *Edinburgh Review* was under the editorship of the illustrious Jeffrey, and it is a subject for wonder how such rancorous views on public affairs could have prevailed as those which historical truth force us to restate. The dismissal of the Whig Government in 1807 may, or may not, have been an undue exercise of George III.'s prerogative, or have been, as Sheridan phrased it, "the result of a deliberate attempt made by the Whigs to knock their heads against a wall, built by themselves for the purpose." But there certainly was nothing in the foreign policy of that defunct administration the slightest in accordance with such ideas as the following. Mr. Wilberforce had exercised the extraordinary power of his penmanship in a brochure, entitled *Dangers of the Country*. For vivid description, clearness of diction, combined with natural and eloquent facility of expression, a counterpart can alone be found in the pages of Macaulay. It certainly merited comments of a different class than those vouchsafed by the *Edinburgh Review*. In the first place we are calmly told that as a subversive democracy has been succeeded by the civilised rule of

The Government found an able supporter in that remarkable statesman Lord Wellesley, who pointed out to the Peers the change of circumstances since 1805, when Europe was, on the whole, neutral. He showed how, in August 1807, on the other hand, every man's hand, willingly or unwillingly, was opposed to England, whilst the ban of commercial exclusion was working its fell purpose, and the ranks of Britain's enemies showed

an all-conquering military despotism, it was England's policy to propitiate Napoleon by surrendering her conquests, and take his word for the observation of the best terms obtainable (*Edinburgh Review*, vol. x. p. 23). And this, in answer to a graphic description of what Great Britain would suffer as a French province, with Imperial cohorts quartered on her inhabitants. As for the Continent, let it make the best terms it could with a nation that every fresh war loaded with additional territory. But the *Edinburgh Review* said more, and scoffed at the foreign policy of the deceased Whig Government, calling Maida a senseless skirmish, and condemning Howick in the same spirit they afterwards tried to crush Canning, Perceval, and Castlereagh. It will scarce be credited, that in vol. xv. p. 518, lines 20 and 21, will be found a distinct suggestion to the effect that unskilful and unsuccessful politicians should become subject to loss of life and character when the issue of their political management was adverse. (Reference will show us to have understated this case.) The whole page in question should be read and pondered over, if only to demonstrate how utterly malignant were the political passions of our age before wise measures of Reform gave constitutional expression to the feelings of those who believed their opinions to be artificially restrained. It, moreover, fully bears out the assertion made in a former chapter, as taken from the written observations of a careful Parliamentary observer (who himself was present throughout the discussions), that the party spirit displayed after Pitt's death was such as to threaten the dignity of debate. A condition of things which, it seems, affected contemporary literature of the highest class.

more serried and determined than they had ever done before.

It was clearly the duty of England's ministry to retain the naval supremacy gained for her by Nelson and Pitt. France seriously threatened this by preparing at least sixty sail-of-the-line in the harbours of France and Spain, whereas at Antwerp, and by means of a proposed confederacy in the north, there would have been added at least thirty* more to the above-named number.

Part of this latter fleet was to have been made up by the Danish contingent, and the fact has since been acknowledged by Fouchè, Napoleon's famous minister, and implied by his master.

It is true that *four* only of the line-of-battle ships were found to be absolutely fit for active service, but the others would in any situation have occupied the attention of an equal number of British vessels of war, a reflection which was not likely to escape the calculating mind of Napoleon. The situation of England after Tilsit has no absolute counterpart in the history of the world, and it is this fact, and the threatened and imminent destruction of his country, that must be held to justify Canning's decided action at Copenhagen.

Being here primarily interested in the part played by Canning during the progress of these events, it becomes as necessary to allude to achievements of his facile pen as to those Senatorial triumphs so justly known to fame.

Mr. Canning, as Foreign Secretary, issued a declaration

* James's *Naval History* believes *sixty* more.

containing England's case. In it he stated that "His Majesty had received the most positive information of the determination of the present ruler of France to occupy with a military force the territory of Holstein, for the purpose of excluding Great Britain from all her accustomed channels of communication with the Continent, of inducing or compelling the Court of Denmark to close the passage of the Sound against British commerce and navigation, and of availing himself of the aid of the Danish marine for the invasion of Great Britain and Ireland."

The despatch went on to instance the conduct of Denmark in 1801, when pressed by external influence, and compared her comparatively independent condition then with the notorious subjection of her Government to Napoleon's wishes. Was it likely that with the Continent prostrate at her feet France would either hesitate to act or have difficulty in forcing the Danes to acquiesce in her scheme. This lucid State paper was penned with a facility and elegance of expression which would have won for its author high praise, were it not that men turned naturally to the more direct justification which proceeded from the Foreign Secretary when in Parliament.

As an historical document the value of the paragraph above quoted is very great, because it goes to show the nature of the facts officially vouched to by men whose integrity and honesty can never be doubted.*

* Sir Archibald Alison has adduced proof that Alexander was not disinclined to play a double game. Through Sir Robert Wilson he undoubtedly expressed his satisfaction with the seizure of the

Canning was certainly a master in the art of penmanship, both as regards composition and style, whilst those who have ever seen any of his despatches in manuscript will not easily forget a handwriting the excellence and beauty of which lives for all time in the mind of a beholder.

It is a curious fact that our Government was, for a time, led to infer that Russia regretted the steps she had taken after Friedland, and approved our action in the Baltic.

As the guardian of that sea the Emperor's opinion had great value ; but the separation from France never really occurred, and was supposed to emanate from agents who had not been apprised of the Emperor's definite alliance with Napoleon.

France must be held, towards the close of 1807, to have reached the highest point of power she was destined to enjoy under the First Empire, and it comprised a sway such as had not been seen in Europe since the days of Imperial Cæsar.

Danish fleet. However, he took advantage of the clause in the treaty of Tilsit directed against Sweden, and in one campaign wrested Finland from her former rulers.

Sir Robert Wilson was a character who played the part of a freelance during the whole Continental war.

He was present both at Eylau and Friedland, and, possessing considerable literary talents, wrote an account of the campaign, which was published in England.

He distinguished himself afterwards at Leipsic, and saw the conclusion of the war consummated by peace at Paris. Although he had spent much of his life in compassing Napoleon's overthrow, he was by no means in favour of the Bourbon dynasty, by an intrigue against which he not only suffered imprisonment, but went very near embroiling the French and English Governments.

In the opinion of the astute Metternich, however, the solider triumph was that attained during the previous year at Jena, because when the Prussian monarchy fell stricken down, there existed a compactness about Napoleon's sovereignty which the more fantastic schemes of Tilsit were not designed to attain.

Sooner or later the Austrian Chancellor foresaw that differences would arise between Napoleon and Alexander. He acted accordingly, trusting to his knowledge of the two men, and kept this contingency steadily in the forefront of his schemes.*

Napoleon had but one problem to solve after Tilsit, and it was how to strike at England. The fleets of Great Britain sailed triumphantly all over the world, and her commerce, although restricted to a degree, was still paramount.

On the other hand, the efforts for discovery of a battle-field whereon English soldiers could appear was rendered impossible on the Continent where France reigned supreme. In this dilemma the Dictator of Europe issued his Milan Decrees prohibiting introduction of British merchandize into European ports.

Posting military at every seaside town to enforce these restrictions, Napoleon hoped to isolate England commercially. Canning, however, replied by issuing the celebrated Second Orders in Council,† prohibiting any

* *Autobiography of Prince Metternich.*

† Mr. Perceval, with his clear power of explanation, defined England's position in connection with the Orders in Council as follows :—

“ The French having said that no nation on earth should trade

neutral commerce from reaching Europe without first calling at an English port and paying tribute.

England, therefore, taxed or seized neutral merchandize on the seas, and Napoleon confiscated English goods on land. So it came to pass that the merchants of Great Britain and America fared ill. The celebrated Russia trade was completely destroyed, and there can be little surprise at an opposition which awaited the Orders in Council in Parliament and the country, and of which Brougham ultimately became the most effective mouth-piece.

One of the consequences of this commercial strife became apparent in the restriction of American trade, a result which trans-Atlantic statesmen laid at the door of Great Britain, so that a leading object of Napoleon's was therefore gained, and the veiled hostility of England's own children became henceforth added to that of united Europe.

America issued a Non-intercourse Act, which prohibited American subjects from trading with the authors of either the Milan Decrees or Orders in Council; but this measure, although it may have rendered the existing paralysis of trade complete, injured America more than England or Europe.

At the root of President Jefferson's action lay dissatisfaction with the rule of search, which England claimed, because British seamen had deserted in considerable numbers to the Americans. Hence it came to pass that the two nations stood on the brink of conflict.

with us, our answer under the orders was that no nation on earth should trade with them except through us."

After a hostile encounter between the British and American frigates *Leopard* and *Chesapeake*, and the controversies that thereon ensued, Mr. Erskine, the British Ambassador, agreed to withdraw our Orders in Council if America refrained from promulgating the Non-intercourse Act.

This agreement Mr. Canning did not hesitate to repudiate, and the ill-disguised hostility between the brethren of Old and New World continued, until the mask was removed in 1811. This trade dispute has been justly deemed a dry and interminable subject.

The debates in Parliament saw the matter thoroughly threshed out, and although illuminated by the knowledge and eloquence of Canning, the experience of Grenville, and the logic of Grey, it cannot be said to have ever aroused the interest which its enormous importance deserved. Strenuously objected to as this policy was by Lord Grenville, it could never be forgotten that the system of trade reprisal was originated by the Government of that nobleman, when they issued Orders in Council but a few months before their retirement from office.

It could, therefore, be but the question of degree which remained in dispute, and Mr. Canning fully established his contention as to the unprecedented national position, which warranted recourse being taken to stringent and exceptional measures.

In December 1807 Russia acknowledged her vassalage to France in a manifesto directed against England. Declaring want of English co-operation, the Denmark expedition, and Orders in Council to be causes of

complaint, Alexander broke off all communication with this country, proclaimed afresh the principles of armed neutrality, designed originally by the Empress Catherine,* and following declaration by action, sequestered all the British property and ships he could lay his hands on.

Canning replied in a State paper of consummate ability, which, as it traversed the same ground as the Parliamentary debates, will not be produced in this place.

It contained, however, a shrewd remark that the Emperor's manifesto bore marks of the policy adopted at Tilsit, and was of itself a justification of England's action at Copenhagen.

In two European countries alone was the Continental system as directed against British trade not in vogue, as even Austria had yielded, diplomatically may be, but with the result that English commerce was excluded from Trieste and Fiume.

Portugal, however, after closing her ports against England, and so giving evidence of the power Napoleon possessed to compel weak and unwilling nations to adopt his system, protested against might becoming right.

Her Prince Regent, amidst the lamentations of the

* Mr. Fox desired to allow the principle of the armed neutrality in the first place, rather than lose the Russian alliance. It can be contended, therefore, that his policy would have inclined Alexander towards England at Tilsit. But the crisis must have come, and although the matters in dispute with Denmark resulted from the same commercial origin, it is by no means evident that Alexander would not have been even then constrained by circumstances to side with France.

nation, sailed for the Brazils, accompanied by the court and a number of personal adherents.

He had hoped that his adoption of the Continental system would have appeased Napoleon and saved his country. When, however, Marshal Junot, at the head of a French army, approached Lisbon, the Portuguese ruler listened to the counsels of the English ambassador, Lord Strangford, and made the only reparation within his power.

Portugal's cause was henceforth to be that of Great Britain. There is an historical interest in the scene that followed far exceeding the immediate results of the events themselves.

As the eight sail of the line, eight frigates and forty large merchantmen sailed down the golden Tagus, at the mouth of which they met Sir Sidney Smith and four English men-of-war, there was there and then cemented that alliance which was destined to influence Europe's future so mightily. When the rugged rocks of Cintra and Torres Vedras sank out of sight, there must have yet gleamed a hope of future independence for Portugal as her prince glanced at Sir Sidney Smith's accompanying squadron.

The other remaining ally of Great Britain was Sweden, whose unfortunate prince, Gustavus IV., resolutely opposed himself to Russia when in alliance with Napoleon, as he had before done to France alone.

A powerful fleet under Admiral Keats, and no less than two hundred transports conveying 14,000 men under the famous Sir John Moore, were sent to succour the Swedes, who were overmatched by Russia on land and

sea, besides having to contend at the same time with Danes and Norwegians.

The British fleet neutralised that of Russia and drove it into harbour ; but Sir John Moore's army never landed, in consequence of a misunderstanding with the Swedish king, whilst the transports and convoy were afterwards sent to the Peninsula.

Thither previously was conveyed a body of 10,000 Spaniards, under the Marquis Romana, whom Napoleon had deputed to act on his behalf in Hanover.

They revolted against the French and joined the English, who assisted them with all the naval power at command. Ultimately Admiral Keats brought the exiles away in triumph to Spain, where they arrived when most required.

Spain was in partial revolt early in the spring ; the French fleet in Cadiz was bombarded, and ultimately had to surrender before French military assistance could arrive ; a fate, moreover, which overtook the army of Dupont after their defeat at Baylen.

The royal family of Spain had positively been taken into France, and in lieu of the old Bourbon line, Napoleon resolved to place his own brother Joseph on the throne.

History might be ransacked in vain to discover anything like a precedent for such an action, which as it was at the time truly said, “soured more of the wildest romance than of sober truth.” First decoyed from his dominions, and then threatened into signing an ignominious abdication, the wretched Ferdinand exhibited a spectacle scarcely calculated to elicit loyalty to his person.

But that the laws and liberties of his countrymen were infringed and trampled on by this outrage, the nation once guided by Charles V. might have recoiled from the rule of one choosing dishonour and universal contempt in lieu of the violent death which a refusal of Napoleon's proposition exposed him to. But it is an advantage adhering to a Monarchical Constitution of the old Spanish type, that the laws of the realm override the evils of a despotism which is thereby limited in its power. Never could Napoleon plead legality for his usurpations. Moreover, the Spaniards were at one as to resistance. In May the province of Asturias had risen against the French ; whilst the rebellion quickly spread, and the country supposed to be most completely under Napoleon's heel was all aflame on behalf of liberty.* Here was a British opportunity which Canning was not slow to use. Portugal soon caught the fast-rising enthusiasm, and the British Government straightway resolved to send a fleet to the Tagus, and 10,000 men under a general of Canning's and Lord Castlereagh's joint choice, and who soon became known to fame.† Sir Arthur Wellesley not only won the battles of Rolica and Vimiera, but out-manœuvred Junot altogether, and placed him in such a position that surrender became a military necessity.

* May 1808.

† The merit of first descrying Sir A. Wellesley's talents has been claimed alike for Canning and Castlereagh. Probably the result of observation in Council where, as Irish Secretary, Sir Arthur's wisdom had been thus early apparent.

Unfortunately Sir Arthur was superseded, and Sir Harry Burrard sent out to take the command, which, strange to say, within a few hours was transferred to Sir Hew Dalrymple. Straightway it followed that the unnecessary convention of Cintra was agreed on, in accordance with which Junot and his troops were conveyed to France at England's expense. The unpopularity of this treaty for a time dimmed the prestige of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the great commander never shirked the share of responsibility for what (notwithstanding the accompanying expulsion of the French from Portugal) has received much condemnation.

Canning, moreover, resolved to employ Sir Arthur again on the earliest opportunity. The high opinion formed of his military qualities by that great statesman, the Marquis Wellesley, operated strongly on Canning, who was equally determined to urge prosecution of the Peninsula War. At last we had found a stage whereon our small army might hope to operate with effect. Spain had been subject entirely to France, and therefore hostile to Great Britain. Now, however, she sent commissioners to England asking for assistance. This was speedily promised, and Sir John Moore directed to take a command in the north of Spain. Lord Castlereagh was said to have been a prime mover in the arrangements of this campaign, the design of which, however, Canning never thought promising.

Moreover, our ambassador, Mr. Frere, urged Sir John forward towards Madrid, at a time when the Patriots had spent much of their enthusiasm, and received more than one check.

It is impossible to read the communications between the English general and Lord Castlereagh without coming to the conclusion that we were late in the field, and that an admirably-planned diversion was likely to fail. In the first place, it was found to be impossible to unite the corps marching from Lisbon with that under Moore, and after some hesitation, caused by conflicting rumours as to the condition and disposition of sundry Spanish divisions, the general disorganisation of which was finally ascertained, retreat alone remained possible for the outnumbered British.

The insurgents had, it is true, inflicted more than one reverse on the French before the British arrival, but when Napoleon himself appeared at the head of 10,000 men to support Soult, Madrid fell into his power.

It is easy to be critical after the event, and a bold advance of the British and Spanish forces might possibly have altered the course of events. But what Wellington, with Lisbon as a base of supplies, and Torres Vedras as a haven for retreat in reserve, accomplished with difficulty, Moore found impossible when operating from Corunna. There is nothing now clearer to the simplest intelligence than the wisdom of our Government (much impugned at the time) in resolving at once to fulfil their treaties, and expel the French from Lisbon and Portugal before proceeding into Spain, and the gallant Sir John Moore did not lay down his life for nothing when, by his failure to gain Madrid and the difficult embarkation of his army, he demonstrated the true strategic value of what Sir Arthur Wellesley secured at Vimiera.

That the retreat to Corunna was admirably executed

in presence of a superior force, and that the conflict which gained embarkation for the English was ably conceived and bravely fought, no military historian has ever denied ; but with the loss of the gallant Sir John Moore England temporally lost also her footing in Spain. There was no military obstacle between the gathering hosts of Napoleon and the devoted land of Portugal, so that many believed the vaunted intention of driving the Leopard into the sea to be nigh fulfilment.

Canning, however, was nothing daunted. He saw in the eagerness of Napoleon, and in his sudden spring on Spain, the importance which that greatest of all commanders had attributed to Moore's operations. Silently and determinedly he resolved to renew them. Trust in Sir Arthur Wellesley was even thus early the talisman wherewith he hoped to charm away the horrors of invasion from the troubled Peninsula.

At home our national fortunes seemed to be at the lowest ebb, and Lords Grenville and Grey were again loudly opposed to the Government foreign policy. Indeed, had Lord Grey's advice been taken, the Peninsula would have been abandoned, for as he urged —apparently with truth—it was always in the power of France to pour her legions across the Pyrenees and overwhelm our puny battalions.

Canning, however, must be granted the statesman's high merit of having seen clearer than his contemporaries. He knew that, but for the peculiarities of the country in which our military efforts were to be made, and the certainty of future European troubles distracting the French, the English nation of at most fourteen

millions and a half could not hope to cope numerically with that of Napoleon. But he had counted the cost, and, as Lord Russell has truly said, entered on a struggle which must have been decided somewhere—a struggle, moreover, in which either Napoleon or England would ultimately succumb. In Spain it was to fight for all that made life worth having that the sword was drawn. In fact, it was felt by a thinking section of the Whig party, comprising Lord Holland and Mr. Francis Horner, that it was in the cause not only of liberty that Sir Arthur Wellesley again took the field, but of that independence of Europe which, with all its questionable accompaniments, had found a place on the banner of the French army that fought at Valmy.

The times were changing, and the true tenour of Napoleon's sway becoming patent to all. Lord Grenville in vain put forward his opinion that we were undertaking a task beyond our strength, so that neither his high position nor Lord Grey's pertinacious and conscientious objections could avail anything in altering public policy.*

The die was irrevocably cast.

True it is that in political circles other than those merely Whig, the safety of the State was despaired of. A conversation has been reported to the author by one who, as a child, heard Canning and Wilberforce bewailing the nation's dangers over a cup of coffee. A combination of creature-comfort and dismay at public peril which failed to satisfy the child's reflective mind ; and, indeed,

* It is fair to Lord Grenville to note that his objections were partially those of detail.

much of the conversation of the great Wilberforce was at this period impregnated with apprehension (as he phrased it) for the future of poor old England. But the British people at large were becoming inured to taxation, and were prepared for any sacrifice. They were, as Madame Remusat observes, “ changing into a military nation, and so made by Napoleon.”

He had calculated that the promulgation of his Continental system would create a revolt in England. Little by little he believed that recriminatory measures would lead to encroachment on the rights of a people specially careful of their liberties.

But encouraged by Canning, who adopted the measures and language of Pitt, the English nation realised the necessity of resistance.

All the popular elements in the realm sympathised with the Spanish patriots, and it is the promulgation of this sentiment, together with exceptional foresight as regards the importance of Spain as an arena whereon British skill and valour could be most advantageously displayed, that formed the special feature of Canning’s first occupation of the Foreign Office, and fixed his inalienable title to be called a statesman.

“ Fortune but not fate has favoured the French invasion of Spain,” became the burden of a stirring Parliamentary appeal made by the Foreign Secretary, such as reference to the various papers and magazines of the day will show to have secured a striking, and as it ultimately proved, abiding effect, whilst those fortunate enough to hear the passionate and patriotic bursts of powerful rhetoric never lost the impression made thereby. As for

the dissipation of the Spanish armies, Canning declared that the British Government, when they despatched Sir John Moore, had resolved to take advantage of the favourable military conditions existent when that resolve was formed, and could not be held responsible for a disintegration over which they had no control. But England's policy, nevertheless, was to succour Portugal, and advance on Spain as opportunity offered.

Mr. Windham in reply blamed Government for not utilising the harbourage of the eastern coast, and for failing to make Gibraltar their rallying-ground. The annual register for 1809 tells how the Opposition looked in vain for an answer to this latter criticism ; but the reply came ultimately when ensconced in Torres Vedras the allied armies beheld Massena's forces helplessly foiled, and ultimately compelled to retreat.

Lisbon was then proved to be the true basis of operations for England, who, at the same time securing Cadiz from capture, adopted a plan whereby they might retain a hold on the Peninsula under the most adverse circumstances possible to conceive.

The misconceptions of Government were undoubtedly attributable to the popular origin of the Spanish uprising.

When that excitable and proud nation found that French troops had been smuggled into the kingdom under false pretences, King Charles persuaded to abdicate in favour of the more pliable Ferdinand, and both representatives of the kingly dignity brought together at Bayonne and there frightened into a shameful abdication, the character of Napoleon's

scheme dawned upon the public mind, causing a popular ferment, which from the very nature of the case was certain to be more or less effervescent.

The glorious achievements of Palafox at Saragossa and the battle of Baylen soon gave way to a reactionary period, of which Napoleon was not slow to avail himself, and for which he was fully prepared.

Critics of the British Government alleged that the populations of Saragossa and Gerona should have been directly succoured and joined with our forces, but that in consequence of this neglect British aid arrived at an unpropitious moment, a circumstance, however, which nothing but the existence of the electric telegraph could have prevented. The prevalent idea to the effect that Government should have despatched 100,000 men for embarkation close to the French frontier was shown by events to have been impracticable, inasmuch as when the field transport and commissariat received better organisation never were half that number of troops with difficulty placed in motion. Just as well might the Opposition have proposed a landing in France and an advance on Paris.

The maintenance of treaties and the defence of Portugal was thus made by Canning the first object of his policy, which was conceived on the assumption that England was entering upon a long and arduous struggle from which no discouragement should lead her to draw back.

In France the people were beginning to weary of military success, and it required all the genius of their ruler to reconcile society to the deprivations which

commercial paralysis entailed. But the dictator worked hard to facilitate these evils.

He pondered over the inventions of distractions likely to occupy the public mind, and by pompous bulletins brought the general subservience to France before the nation.

The smallest detail did not escape his attention, and he positively conceived the idea of manufacturing sugar out of beetroot and so of allaying the discontent of the French at the absence of a luxury which they looked upon as a necessity.

During these attempts to destroy England and degrade her constitution Napoleon called upon Pope Pius VII. to join the common league against his enemy. On the Pontiff's refusal he annexed the states of the Church to Italy, and if by so doing he, in some degree, anticipated a national desire, it was at the expense of the indignation which his conduct aroused amongst the Roman Catholics of Europe. This result was specially apparent in Spain and Austria. In the latter empire a restlessness had been promoted by her leading statesmen who had formed an opinion that the empire of the Hapsburghs had not put forth its full strength in 1805.

Napoleon, moreover, getting scent of this hostile disposition, made overtures of peace to England.

Although no direct collusion has been, at the moment in question, shown to have existed between the ministries of Austria and England, there is evidence of the interest with which our policy was watched by Metternich, who was then Austrian Ambassador in Paris.

He has left on record a strong opinion of the happy results which Canning's resolute conduct would conduce to perpetuate. The English Foreign Secretary refused to make peace except when acting in unison with Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and the Sicilies, and as the French Government scorned all idea of recognising the Spanish insurgents, the negotiations straightway lapsed.* Nothing daunted, Napoleon taxed Metternich with complicity with England and subjected him to a not unfamiliar scene before the assembled ambassadors.†

But the Austrian emperor had once more resolved to submit events to that arbitration of the sword which had served his empire but ill on the two previous occasions.

France cannot be said to have given direct cause of offence to Austria in 1809, but it was probably true, as Metternich declares in his autobiography, that such a conflict as occurred was unavoidable.

The Peace of Presburgh as a consequence of Austerlitz was held to be unbearable for an empire which felt itself strong enough to gain better terms. The treaty of Tilsit had surrounded its frontiers with French troops, and the commerce of the Adriatic remained paralysed by the Continental system. To shake off these disabilities the war of 1809 was commenced, and

* The proposition came from Napoleon and Alexander, in conference at Erfurt.

† Austria went so far as to draw on England for pecuniary aid, a proceeding which Canning repudiated as one he could not endorse without reference to Parliament.—*Parliamentary Debates*, 1809.

with an advantage to Austria which Metternich's finesse had gained. By plausible diplomatic explanations he reassured Napoleon, so that after the Congress of Erfurt the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine had been allowed to disband their contingent forces.

This premature loss of her ancient leadership in Germany, destined in future years to recur, was unbearable to the proudest of all Continental aristocracies who insisted that a further attempt should be made to wrest supremacy from the hated Gaul.

The British Prime Minister was the first to receive a somewhat vague report that Austria intended to wrestle afresh with Napoleon, and the Duke of Portland seems to have both mentioned it to Lord Malmesbury and, of course, to Canning.

Soon, however, a confirmation arrived in the person of Count Walmoden, a natural grandson of George II. who, resident in Austria, had been sent by the Emperor to announce his resolve.

Walmoden told how, unlike in 1794 and 1805, the whole of the Austrian nation was heart and soul in the coming struggle. The measures taken by Napoleon against the Roman Catholic religion had stirred the aristocracy to the depths, and he came to tell of a nation united and strong in numbers but wanting money wherewith to sustain the conflict.

Nominally England was at war with Austria, and so far Canning gladly accepted Walmoden's offers for peace, but it remains on record that he did not reverse the policy of Fox and Howick, so much criticised in 1806-7, and held aloof from subsidising the Austrians.

How far the fatal delay after Aspern may be traceable to this cause, and consequent lack of resource, we are neither prepared or competent to aver; but we do know that if Canning had had his way, neither would the diversion on Holland have been attempted. It is remarkable, however, that England's minister of action should have been led to adopt the scorned policy of his predecessors, a continual persistence in which never could, humanly speaking, have brought about a restoration of liberty to Europe.

And yet it is fair to state that Lord Malmesbury believed Canning himself to be favourable to supporting Austria—much, however, in the sense, as events proved, that Lord Howick desired to retain the Russian alliance before Friedland.

On the 22nd of April Napoleon fell on to the Archduke Charles' army and defeated it at Eckmuhl. The Archduke was considerably outnumbered, having but 40,000 men to the 75,000 French troops engaged. Several other engagements resulting unfavourably for Austria, Vienna was again occupied by the enemy on the 13th of May.

As England had just despatched Sir Arthur Wellesley to Portugal, with orders to advance into Spain, and succour the still-resisting Spaniards, and to do so at the head of 40,000 men, this Austrian collapse was most depressing news for the British ministry. The forebodings of the Opposition looked like receiving an early fulfilment, and as if Napoleon would be able to throw his legions once more freely into Spain.

But a gleam of light came from the Danube, whilst

the public and some members of our Government had not Canning's unbounded confidence in Sir Arthur Wellesley's powers.

At Aspern and Essling near the Danube was posted the Austrian army, whose wings rested on the two above mentioned villages. On the 21st and 22nd of May they became the scenes of two days' desperate fighting. Vienna lay on the opposite side of the Danube, to cross which several streams, caused by islands in the river, had to be bridged ; the largest of these, Lobau, lay close to the western or left bank of the river.

Napoleon, proceeding from the capital, made light of all difficulties, and aided by the possession of the Vienna arsenal and its resources, placed a large part of his army on the marchfield or plain which divided the river Danube from the Austrian positions.

But the Archduke Charles had ably schemed so to fill certain heavy boats with stores that they should be launched on to the tide at its height, and destroy the bridge connecting Lobau with the main land. This actually took place, and the French were attacked by superior numbers, and had, on the whole, the worst of a frightful day's fighting. On the 22nd of May the fortune of war again wavered, but in the evening Napoleon had to retire on to the island of Lobau, with his retreat dependent on engineering skill, and on the condition of the river. Vain had proved the heroic valour and wondrous military skill of Napoleon, who long held Aspern against overwhelming odds.

The fortune of war had wavered, but for once it had proved adverse to Napoleon. The question came to be

whether the courage of the French emperor's soldiery, and his own unrivalled resource, could save him from destruction. The astonishment of Europe when this became generally known can be scarcely described, and a prospect seemed to be opening which must soon have been perilous for the Imperial interests in Europe. But unfortunately there was at this time neither confidence nor concert between the Continental nations.

Whether the Fabian tactics adopted by the Austrians resulted from exhaustion, or from other necessities of their position, it is certain that the French were allowed time to repair their bridges, and to build a fresh one threatening the Austrian left wing.

After drawing attention to this quarter by means of a feint, the French forced their way higher up across the Danube.

Nothing was left to the Archduke but retreat across the plain of Wagram, where, awaiting a junction with the Archduke John, the Austrians took up a fresh position.

Napoleon, having concentrated the fire of his artillery on the enemies' centre, literally crushed it at the same time that he turned the Archduke's flank by a masterly movement.

The fighting was deadly and long-continued, but the French forced their opponents to retire into Moravia, where, notwithstanding the efficiency of one untouched army corps under the Archduke John, the Austrian commander soon saw necessity for an armistice. The slaughter on the plain of Wagram was frightful on either side, and 20,000 prisoners were taken by the French.

Still the Austrian resources were in advance of those which Napoleon's bulletins ascribed to her.

Moreover, if Metternich's diplomacy had cajoled Napoleon before the war, it was decreed that an ample reparation should be in store for France.

Prince Metternich's autobiography has removed the diplomatic veil which rested over the ensuing Peace of Schonbrunn.

Napoleon asked the Emperor Francis to send him a soldier to talk over the military situation, which he declared a civilian could not understand.

The Prince John Leichtenstein was accordingly sent, before Metternich's advice was taken. When the great diplomatist heard of the incident, he gave it as his opinion that the move would prove a disastrous one. Either Leichtenstein would be detained, and an able general lost to Austria, or the soldier would be beguiled into signing a shameful peace. The latter proved true.

Assured that he was merely affixing his signature to a provisional agreement, the Austrian general fell into the trap so skilfully laid for him. On leaving Vienna he heard a general ringing of bells and other sounds of rejoicing. In reply to his inquiry as to the reason of such demonstrations, he was told that peace was signed between France and Austria. The exuberant joy of the Viennese was such that their emperor found it impossible to repudiate even the details of a treaty which smothered his empire on land and sea.

The only two Austrian sea-ports, of Trieste and Fiume, were delivered over to France, whilst Austria sacrificed by this peace upwards of 2,000 square miles

of territory, with a population of between three and four millions, and being entirely surrounded by powerful neighbours the military advantages of her position were neutralised.

And this when, as Metternich tells us, Austria could still have placed 250,000 men in line to oppose the French, and at a moment when, as he pertinently observes, England had made a timely descent on Holland. The advantage of having occupied Vienna early in the campaign gave the invaders an opportunity to play the above trick upon their opponents, and so change the course of European history. Who, for one moment, can deny the probability that a prolonged Austrian resistance might have quickened Muscovite intentions, formed, as they doubtless were, to break ultimately with Napoleon.

The joy of the Viennese knew no bounds, for when, as a result of the peace, French troops retired from the capital, the Emperor Francis was literally carried to his palace by a delighted population. It was, moreover, thus early ominously apparent that the Russian emperor was discontented with this treaty.

As the nominal ally of France, Alexander considered that his friendly disposition should have been more liberally rewarded.

Although he received enough of ancient Galicia to contain a population of 400,000, he was much exercised at the fact of Brody not being comprised therein. Being particularly adapted to forward commerce between Russia and Turkey, the Muscovites had long observed this spot with longing eyes. Moreover,

the refusal to confer this town on Russia was one of the subsequent causes of the Czar's estrangement from Napoleon. We have dwelt thus somewhat fully upon the condition of Continental affairs because it is evident that the element of Austrian future capability for warfare must have affected the calculations of those who believed her to be crushed when she was in truth but cowed. And no precaution of Napoleon's could eliminate the strength which military training, conferred on a large percentage of the population, had given, even if (as was the case) Austria's standing army became temporarily reduced.

At this moment two expeditions were in process of execution which had been devised by the British Government as a means of assisting Austria.

One, under General Stewart, left Sicily with the view to creating a diversion on the coast of Italy, but met with little opportunity of effecting their purpose. They captured the islands of Ischia and Scylla, but their operations remained unattended with material advantage.

Another, under Lord Chatham, proceeded to the Scheldt, with the object of destroying or capturing the shipping at Antwerp and the docks at Flushing.

The Government had received a warning in 1808, which told them their policy of retaining British pre-eminence at sea could not be ensured if Napoleon's naval combinations were allowed development.

The Rochefort squadron escaped, whilst Sir Richard Strachan and his fleet were driven away by a storm, and passing unnoticed through the Straits of Gibraltar, slipped into Toulon. Finally, a French squadron

literally ravaged the Mediterranean commerce of England.

This turned attention to ship-building in the Scheldt, situated as that harbour is, advantageously to contribute a quota towards a naval attack on England. Never did a better equipped armament leave these shores than that known in history as the Walcheren expedition. Lord Castlereagh watched its departure from the Downs, and looked anxiously after the child of his own invention. But the leaders did not prove equal to the occasion. Flushing was certainly taken and the docks finally destroyed, so that no line-of-battle ship fully equipped and stored could float in secure haven inside the Scheldt, but this, and this only, was the solid result of a venture which cost close on twenty millions sterling, and sacrificed between three and four thousand lives.

The story has been oftentimes told how the fever swept over the island of Walcheren, and how the attack on Antwerp failed because the besiegers had not the requisite information as to the position of the citadel which, it was discovered when too late, commanded the dock-yard and harbour. Just, however, as the healthy season was approaching and the ravages of disease had done their worst, the British forces were withdrawn.

It had originally been commenced when the sickly season was setting in, and although Flushing was absolutely rendered useless for Napoleon's immediate purposes, and danger from the Scheldt in winter, therefore, reduced to a minimum, the assaults which were directed against the Government in Parliament must be allowed to have possessed real foundation.

And, indeed, if the miscarriage of a great venture, designed by patriotic and talented public servants, is ever to attract the opprorium which a healthy sense of responsibility should visit on failure, surely this was the occasion more than all others in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries when it must alike have been unconstitutional and demoralising to the public service for national opinion to remain silent. England had positively sent forth this vast armament without proper geographical knowledge of Antwerp being obtained, and such shortcoming was proved on inquiry to have existed.

But the blame should be shared by the ministry as a whole, and not cast on Lord Castlereagh in particular. The failure of naval or military operations naturally reacts upon those who jointly originated them, and the loss of human life and money which ill-considered schemes may at any moment bring about should, at least, be secured against by undoubted ministerial responsibility. Mr. Canning had already been allowed the doubtful plea of absence from Council when the Convention of Cintra received ratification. On the other hand, the sweeping Opposition statements that nothing could have been effected by a diversion on the Scheldt when Napoleon was straining his resources on the Danube, is as untrue as the mismanagement of details is notorious.*

* There was a disagreement between the naval and military commanders, and Lord Chatham forwarded his version to the King, which if he had known, Lord Mulgrave, the First Lord of the Admiralty never would have opposed the City of London demand for an inquiry.

The well-known lines will better celebrate this unfortunate venture than any elaborate criticism in Parliament known only to the pages of Hansard.

“Lord Chatham with his sabre drawn
Stood waiting for Sir Richard Strachan ;
Sir Richard, longing to be at ‘em,
Stood waiting for the Earl of Chatham.”

Lord Liverpool has, however, left on record the fact that abandonment of Walcheren was not finally determined on until peace was proclaimed between France and Austria. Sir Richard Strachan wrote to Lord Mulgrave begging that nothing should be finally decided until he could see his lordship at the Admiralty, when personal familiarity with military and naval tactics would render explanation easy.

Napoleon having his hands free to act either in Spain or Belgium, together with the proved unhealthiness of the island, led to its immediate evacuation, contrary to the admiral’s request, but a potent result of British efforts remained in the fact that no large naval contingent could be fitted out in the Scheldt until the docks at Flushing were repaired.

This fact, together with the destruction of French ships in Basque roads by Admiral Cochrane, went far to unite our hands and render operations in the Peninsula a main object.

Mr. C. D. Yonge has published a letter in the Liverpool correspondence, which tells the story of the events which led to the Canning and Castlereagh duel, and to the Foreign Secretary’s resignation.

The story as told by Lord Mulgrave in Mr. R. P.

Ward's life is confirmed, and all doubts are cleared up. Canning did wish to remove Lord Castlereagh from the War Office, and the Duke of Portland agreed to get rid of him. Several ministers, including Castle-reagh's special friend, Lord Camden, were apprized of this, but they appear to have temporised, and the matter was kept secret from Lord Castlereagh, until after the conclusion of the expedition to Holland the intrigue became known.

Without expressing any opinion as to whether duelling was ever justifiable at all, Lord Castlereagh's challenge must, at least, be admitted to have resulted from gross ill-usage. Nor is it possible to withhold blame from all concerned in the secrecy which had worked such dire mischief, even if the weak health of the Duke of Portland had for some time rendered his premiership a mere nullity.

Moreover, Canning's supremacy in debate had led him to underrate the talents of Lord Castlereagh, and he openly confessed his aspiration to the leading position in any Government which might succeed the Duke's, desiring, at the same time, that Lord Wellesley should enter the cabinet. Perceval, he, however, admitted, might become a rival.

There had for some time been differences between Canning and Castlereagh, inasmuch as the Foreign Secretary wished all our resources thrown into the Peninsula under Sir Arthur Wellesley, and had never approved the diversion in the north of Spain, which ended in Corunna, any more than he liked the attack on Holland.

The public scandal which ensued led to Canning's resignation and to an unpopularity in certain quarters from which he long suffered, but had the House of Commons of those days been governed simply by the exercise of eloquence, he might have carried all before him and have survived the storm which ensued. But the qualities possessed by Castlereagh had worked their silent way, and it was felt that he had been misunderstood.

Scattered through the two last published volumes of Lord Malmesbury's letters are various characteristic notices of Canning. An interesting picture is drawn of his demeanour at the Foreign Office at the time of the Treaty of Tilsit, by his secretary, Mr. Ross. The minister's industry is described as only equal to his power of despatching business with celerity. But then he is, we are told, often weary and in want of rest, betokening the delicacy of constitution which clung to this gifted individual during life.

Moreover, the reception by Canning of the news telling the complete success of Lords Gambier and Cathcart at Copenhagen is especially striking. What would have been the position of the minister announcing an unsuccessful attempt to seize the Danish fleet may be imagined.

The account given of the commotion and trouble amongst Canning's friends when Lord Castlereagh claimed satisfaction for the unjust conduct to which he had undoubtedly been subjected, is vivid to a degree. Canning's conduct on the occasion was perfect. Without uttering a complaint, he complied with the vicious custom of his times, and both fought and was wounded

in a duel with his rival.* But that he did so in connection with a dispute in which he himself was as utterly guiltless of deception as, from his frank and open nature, might be supposed, there can be no manner of doubt.

He did desire to remove Lord Castlereagh from the War Office, and understood that Lord Camden, as a private friend, was to apprise Lord Castlereagh of the fact.

That this had not been done according to agreement was surely no fault of Canning's, who, for a long time, had to bear the obloquy of what, unexplained, looked like treason to a colleague.

Lord Mulgrave has substantiated every word written in Lord Malmesbury's book on this matter, and as we have elsewhere stated, always averred Canning's innocence of unworthy or underhand conduct. At the same time it is clear that several in the cabinet made a mistake as regards Lord Castlereagh's ability.†

* This encounter took place close to the telegraph on Wimbledon Common.

† The fact that staggered those anxious to judge Mr. Canning's conduct fairly was the assertion that he believed Castlereagh to have known his fate and proximate expulsion from office for some time before the explosion took place in the cabinet. If so, how, says Mr. R. P. Ward, could Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh have remained in friendly deliberation over public business? The answer we believe to consist in the fact that for some time unfortunately the two statesmen had looked askance at one another. Mr. Canning doubtless mistook Lord Castlereagh's reservation towards him for resentment. At all events, the Foreign Secretary's word is to ourselves *conclusive*, even if it had not been seconded by

The account of a subsequent meeting of the two rivals in 1812 is likewise singularly interesting.

Canning feared that political arrangements might be discussed at the meeting which Castlereagh sought.* But when assured by Lord Liverpool that the object was personal he relented, and soon found that the generous Irish nobleman desired all the past to be forgotten. They heartily shook hands and parted friends. The *contretemps* is pleasing and creditable to the two great men, who soon forgot their differences in zeal for the public weal, and Canning's first Foreign Secretarieship, despite an unpropitious conclusion, remains indelibly connected with the Peninsula struggle and its ultimate effect on the war.

After Corunna his attitude of resolution determined many a waverer, whilst in Parliament he proclaimed his confidence in the struggle. The heroism of Saragossa had not been continuously maintained amongst the Spaniards. Reliance could not be placed on their combinations, and more than once jealousy of the

Lord Mulgrave's persistent statement to the same effect. In justice to the cabinet it should be noted that the intrigue against Lord Castlereagh's continuance in office was not known generally until a few hours before matters came to a crisis.

Canning, the Duke of Portland, and Lord Bathurst all appear to have underrated Lord Castlereagh, but his inherent high qualities possessed such an unexpected hold on the opinions and sympathies of his colleagues, that his dismissal threatened the dispersion of a cabinet which was not even informed of its leader's acquiescence in this most momentous change.

* Lord Malmesbury's *Letters*, vol. ii. p. 311.

English deliverers had marred the prospect ; otherwise the Spanish line-of-battle ships in Ferrol harbour would never have been suffered to fall into French hands.

But neither these facts nor Mr. Windham's accusation of bustling about and spending a great deal of money for no result, affected Canning's resolution.

Succeeding in getting Sir Arthur Wellesley re-appointed, he saw Talavera fought under the auspices of his chosen general. And afterwards, when, released from Germany, Napoleon sent Massena to drive the English out of Portugal and into the sea, he had the supreme satisfaction of seeing the British army safely ensconced on the Portuguese frontier, soon to retire behind the fortifications of Torres Vedras, which remain to this day a monument of their leader's genius. Such was ample reward to a British statesman even if destined to see a policy he had inaugurated brought to maturity by others.

Steadily did Canning support the efforts of his successor in the Foreign Office, and no factious word passed his lips while Lord Bathurst and Lord Wellesley were carrying out in detail the conception of his own mind.

We have previously given an opinion that Mr. Canning scarcely fills the position in history destined hereafter to belong to his name. This Foreign Secretaryship just narrated seems to possess features peculiar alone to the period in question. Notwithstanding the continued abrogation of Continental subsidies, the two strongest pieces of ready action recounted during English nineteenth-century history must be traced to the individual

decision and prompt resource of George Canning. The unveiling of the plot laid by France and Russia, and the iron grip on the Peninsula seized by England, were both the result of this minister's individual inspiration, and, despite all criticism and some shortcomings, presents to our memory the form of one acting and speaking much as Chatham had done before him. The younger Pitt and Lord Castlereagh were essentially ministers skilled in the intricacies of Government, and although each possessed the faculty of addressing himself to wider interests, they were *prima facie* great administrators, one being fired with a genius such as antiquity can find no model to eclipse, and the other clever and patient beyond measure, and therefore successful in most that he undertook. But they were only War Ministers because the times they lived in forced them to adopt that *rôle*. But Canning's whole official nature was that of the war-horse who scents the battle from afar.

Like Chatham, he cemented the decision he might be called on to make, by burning and noble thoughts, conveyed with all the force and grace that words would allow.

It is left for us to tell hereafter how, when peace blessed British soil, Canning was again and again its guardian, because, as he phrased it, "he did not shrink from war if forced upon him." Against wars of aggression or of mere expediency we shall find him an equally strong opponent.

But other names have taken precedence of Canning's during times when social questions have relegated to

history all reference to the reason why cheap bread became a political possibility, reform was not shelved, the treasury not drained beyond hope of present recovery, and this island not now slowly arising from disaster if not foreign dominion.

To no man is it more attributable that such conditions have not been existent during the careers of many now living than to Canning, who whilst he perpetuated the spirit of Pitt amongst the people, yet hesitated not to straightway hurl the might of England at those whose secret schemes were aimed at her destruction, or who hoped by quenching liberty all over the earth to isolate, pauperise, and crush her down.

Foreign affairs have for some time past forced themselves into what some amongst us think undue prominence. But such a time is surely that when, in the interests of peace and liberty, the memory of this first Foreign Secretaryship of Canning's should be kept alive in our midst. The shadow of foreign conspiracy even now—whilst these lines are written—may be hovering over the realm. We know but that yesterday a scheme of devastation and robbery was planned against our dominion by one to whom we had but to say, "Thus far and no farther," whereupon the traditional and long deliberated course of public action adopted by our secret enemy would straightway lead him to hold aloof. It is to say this with emphasis, and to repeat it if necessary, amidst preparations for defence not defiance, that we need a George Canning to arise amongst us. We will elect him as a leader when the light of his presence is seen, and trust to his teaching

for the transmission of ideas which alone can secure peace for England in times of gathering peril.

In Canning then, more particularly, do we see the type of an Englishman during the first part of the present century. He specially represents a steady determined watchfulness against aggressive territorial advance on our own part, and in guarding imperial interests with a statesman's eye. His due regard for the laws of nature and the rights of manhood was tempered with a stern determination to suffer no wrong to be devised against his country without measures of precaution—may be of defence, which might merge into action—being straightway adopted.

We have, then, surely reached a time in our history when justice may be rendered to him who, recognising the fact that the traditions of a former century were growing fainter, received for such prescient foresight the commendation of his countrymen.

It will, moreover, be our duty later in this volume to enter more fully into the circumstances which brought such statesmanship into action, but it must never be forgotten that to any honour then gained should be added that of having previously delivered our country from the peril of foreign conspiracy, and changed an impending struggle near our own shores into one waged across the seas, on behalf of treaty law, and in the sacred cause of constitutional freedom—such, moreover, as Mr. Croker has elegantly phrased it, Canning knew well how to mete out for the benefit of all.

That measured freedom is, moreover, inalienably

allied with the adoption of a foreign policy at once determined and peace-giving.

The proverbially tender plant, Liberty, has been descanted on by the greatest of all modern philosophers, John Stuart Mill, who places strength of government in the fore-front of all attempts to conserve its influence. How, then, can such safety possibly exist where the rights of a nation are infringed with impunity from without?

Moreover, in all possible conditions of society—shift and shuffle the cards as you may—there must exist a ruling class holding privileges, either by virtue of superior knowledge, wealth, or birth, but whose natural tendency being to care for their own interests, require a constitutional check upon their movements, such as Great Britain has accumulated through the experience of ages.

By no possible means can such liberties be more effectually guarded, or the mind of a nation become more elevated, and self become more completely merged in the commonweal, than by an adherence to the maxims Canning strove to put in practice and which characterised this his first great Foreign Secretaryship.

The key to his conduct and intention may be held to have been the example and career of Mr. Pitt, whose precepts of public polity were constantly kept in view. If moved therefrom at any time it had been by faults of temperament rather than of intention.

The lines which he wrote on his great master, and with which we desire to close this first record,

might not improperly have been inscribed to his own memory.

“ Shall not his name to Britain be dear
Whose example all nations with envy behold ?
The statesman unbiassed, unflinching from fear,
Uncorrupted by nature, unbiassed by gold,
Who, when terror and doubt through the universe spread,
Whilst rapine and fury their banners unfurled,
The hearths and the hopes of his country maintained,
One kingdom preserved 'midst the wreck of the world.”

—George Canning on Pitt.



LORD BATHURST.

"There is an honourable desire open to every man such as the acknowledgment of his services from his sovereign and country affords. Let no one underrate such reward by the chilling lessons of a selfish philosophy, which seeks not to animate the exertions of genius and heroism."—*Thanks of the House to Duke of Wellington, June 27th, 1814.*

SEPTEMBER 1809 TO DECEMBER 1809.



HE above-mentioned sentiments prove how thoroughly the speaker could arise to the level of a great occasion. We shall show that on ordinary subjects his oratory was of the simplest and most unadorned character, and how, even during the remarkable speech delivered by him in 1812 upon the Orders in Council, practical argument preponderated over more ambitious flights of eloquence such as head this chapter.

Sprung from a family settled in England since Saxon times, Lord Bathurst claimed descent from those who had served sovereign and country in almost uninterrupted succession.

The son of an eminent lawyer, who rose to be Lord

Chancellor of England, Lord Bathurst early acquired habits of business such as, linked with a taste for politics, attracted Mr. Pitt's attention.

The knowledge that Lord Bathurst was holding the seals of the Foreign Office until he could arrive in England, proved a source of great satisfaction to Lord Wellesley, who spoke of the future War Minister as his old friend, in whose judgment he reposed implicit confidence. The moment was one of anxiety for England.

Austria, tricked into a shameful and unnecessary peace, had relapsed into an almost hostile neutrality, such as unkind fortune fixed on her.

The Pope consequently, on his refusal to become an Imperial instrument, suffered imprisonment in France, whilst in Spain Lord Wellington, halting near Badajoz, remained on the defensive in face of a renewed irruption of Napoleon's trained legions, who, fresh from their Danubian triumphs, poured across the Pyrenees for the purpose of enforcing the Emperor's early resolve.

Although the interregnum came to be prolonged beyond the time that it had originally been expected, no leading question of foreign policy seems to have called for decision before the great Marquis returned from the Seville embassy.

One appeal to the British Foreign Office cannot pass without notice. It came from the unfortunate Tyrolese, who by the treaty of Schonbrun were assigned to the alien yoke of Bavaria.

Notwithstanding that the house of Austria succeeded in embuing mens minds with a conviction of its

tyrannical tendencies, the institutions and local government granted to these children of the mountain were such as to satisfy their undoubted aspirations for liberty.

On the occasion in question the Tyrolese found a leader in the gallant Hofer, whose memory dwells amongst these simple people as the Tell of that interesting district. Himself an innkeeper, Hofer nursed the flame of independence which was destined to be maintained, even if in the throes of the struggle the leader died a martyr to his country's cause.

Never could England's aid have been solicited when her own principles were plainer seen to be at stake, and may be said to have gone in manifest unison with her interests.

But all energies were by general consent to be concentrated on the Peninsula war. The navy of Great Britain could, moreover, exercise no influence on an exclusively inland struggle, whilst the conveyance of a money subsidy must have been attended with uncertainty, in consequence of the geographical isolation in which Napoleon's late success had placed the Tyrol.

It was under these circumstances that Lord Bathurst was constrained to return a sympathetic and unwilling refusal to the request of these undaunted mountaineers.

But even in Spain the crisis appeared to Englishmen to present an almost desperate aspect. There the National Junta, essaying to act independently of the British, had suffered complete defeat at Ocana,* whilst not even the prestige of Talavera (where the reputation

* November 1809.

of English soldiers, as established at Maida, received general acknowledgment) could for the moment stem the tide.

Under these circumstances it was natural that the Government should anxiously inquire of Lord Wellington what he held to be the ground of our hopes in maintaining Portugal and Lisbon.

The Duke's calm and resolute reply reached England when his gifted brother was about to become Foreign Secretary, and re-infused a much needed confidence into the nation.

Lord Wellington replied that he did not believe the French could, even by an immediate and combined military movement, drive him from Portugal, but that he felt confident of being able in any case to re-embark his army in safety even after defeat.

When it is taken into consideration under what adverse circumstances and amidst what gathering clouds this brave forecast was ventured on, admiration for the high qualities which inspired such confidence must of necessity animate the breast of every English reader.

But the Duke was about to reap the advantages of steady and unobtrusive support at home.

The merits of desk-work, performed by men such as Bathurst and Liverpool, does not become apparent until years after the events therein controlled have passed by, but it is now clear to every reader how ably and manfully the duties of office were performed. The historian of the Peninsula war,* who in the description of military

* Sir C. Napier.

manceuvres has not been equalled for clearness and accuracy, errs again and again when he ventures into the sea of politics. His information was not collected with equal knowledge of its value or judgment as to its selection. When in his preface to the *History of the Peninsula War*, Sir William Napier says that Wellington was supported by three inefficient administrations, he was pronouncing a judgment which history will never endorse.*

The despatches of Bathurst, Perceval, Castlereagh, Canning and Liverpool, are still open to the perusal of

* It must be evident to anyone of a reflective turn of mind that the assumed merit of the administrative arrangements, which Mr. Kinglake declares were organised under the war administrations of Dundas and Liverpool, are totally irreconcilable with the wholesale ministerial condemnation fulminated by Sir William Napier in his *History of the Peninsula War*. But an additional witness on behalf of Mr. Perceval's Government has lately appeared in the shape of the Right Hon. J. C. Herries' biographer —Mr. E. Herries tells us on page 29 of the first volume that his father (who was Commissary-in-Chief at the time) always emphatically denied the truth of the charge of neglect, so frequently made and insinuated in books, pamphlets, and newspapers, against the Government generally through the war, but most particularly under Mr. Perceval's administration. "I could tell a very different story," he said, "if I chose to speak. There is not the slightest ground for pretending that the Duke was not supported to the utmost."

After perusing several letters connected with the supplying his army with the needful clothing and commissariat, the great Duke speaks as follows in a letter to Mr. Herries:—

"I assure you that I am fully aware of Mr. Perceval's kindness, and, I must say, partiality towards me."

Mr. Herries' biographer may well say, "Compare this with Napier's attacks upon Perceval for his *imaginary*, and now, we may add, disproved, neglect of Wellington."

those who have time and inclination for the task. They prove that at no one time was there any desire to restrict Lord Wellington's operations, but to support them with men and money so far as the resources of the country would allow. It appears, however, certain that ministers were hardly judged in more than one quarter. Mr. Perceval's Government may never have been strong, but its leader took the same view of the financial aspect as did his successor at the Exchequer. A remarkable minute of Mr. Rose on this subject is conspicuous among the Bexley papers.*

Since the commencement of the war in 1798, the charges of army, navy, and ordnance, had increased from £13,448,000 to £44,720,000 in 1809. As Napoleon's intentions appeared to preclude hopes of peace, and the conflict must therefore be indefinitely prolonged it followed that ordinary means might fall short of the annual requirements.

The limits of taxation were believed by our financiers to have been reached in England, whilst the requirements exceeded all expectations. Under these circumstances there was danger of the theatre of war being transferred once more to our own coasts, unless a resolute attempt were made to keep expenses down.

So thoroughly, however, did Mr. Perceval and his

* Mr. G. Rose was one of Mr. Pitt's political friends, whose considerable talents were turned towards finance. He appears to have had the ear of the House of Commons, to whom he announced Pitt's dying exclamation, "Oh! my country." He was also an author of repute, publishing, amongst other works of a somewhat Tory complexion, a *Review of Mr. Fox's History of James II's Early Times*.

colleagues realise the fact that the independence of Great Britain depended on a sustained support being given to Lord Wellington in the Peninsula, that, in addition to providing him with all the troops he asked for, they brought the financial question prominently forward. When, therefore, Lord Bathurst, in 1812, succeeded at the War Office, he had before him the task of supplying the largest British army that had yet taken field in the Peninsula. He was slightly relieved in his task by specie getting a little less scarce in consequence of the opening of Baltic ports to England, a result which accompanied the war between Russia and France.

The British were at an enormous disadvantage as to the respective modes of waging war. They paid for everything with a regularity such as would have accompanied a camping-out at home.

The French, on the other hand, laid heavy contribution in money on parts of the country where it could be procured, and paid for provisions in places where coin of the realm was not to be obtained. A process resembling that of robbing Peter to pay Paul, for which the assurance of a like remission of taxation can scarcely have rendered the unhappy capitalists a satisfactory equivalent. A more certain means of driving capital out of the country could scarcely have been devised.

It appears that King Joseph's hold on Spain was never firm enough to secure regular payment of revenue, but the French Government thus avoided the stigma of living by simple requisition.*

* The above information is taken from Lord Bexley's *Correspondence with Individuals of Knowledge and Influence*.

The subject is here enlarged on because the value of business qualities such as Mr. Dundas, Lords Liverpool and Bathurst brought to the solution of a most difficult problem, will be thereby sooner seen and appreciated.

If the attempt is made to throw blame upon Lord Liverpool's Government, for not making permanent field appliances and war organisations devised on an emergency, surely the resource of those who devised such expedients should not pass unrecognised.

Lord Bathurst's services were evident in all the negotiations connected with a later period of the war.

As Colonial and War Secretary it fell to his part to arrange details concerning Napoleon's fate, and final detention at St. Helena.

His, therefore, was the duty to embody the cabinet decisions in plain unvarnished language. Want of sympathy with fallen greatness has been charged against him, but has no possible ground to stand on, other than the promptings of passing political feelings.

If the officials of England had gone out of their way to feed the very sentiment, a general prevalence of which might, at any moment, have deluged Europe in blood, they would have betrayed the nation they served.

The generous promptings of Lord Holland's kind heart and sympathetic imagination, might most honourably lead to expression of the interest he so notoriously felt in Napoleon. It would have been otherwise with the official world of England who had themselves knowledge of the blood spilt and treasure sunk in the

attainment of an object, the results of which should be sternly and carefully guarded.

The justification of Government is amply accomplished in the despatches and speeches of Lord Bathurst to Sir Hudson Lowe. If Napoleon was to be kept in custody at all, the measures taken were clearly those prompted by humanity.

Even after a more circumscribed amount of ground had been marked out for the imperial prisoner's recreation, there was space eight miles in circumference whereon he might ride or walk. As for the assertions repeated from time to time concerning the scarcity of food and wine allowed to the emperor's suite, they collapsed when inquired into, and that large-hearted man, the late Sir Robert Inglis, after full investigation, was of a decided opinion that no ground existed for any such asseverations.

The fact is, that the custody of so illustrious an individual for the prolonged period of six years was certain sooner or later to generate complaints. The hope expressed by Lord Liverpool, that at St. Helena the mighty conqueror would soon sink into oblivion, was neither destined to meet fulfilment nor does it appear to be in accordance with the unsurpassed faculty of discernment which characterised most of the Prime Minister's opinions.

So unrivalled had the great Frenchman's pre-eminence been in Europe, that the mental agonies suffered during his imprisonment were certain to find an echo far beyond the boundless space of ocean which separated St. Helena from the busy world.

Death would undoubtedly have proved the lighter penalty had it been inflicted, and the thoughtful reader rises with relief when the mournful story reaches its close.

Without entering into any undue disquisition on the moral influence of Napoleon's actions on the world, there may yet remain in the minds of many a regret that at Chatillon * he did not see fit to accept the allied propositions, and so give a Continental countenance to his dynastic sway.

That Europe resolved to take security for the non-infringement of her liberties seems to have proved the bar to such settlement, and finally estranged the sympathy of the world for a Government that elected war in preference to peace. No change of policy prompted by expediency could hope to remedy this fatal error, and although the struggle might be extended for a short season, the seeds of that expiation of St. Helena and its attendant miseries were alike rendered inevitable after the fatal refusal to make peace at Chatillon. The man must be bold who writes down the Napoleonic system as wholly bad, or the individual as having exercised no beneficent influence on his race or generation. On the other hand, certain facts stand out so cruel in their inception, and inhuman in their execution, that pity shrinks involuntarily and gives place to a desire for the fulfilment of that stern retributive justice which, indeed, had its full swing.

* See chapter ii. on Castlereagh.

The conducting to Cherbourg of the eleven noble Prussian youths* of Queen Louise's Regiment, who there worked in manacles and chains, and shortly after suffered death, is an instance of the worst kind of revenge—personal, alas ! in its barbarity ; the memory, moreover, of which has led to prolonged and bitter national revenge.

Other instances might be adduced of cruelties staining the memory of a name which must share with Cæsar, Hannibal, and Alexander the Great the title of Supreme Conqueror—the incarnate genius of war.

One would desire rather to let memory rest on the ever-ready desire to grant an armistice and follow it up by peace whenever circumstances admitted, which universally characterised Napoleon's conduct. He willingly ceased from inflicting pain, provided he could gain his own ends, and in this particular stands out in brilliant contrast to the victors in earlier periods of European history.

His prolonged reverie after the battle of Lutzen in 1813, when his beloved Duroc was killed, proves the possession of the gentler feelings of humanity, even if such natural instincts were constantly crushed out by baser and coarser motives.

So certainly, however, did the subjection of all men's ideas and hopes fall under the power of his tyrant will that the world can scarcely be held cruel for the fate they decreed their prisoner when vanquished.

* Alison's *Modern History of Europe*.

Lord Bathurst was but the instrument of the British Government in arranging details which threw upon him and his colleagues partisan obloquy as undeserved as it was doubtless not unexpected.

When a paper with the high character of the *Illustrated London News* allows an attack to be made on a political party in its columns, and gives publicity to palpable error under the colour of rendering justice to Napoleon's memory, it is time that the facts be given such prominence as opportunity affords. It was stated in the above paper on July 31st, 1880, that Napoleon was restricted to a single bottle of champagne between the suite and himself at dinner. Moreover, Sir Walter Scott's authority is quoted as if he had endorsed this mean allowance as a fact, and commented on it accordingly. Now, not one word in confirmation of this statement appears in Sir Walter Scott's life of Napoleon, where the treatment of the distinguished prisoner is fully descanted on and a conclusion arrived at totally antagonistic to that of the *Illustrated London News*.

* The extract in question runs as follows :—

"I have said, and I repeat, that the bitterest political and personal enemies of the first Napoleon—from William Pitt to Lord Bathurst—were the Tories. It was the Tories who sent him to Saint Helena, and slowly killed him there, and who had the inexpressible meanness to restrict the table allowance of champagne for himself and the gentlemen of his suite to a single bottle per diem : thus denying him, as the Tory Sir Walter Scott half-ironically, half-compassionately, observed, even the solace of intoxication."—*Illustrated London News*, July 31st, 1880, p. 99.

We have no desire to question the matter of fact as to what Sir Walter Scott may have said, although the point is *how and when* did

Lord Bathurst, moreover, in the House of Lords told Lord Holland officially that *two bottles* of high-class wine was allowed each individual at Napoleon's table, and that other and cheaper alcoholic beverages were in reserve.

The statement of the newspaper is, moreover, tinged with the bitterest party feeling, urging people to believe the Tory party and not the nation as responsible for Napoleon's captivity and unavoidable distress. But for the fact that even random statements gain credence when they issue from respectable quarters, this reply would not have found the place here that, in the interests of historical truth and justice, the author has felt bound to allot.

The writer in the *Illustrated London News* should know that when an allowance of £8,000 per annum was increased to £12,000 for the ex-emperor's establishment, there could of necessity have been no undue restriction.

The grievance lay in the unfortunate circumstances of the case.

The logical consequence of Lord Holland's philanthropic desires would have been the restoration of Europe's great captive to that life and liberty which it had been universally resolved to limit.

When the great ex-captain's health had begun to give

he make use of such language. But if the general conclusions derived at in his *History of Napoleon* go for anything, they clearly prove the expediency of Lord Bathurst's actions, and certainly give no colour to belief in mean restrictions as to food and drink having been resorted to by the British Government during Lord Bathurst's communications with Sir Hudson Lowe.

give way, the anxiety of the Prince Regent and his Government was set forth in a despatch of Lord Bathurst's, which displayed all the sympathy due to distressed and fallen greatness, desiring, moreover, that the existence of such sentiments should be made known to the sufferer. Medical help was to be sent for from the Cape, and every possible alleviation adopted consistent with acknowledged public duty.

Delicacy of feeling could go no further, nor could a repulsive but necessary duty have been more perfectly fulfilled. The more imperative then the acknowledgment of such services by Lord Bathurst's countrymen, and the indignant repudiation by them of anonymous attacks in a matter which had nothing to do with party, as England was alike carrying out the mandate issued by the citizens of liberty-loving Germany, as by their imperial and royal leaders.

The close of this great career is, indeed, one over which all can afford to ponder with regret, and yet acknowledge the measures taken as necessary.

The request that his heart might be taken to Marie Louise at Parma is touching and affecting in the extreme. Whatever may be averred to the contrary, there from the first existed a sentiment in his heart creditable alike to the man and husband.

He studied to make her original position pleasant to her in Paris, was never harsh or inconsiderate, and their meeting in Paris after the disastrous Russian campaign was one, as Alison tells us, of affection.

Sad is it, then, to think that considerations of policy should have kept man and wife apart at Elba, especially

when it is notorious that the Empress desired to rejoin her husband.

But the Austrian alliance with Imperial France was looked upon as a danger to European peace. This digression has, we are fully aware, led us to comment on events not chronologically in order, but as any notice of Lord Bathurst is manifestly incomplete without recital of these circumstances, our readers will understand the necessity which prompted such an anticipation.

So numerous and comprehensive as to the variety of subjects treated on are the official despatches of Lord Bathurst, that it is only possible to give a general idea of his merits at moderate length.

Although a former opposer of the slave trade abolition, he vied with other English officials in his determined attempts to eradicate the evil, when such task had been undertaken by the nation. As Colonial Secretary he had to strive against all the distrust and opposition which the measure engendered amongst West Indian colonists. Slave owners were still placed high in West Indian office, civil and legal, and the difficulty of even bettering the condition of the unemancipated slaves became almost overpowering.

Thanks, however, to resolute public opinion in England as to a corresponding sentiment amongst the colonists themselves, Lord Bathurst was enabled to adopt a tone which, coming from the responsible minister of the Crown, must have had great effect in hastening the final emancipation which had dragged so wearily. The British Government in 1825-26 had laid

down the principle that it was indispensable that there should be, both in form and in substance, equal administration of justice open alike to white and black.

Here was the difficulty, to remove which was the end desired.

Lord Bathurst wrote to the Governor of the Bahamas as follows :—

“ Since the superiority of rank and education which belongs to the white inhabitant is an aggravation of the offence committed by him when he infringes the law, there is an injustice in assigning to the aggravated offence the minor punishment.”

This may be recommended to the attention of those who, looking on Lord Bathurst as a Tory of Tories, might not expect such expressions to proceed from his pen. But they will learn that they are the victims of fallacy when seeking to fix opposition to the expressed national will on Lord Liverpool’s administration. The machine to which they had trusted to indicate that will might be antiquated, and its motive power unequal to the increasing duties demanded of it, but its voice was less unerring than it has suited the views of some opponents to confess. Its dictates were never neglected if even on occasions delay led to temporising, and thence to discontent.

On the occasion of the despatch of troops to Portugal in 1826, Lord Bathurst stated the Government policy to the Lords in an able and temperate manner, which received universal and well-deserved praise. Lord Liverpool was ill and absent from Parliament, whilst in

the Commons Mr. Canning seized the occasion for making one of his great speeches which, of itself, stamped the occasion. Lord Bathurst's statement, however, may even now be referred to with advantage by those who desire to see what the end and aims of Government were directed towards effecting.

Lord Bathurst's speaking had no pretension to the higher character of oratory, but was frequently effective from its very simplicity.

It has fallen to the party of which Lord Bathurst was a distinguished member to be frequently objurgated as the enemies of all change, and of being shown by the force of later events to have been once and for all in the wrong. Now, those so deciding are clearly railing against human nature, just as much as at the objects of their political condemnation.

The human understanding, as ordinarily constituted, is not formed to see clearly the two sides of any great question. Occasionally the statesman arises who solves the problem in his own mind, and proceeds to adapt its fulfilment to the institutions and traditions of the country he rules.

Such was Pitt, had he not been foiled in his schemes by the great and devastating war which, as we have shown, was forced upon him.

The followers who were afterwards appalled at sudden and considerable alterations in the British Constitution, were not the easier reconciled thereto by the fact that the changes were directly the results of popular commotion. Those best acquainted with England and her requirements knew that, as hope deferred makes the

heart sick, so had justice deferred been productive of demands beyond even the requirements of an exceptional occasion. The mistake of many careless political writers has been the attributing continued class restrictions and the tardy reform of Parliament entirely to individual prejudice and obstinacy, instead of to circumstances in which no other nation has ever found itself placed. We state this, moreover, without sympathy with the alarmists of politics who undoubtedly did retard change unduly. Pitt had clearly reprobated every symptom which at length led statesmen to concur in the great Reform Bill.

But it is notorious that he would originally never have allowed the internal requirements of the country to be neglected, had not threats of foreign interference and invasion forced him to defer his contemplated measures of relief.

Consequently the statesmen who looked with prejudice upon Catholic Emancipation and Parliamentary Reform were mostly those who learned their traditions under Pitt. The altered circumstances of the case accustomed them to a system logically out of all unison with their former leader's aspirations.

In fact, the traditions of office had been formed under a war system.

So thoroughly fired, however, was Lord Liverpool's Government with respect for Constitutional and even popular prejudice, that they deprecated the original formation of the United Service Club on the ground that an organisation of the kind in London might, in times of popular commotion, lead to a natural, if

unfounded, popular distrust.* The objection denoted a dread of standing armies and their possible unconstitutional aggressions, for which we, in the year 1880, can find no counterpart. Trace of Lord Bathurst's prescience and military knowledge is apparent in the ready acquiescence which he gave to the Dutch request for help in 1813. The people would rise, Lord Bathurst was told, if British succour came to their aid. The capture, moreover, of Antwerp was as much desired by England as it was dreaded by Napoleon, who, in the negotiations at Chatillon, made much of the detention of his beloved fortress.†

The appointment of Sir Thomas Graham, afterwards Lord Lynedoch, at first to the vice-command in the Peninsula, under the Duke, and afterwards to the leadership of the aforesaid expedition to Holland, were not only tributes to undoubted military talent, but evidence of the absence of all party spirit from the Government councils, who in the face of considerable dissenting opinion preferred a strong political opponent to high command, and finally raised him to the Peerage.

Moreover, the perspicuity with which Lord Bathurst saw the cause of failure in Holland, and specially at Bergem op Zoom, not to be attributed to military shortcoming, was shortly confirmed by no less an authority

* Lord Lynedoch's *Life*.

† Napoleon laid special value on its possession, and over and above pure military considerations, coveted the art galleries and admired the churches. The cathedral spire he longed to remove to Paris.

than Napoleon himself, who remarked to Colonel Campbell, the English Commissioner at Elba, when on their journey to that island, how admirably the attack on Bergem op Zoom had been conceived by that great soldier Sir Thomas Graham.

The despatches connected with these events, as they flow from the facile pen of Lord Bathurst, recount the whole story of the above-mentioned expedition, which failed in its immediate effects only because Bulow and his gallant Prussians were called into France for the purpose of reinforcing Blucher.

Both Kings George III. and IV. extended unlimited confidence to Lord Bathurst.

This fact is patent after reading the various histories and biographies connected with the time, the latest of which, Lord Ellenborough's *Diary*, abounds with characteristic incidents of Lord Bathurst's dread of change; telling us, moreover, how after the passing of Catholic Emancipation he believed twenty years would see the Roman Catholic religion established in Ireland. Again, it is recounted how the stout-hearted Tory Earl urged the Duke of Wellington to allow King William IV. to pay his visit to the City, notwithstanding the Reform riots, and not to countenance the surrender which yielding to popular clamour would certainly involve. It fell, moreover, to Lord Bathurst to take the news of his daughter Prince Charlotte's death to the then Prince Regent.

In so doing, excellent tact and delicate consideration for the father's feelings were blended in a remarkable manner.

The hearty shake of the hand, which even in the agony of his trouble the Prince accorded to his trusted servant, told how thoroughly these manifold services were appreciated.

As the Minister for War and the Colonies in 1816, Lord Bathurst's ministerial policy has been more directly impugned than any other members of Lord Liverpool's cabinet—the Premier excepted—when in the last published volume of Mr. Kinglake's *Crimean War* a charge of pandering to court influence at expense of the nation has been made against the Government who concluded the great war with France.

It is contended that ministers were responsible for not welding together the Horse Guards, Ordnance, and War Department into one office under Parliamentary supervision, which might at least secure, in any future war, the unity of action which experience had proved to be desirable.

Now, without stopping here to inquire whether that unity was ever legally attained, there are certain other considerations which strike the most casual observer.

Not only had the objects of war been attained after a desperate struggle, but, as Lord Bexley's correspondence shows, the exchequer was nearly exhausted.

Now the establishment of a new institution, formed for the purpose of waging future conflict, must, from the very nature of the case, have aroused powerful opposition, both popular and constitutional.

It may certainly be doubted whether the transference of the Horse Guards' supremacy, once and for all made in 1816, might not, in any moment of popular

excitement, have led to the removal from supreme military influence of the two individuals who were most fitted to exercise such sway.

Now the Duke of York, despite faults of character, possessed a faculty for military organisation which the history of his country discloses, and but for the success of his endeavours, seconded by those of Lord Bathurst, to keep regiments on the home establishment well up to the mark, Waterloo could never have been fought in 1815, when the flower of our line regiments was across the Atlantic.

A popular transfer of military authority would certainly have swept the King's brother out of office, whilst after-experience of popular feeling during moments of political excitement goes to show that the great Duke himself was not exempt from the changes of popular sentiment which led King James of Scotland to exclaim in the *Lady of the Lake* :—

“ Who o'er the crowd would wish to reign,
Fantastic, fickle, vile, and vain ? ”

There was then a principle at stake, which, at the moment to which Mr. Kinglake refers in blaming Lord Liverpool's Government, was universally regarded as a constitutional safeguard.

Mr. Wynne, a representative of the Grenville and therefore moderate Whig connection in Lord Liverpool's Government, subsequently resisted a proposal, of the nature which Mr. Kinglake would have desired to see adopted at the hazard of existing military equilibrium
“ The House of Commons,” said Mr. Wynne in reply to

Mr. Hume, "by dictating to the Crown whom it should or should not employ, would arrogate to itself the management of the army, than which nothing could be more dangerous to the Constitution."

Thus we see that in the political constitution of the country in 1816, such immediate change would have been impossible, inasmuch as the more Liberal official elements repudiated it eight years later.

But in 1816 three leading Englishmen came forward to preach peace and reduction of military establishments.

In the face of the protests set forth by Lords Lansdowne, Grenville, and Wellesley, what Government would dare to enter on a course of legislation which at the outset would naturally trench on the English dread, then deeply prevalent, of the unconstitutional elements believed to surround exclusively military institutions ?

The more immediate guarantee for national safety was clearly present whilst the Duke of York organised and Wellington watched over the well-being of England's land forces. These considerations involve no denial of Mr. Kinglake's hypothesis, nor is it desired for one moment to doubt that the unity of principle gained for our war administration during the Crimean encounter was in accordance with the march of intellectual progress and reform, and at the same time productive of every advantage which compact organisation, consummated by general concurrence, must confer.

On the other hand it should not be forgotten that those best acquainted with the British army, its needs

and requirements, are constantly found to declare that the pendulum has swung too far in the popular direction, either for the maintenance of discipline, due *esprit de corps*, or of that regimental enthusiasm which Mr. Kinglake so justly confides in.

The above thoughts appear to the writer naturally to flow from the consideration of a painstaking career which, at the very moment of all its aims and desires reaching consummation, is arraigned for Lord Bathurst's non-fulfilment of conditions which naturally pertain to a later period and more recent order of things.

On the principle, apparently, that any stick is good enough to beat a dog with, Mr. Kinglake's vials of wrath are straightway poured out upon the devoted head of George IV. He is the personal king who, for selfish reasons, retains his privileges—privileges, let the reader mark, that for the whole of the succeeding reign and for twenty years of the next never met question from the most uncompromising adherents of popular will.

If Lord Liverpool's Government, and the so-called personal ruler, have been thus odiously gibbeted for the sustentation of a false principle, why should not the blame be equally shared by officials taking their mandate from the new rule, and owing allegiance to a more modern political condition, when, as we know, at least twenty years were allowed to elapse without the whisper or suggestion of a change?

After the Reform Bill the retention of Crown privilege in army affairs is not surely to be traced to the selfishness of the personal sovereign who never had alteration suggested by his ministers. Without attempting to deny

the benefit of the change which Mr. Kinglake contends should have been effected in 1816, the utter impossibility of entering on a novel constitutional reform at the close of an exhausting, and withal successful war, must occur to every mind familiar with the minutiae of English public life.

The biographer of Lord Bathurst—that painstaking director of our war system during the greatest crisis of modern English history—should ask for his hero the just judgment of posterity, such as Mr. Kinglake, in chivalrous and convincing language, has claimed and won for Lord Raglan in the Crimea.

To gain anything approaching an adequate conception of Earl Bathurst's industry, one has but to search through the pages of the *Wellington Despatches*. There in the simplest and most lucid form will be found expressed, in short space, all that the writer's colleagues desired. Financial details are disposed of, questions of high policy descanted on, whilst the whole series of official letters breathe a high spirit of confidence in English resources, and the future of her great Commander, which, if not prompted by absolute genius, are clearly the fruit of an enthusiasm to which it is near of kin.

Not the least merit in Lord Bathurst's war administration consists in the effective reserves, gathered in haste and despatched to Belgium after Napoleon left Elba.*

The English minister could rely on no conscription.

* The remarkable administrative skill possessed by H.R.H. the Duke of York should not pass unnoticed in any history of the time. To his co-operation Lord Bathurst's success was, no doubt, greatly due.

His choicest troops were across the Atlantic, and unable to reach home in time.

And yet an efficient British force was gathered together in a few weeks and participated in the greatest military success that ever fell to our share.

Again, when the army of occupation was at Paris, Lord Bathurst's watchful and business-like eye was directed towards strengthening the Duke against any eventuality, and it is not too much to say that, but for men of the War Secretary's type, and for the hard work they performed in the cabinet, England could never have contributed her share towards the liberation of Europe.

Lord Bathurst, moreover, had in his composition a full appreciation of the prestige of Old England. After the second Treaty of Paris was negotiated, he took care to claim the restitution of all British trophies, and claimed one as far back as the battle of Fontenoy.

To the last he was a stout Tory, and stood by the Duke of Wellington until his resignation after the final settlement of the Catholic Question. His desertion of Mr. Canning at the crucial moment was due more to his fidelity to the Great Duke than to any direct breach between himself and the new Prime Minister. But there doubtless existed increasing differences of opinion between the two former colleagues.

The Foreign Secretaryship of Lord Bathurst is but a chance incident in a long official career, which has given an opportunity for the inclusion of a worthy name amongst those of others whose acts help to fill up the pages of this volume.

The friend of each Sovereign under whom he served,

the confidant of the Duke of Wellington, Lords Liverpool, Castlereagh, and, indeed, of every leading individual whose efforts were aimed at sustaining the interests and liberties of Britain, Lord Bathurst's character cannot but stand out in bold relief by the side of many whose prominent positions have handed their names down to a grateful posterity. Those most intimately associated with the Earl in public bear witness to his kindness of heart, whilst a gentle nature was the charm of an appreciative home circle.*

We have previously alluded to Lord Bathurst's remarkable speech on the Orders in Council made in 1812. Lord Holland remarked on that occasion that it was the best statement on the subject he had heard made by an opponent, whilst Lord Mulgrave, moreover, rejoiced in its powerful refutation of Lord Grenville's arguments against the deceit and fraud which, it was not unreasonably urged, the issue of trading licenses involved.

Mr. Greville in his memoirs speaks from time to time of Lord Bathurst. As his private secretary, although differing from him in politics, the opinion formed possesses great value.

We hear of him as a very amiable man with a good understanding, a High Churchman, and a Tory, but a cool politician; a bad speaker, a good writer, greatly averse to changes, but unwillingly acquiescing in many.

* In 1789 Lord Bathurst married a daughter of Lord George Lennox. The two eldest sons by this marriage were consecutively Earl Bathursts, whilst the third son left an heir in the person of the present Earl, who succeeded to the title at his uncle's death in 1879.

To Mr. Greville himself Lord Bathurst appears to have been too indulgent, inasmuch as he allowed him time for employment of his tastes. That, like many other young men of eighteen, Mr. Greville did not early incline towards literature and employment, is surely not to be charged at the door of a hard-worked official such as Lord Bathurst was during the major part of his career.

Mr. Greville, however, seems to have expected something more of his contact with the minister than he gained thereby. Doubting if his master's abilities were absolutely brilliant, he was inclined to rate them higher than the world has generally done.*

In this opinion he was holding a similar view to that of Mr. G. Rose, the financier, and able Member of Parliament, who considered Bathurst's talents to be the most considerable of those competitors for Premiership honours who disputed for pre-eminence with Mr. Perceval.

Mr. Greville relates how, as a friend and devoted adherent of Pitt, and a regular Tory of the old school, Lord Bathurst felt that evil days had come upon him in his old age. Dying before the fortunes of his party were resuscitated under Sir Robert Peel, Lord Bathurst could not reconcile his views as being compatible with the new Conservative creed.

Without for one moment deprecating the changes which were doubtless unavoidable, it is yet possible for the strongest Liberal to feel sympathy for men of the

* *Greville Memoirs*, vol. iii. p. 116.

olden times, like Lord Bathurst, who had accomplished so much themselves, and seen such extraordinary events take place under the former dispensation, that they looked coldly and doubtingly upon measures which at the time we write of were still on trial.

Lord Bathurst passed the last few years of his life in private, where his gentle nature has left memories destined to be handed down in unison with a public character distinguished, as Lord Malmesbury tells us, for acuteness, sensibility, and uprightness.

Mr. Greville's asseveration to the effect that want of sympathy with fallen greatness, as evidenced in his despatches to Sir Hudson Lowe, resulted from a defect in Lord Bathurst's composition, is not borne out by the personal preference which Mr. Pitt accorded to Lord Bathurst equally with Wilberforce and Mulgrave.*

* The following expressions in a correspondence between Lord Mulgrave and Bathurst in 1818 at once testify the tie between the two men which intimacy with Pitt had formed, and presents the character of Lord Bathurst in its true aspect. The occasion is Lord Mulgrave's resignation of the Ordnance.

Lord Bathurst says :—

“ We are two of the oldest of Mr. Pitt's friends now belonging to the Cabinet, and when I recollect the time which we passed with him at Bath, when we were all out of office, I cannot bring myself to allow your resignation to pass by without lamenting, on the one hand, that your health should have rendered the measure advisable, and without, on the other, expressing sincere delight in finding that you have consented not to withdraw from us altogether.”

To this warm and affectionate expression of feeling Lord Mulgrave replied :—

“ Few circumstances in my life have given me more satisfaction

Sympathy could scarcely exist between the mind of Pitt and a really commonplace individual.

Towards the close of his life Lord Bathurst was a welcome visitor wherever (amongst the extensive range of his acquaintance) he could be prevailed on to come.

There are those living whilst these lines are penned who remember the pleasure and amusement which the Earl was wont to diffuse amongst those around him. One of the last who clung to the pigtail, he preserved therewith all the dignity belonging to a gentleman of the old school, and with it a humour all his own.

Beloved, respected, and destined to live in history, he died in July 1834, at the age of seventy-nine.

than the uniform friendship which I have experienced from you. . . . It is no small addition to that satisfaction that it connects itself with the remembrance of the admiration and affection with which we both estimated all the qualities of the heart and understanding which endeared Mr. Pitt to those who had the happiness of enjoying his society and regard."

END OF VOL. I.

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